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Abstract 
 
Although mutual housing is not widespread in the UK, it does offer an important potential way 
of delivering housing in the context of the serious housing challenges faced today. The thesis 
looks at how mutual housing groups have overcome problem of collective action through self-
governance by using formal and informal institutions used by mutual housing groups. The case 
studies used are based in London and are described by developing a typology of a range of mutual 
housing types from housing co-operatives, including short-life and long-life, fully mutual groups, 
through to co-housing and Community Land Trusts.  
  
Using Ostrom's work on governing the commons, a theoretical framework is developed to 
understand the governance practices within mutual housing groups. The thesis uses Ostrom’s 
institutional approach to understand mutual housing as a form of commons, and their governance 
practices as analogous to forms of commoning. The empirical chapters build on the interview 
material and cover the experiences of the mutual housing groups in accessing land, finance, their 
micro-practices of governance and other aspects of mutualism considered important in their 
experiences. The work offers a theoretical and empirical contribution to the field of the housing, 
collective action and governance institutions, as applied to mutual housing in London. 
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Prologue 
 
In a large portakabin in south London, a monthly housing co-operative meeting was taking place. 
On the walls were posters from a recent workshop on setting up a new mutual housing group. 
Scattered around the room were sofas, musical instruments, a small heater around which we 
huddled, and other furniture. Gathered were representatives of nine shared houses, along with 
the chair, secretary, vice-chair, finance officer and external housing manager. An update was given 
on the new bike shed, also being used as a food bank, and information provided on the new eco-
boilers, as two members had been sent for training in servicing them. Other items on the agenda 
included rent arrears, the next social being held in a month’s time, a local campaign highlighting 
the housing problem in the area, and a summary of a meeting of south London housing co-
operatives to discuss the sharing of maintenance services.  
 
Approving the annual budget was the main item on the agenda that evening, and a long discussion 
was held about whether to keep rents at the same level next year, considering the changing 
government policy on rental levels and also considering the rising reserves due to falling mortgage 
repayments. It was an ordinary meeting, but it was interesting to observe that this was how people 
were creating their living environment. It was collective governance in action: the group managing 
their own housing, creating an atmosphere where issues could be discussed – from the practical, 
daily running of the homes to issues external to the co-operative. It was an illustrative moment 
that summed up the group’s 30 plus years of experience as an experiment of living together. 
 
The issue of “mutual housing” had also been a key topic of discussion at a meeting where I had 
first met a member of that housing co-operative, in a very different setting. In a wood panelled 
committee room in the Houses of Parliament that smelled faintly of cabbages, at a meeting chaired 
by the late Michael Meacher MP, to discuss “Reclaiming the commons: Why, what and how?” 
Anarchists and parliamentarians, including housing activists, members of co-operatives, Ostrom 
scholars, civil servants, and Community Land Trust organisers were there.  
 
The discussion centred on how collectively managed commons can be better governed. The 
variety of forms of activism and policy-making around land use management as a commons was 
explored. Examples ranged, in a typical Ostromian way, from the proposals for a Great Lakes 
commons management scheme across the US and Canadian borders, to a project for a London-
wide national park, to vivid accounts from Grow Heathrow activists on the evolution of a small 
protest camp into a larger project for the community. The meeting was an example of the various 
interests and institutions articulating similar concerns around land-use, management and control, 
ranging from housing development to environmental management.  
 
xiv 
 
The research in this thesis focusses on mutual housing and is an empirical study that uses collective 
governance theory to frame and understand institutions of governance within mutual housing 
groups in London. The research stems from an interest in understanding the collective governance 
involved in community-led approaches to meeting housing needs. This includes the theoretical 
and practical dilemmas of a commons approach to housing, in situations where co-operation and 
mutualism are developed internally to the group as institutions for governance.  
 
The two portraits of the different meetings offer a stark contrast in the ways and spaces in which 
the governance of mutual housing is being discussed and articulated today. These are some of the 
spaces for the crafting of institutions for collective governance – from small co-operative housing 
meetings to the committee rooms of highest levels of government in the land. Each are marked 
by the contradictions of history and contemporary political and economic forces, both a source 
of inspiration and frustration for the research, influenced as it is by these utopian desires as well 
as a more pragmatic sense, one that is marked with urgency and disillusionment in contemporary 
practices and solutions. Concentrating on mutual housing in London was a lens through which 
to look at the challenges and hopes that are embodied through these experiments in living together 
and the difficulties of collective governance.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Seek and learn to recognise who and what, in the midst of the inferno, 
is not inferno, then make them endure, give them space. 
 (Calvino, 1974, p.165) 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Most people agree that London is faced with serious housing challenges. Mutual housing, despite 
being a small sector, can provide some potential answers in terms of provision. However, there 
are difficulties in understanding how mutual housing groups have succeeded in the past and can 
succeed in the future. In part, the issue is one of access to land and finance, but it is also a deeper 
question of how groups organise themselves to develop and manage property in a mutual way. 
As groups, they need to be able to craft their own governance institutions. Therefore, the central 
problem is of how mutual housing groups develop their own forms of collective self-governance. 
This thesis will examine contemporary models of mutual housing by focussing on cases in 
London, which has the most intense dynamics around housing prices and land pressures in the 
UK but also for its breadth of London experiences in mutual housing. The aim will be to 
understand how mutual housing groups have overcome the problem of collective action through 
self-governance. This is achieved by looking at how the groups are governed, what governance 
institutions have been crafted by these housing groups, how they have evolved, and what 
constraints and challenges they face.  
 
There are different possible frames of analysis to understand the governance of contemporary 
mutual housing. There is the broader structural context of the political economy of housing 
provision within which mutual housing exists (Bowie, 2010; Dorling, 2015; Edwards, 2015; Ball, 
2010). Viewed through a more sociological lens, it is clear that people’s experiences and 
expectations around housing in the UK have changed radically during the post-war period. The 
cultural-material dimension of people’s lives has changed due to tenure distribution patterns, the 
changing nature of home-ownership, the changing role of domestic labour associated with 
housing, and changes in household composition. These socio-cultural dynamics have also affected 
how housing alternatives are viewed and how people have organised themselves to address their 
housing conditions.  
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The challenge of mutual housing is one of collective action around the management and control 
of housing. A theory of collective action could be a starting point to develop a theoretical 
framework to look at mutual housing (see Poteete et al. 2010). There are macro and structural 
dynamics, which set out the context of mutual housing. There are the more micro-social practices 
and consumption demands. These, in collective action terms, are the micro-situations that 
impinge on individuals and groups in a collective-action dilemma and understanding these 
governance micro-practices (Healey 2012) will be useful to see how mutual housing groups 
overcome the problem of collective action through self-governance.  
 
This chapter discusses first the historical and thematic topics that have helped define mutual 
housing as a housing alternative, including the rise of co-operativism in the nineteenth century, 
associated utopian or socialist theory in urban planning. The chapter also touches on the more 
abstract ideas of prefigurative practices and development of diverse economies, autogestión or self-
management, and how these can be applied to housing. An outline is presented of the research, 
together with the research questions and objectives. The chapter concludes with the overall 
structure of the thesis.  
 
 
1.2 Mutual housing as a housing alternative 
 
The housing question (Engels, 1979) has returned to loom large in urban planning debates 
(Larsen, Hansen, MacLeod and Slater, 2016), but there is little consensus around the answers. 
Housing played a particularly crucial role in the economic crisis of 2008 and has now turned into 
a crisis of its own due to its increasing unaffordability, exacerbated by such longer-term trends as 
the reconfiguration of the rental sector, the restructuring of social housing, and the use of housing 
as a financial asset (Whitehead and Williams, 2011; Edwards, 2015). The UK-wide dynamics are 
strongest in London and the South East due to population pressures, the re-commodification of 
social housing, as well as the high levels of international speculative investment, all fuelling the 
rise in house prices (Edwards, 2011, 2015), hence the focus here on London cases.  
 
Numerous campaigns have emerged in response to the lack of affordable housing and sweeping 
changes to the housing sector (Watt and Minton, 2016). The most contestatory housing 
movements have involved people resisting evictions from social housing (Plessis, 2005; Douglas 
and Parkes, 2016), renters calling for fairer rents (Walker and Jeraj, 2016), and a rise of cross-
tenure alliances, through a series of protests (Lees, London Tenant Federation, Just Space and 
Southwark Notes Archive Group, 2014; Humphry, 2016; Watt and Minton, 2016). Current 
government and mainstream responses to this conjuncture emphasise market approaches, or 
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social housing provided by the public sector or housing associations. Therefore, mutual housing 
is an alternative to these two main approaches.  
 
There is no shortage of policy analysis and proposed solutions to tackling the housing situation. 
Some have argued for the need to build more, whether through planning deregulation, by 
increasing access to credit, changing financial incentives to avoid land-banking or through land 
reforms (Edwards, 2015; Bowie, 2010; Stephens and Whitehead, 2014). Calls for new forms of 
regulation, for example, the introduction of a land value tax (Mirrlees et al., 2011; Wightman, 
2013) or rent control policies (Walker and Jeraj, 2016) could rebalance the way in which land for 
building or existing property is made available for additional housing. Still another approach 
would be to encourage the alternative to market or social housing forms, based on a different 
relation between the value of the land, the housing built on it, and the group of owners or housing 
users (Large, 2010; Hill, 2015). 
  
The term ‘alternative housing’ refers to a spectrum of different housing forms with some being 
more widespread than others. The provision of alternative housing can differ from dominant 
housing models and consists of a range of material and technological innovations that improve 
the quality, form and environmental gains of housing as a product (Fernandez, 2014; Williams, 
2012). It can also consist of a range of models that are social alternatives, aiming to address “how 
diverse social needs can be met, including the needs of lower-income households and the 
provision of affordable housing” (Rydin, 2013, p.115). They include co-operative, community-
driven, participatory, or self-managed housing, and can involve different property arrangements, 
including shared tenure, or the sharing of generated value, accompanied by governance practices 
that are created by the groups to manage themselves – as a form of collective action (Rowlands, 
2010; Gulliver, Handy and Morris, 2013; Jarvis, 2015a). This wide set of social alternatives for the 
provision of housing can be broadly labelled ‘mutual housing’.  
 
The term mutual housing comes from the idea of “mutualism” – originally a biological term used 
to describe the way in which species, including humans, create relationships of mutual aid, “a 
tendency so deeply interwoven with all the past evolution of the human race, that it has been 
maintained by mankind up to the present time, notwithstanding all vicissitudes of history” 
(Kropotkin, 2009, p.136). Nineteenth-century social thinkers, such as Fourier and Kropotkin, 
elaborated the concept of mutualism as they were interested in how the control and ownership of 
the means of production could be radically changed through the creation of institutions to share 
benefits in a collective way. Colin Ward, the anarchist planner, in his pluralistic description of the 
way in which societies solve problems, included what he called “techniques of mutuality”, 
encompassing mutual aid and co-operative self-help (Bradshaw, Ward, Ward and Worpole, 2013; 
Ward, 1990, 1973). Large points out how mutualism is also part of that “historical movement to 
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reclaim land as a commons and for the community democratically to control the bundle of rights 
available in it” (2010, p.194). Therefore, mutualism can be understood as a form of collective 
action where resources are pooled, and the resulting benefits are shared. This can include 
resources such as housing (Ward, 2002, 1990, 1982; Turner, 1982; Gulliver, Handy and Morris, 
2013) as well as land (Large, 2010; Ward, 2002; Woodin, Crook and Carpentier, 2010; Wyler, 
2007).  
 
In reviewing the literature on mutual housing, some strands emerge (Tummers, 2015; Vestbro, 
2000). First, within the mutual housing sector there are a burgeoning number of guides and 
advocacy papers that help support people and institutions to operate (Gulliver, Handy and Morris, 
2013; Rowlands, 2010, 2009; Woodin, Crook and Carpentier, 2010). This ‘grey’ literature generally 
is used as advocacy and information tools for others to learn from. As such, the authors tend to 
adopt a normative, even hagiographic approach, in which mutual housing is considered beneficial 
to both individuals and their community.  
 
Secondly, there is much work dealing with the architecture and design of mutual housing: the 
physical layout of the housing at different scales ranging from the individual home to the 
neighbourhood, along with the collaborative practices involved in the design and building stages 
of mutual housing forms ((McCamant and Durrett, 2011; McCamant, Durrett, Hertzman and 
Moore, 1994; Hansen and Hanson, 1996; Marcus, 2000; Williams, 2005a). Thirdly, there is a body 
of literature that reflects on the social forms involved in mutual housing. These include changes 
in lifestyle and offer new theorisations concerning the role of gender (Vestbro and Horelli, 2012; 
Pickerill, 2014), the family (Jarvis, 2011), or the elderly (Brenton, 1998; Choi, 2004; Brenton, 2013; 
Labit, 2015; Scanlon and Arrigoitia, 2015). 
 
Another topic in the literature deals with some of the broader institutional contexts of mutual 
housing, and has been focussed on issues of land, finance and the legal frameworks related to 
shared forms of property. For example, the new planning legislation of the Localism Act 2011 
now includes neighbourhood planning and such new rights as the Right to Bid, Right to Build and 
Right to Transfer, which can potentially have an important role to play in developing design and 
management at a neighbourhood scale (Field and Layard, 2017; Fromm, 2012). There are also 
new legal tools which can be used by community groups seeking to set up mutual housing 
schemes, and which have to be understood by financial institutions when mutual housing groups 
seek financial support (Tummers, 2015, pp.5–9). Another important legality is that of tenure 
arrangements. In a recent report on collective and communal forms of tenure from around the 
world, the categories used included “collective or communal ownership, including co-operative 
(where ownership is vested in the co-operative or group of which residents are co-owners); 
Community Land Trusts (a non-profit organization develops and stewards affordable housing on 
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behalf of a community); and customary ownership or use” (Rolnick, 2012, p.7). Mutual housing 
encompasses these diverse tenure categories of co-operative, collective, and communal 
ownership.  
 
Housing scholars and practitioners have begun looking at the governance institutions that have 
developed to manage mutual housing (Somerville, 2002; Cornforth, 2004; Rowlands, 2009; Moore 
and Mullins, 2013; Moore and McKee, 2012; Lambert, 2012a; Lang and Mullins, 2014; Jarvis, 
2015b). The rationale for the increased focus on the governance institutions of mutual housing 
covers four main topics of concern, which are motivations for this research. These include how 
mutual housing affects the concepts of property; changing economic practices for cheaper 
housing; and deepening forms of democracy and participation; and the formation of community. 
 
Mutual housing can be seen as a hybrid property form, neither fully public nor private, but a third, 
more collective form of ownership, which is less understood. Even this separation into clear 
categories of ownership (i.e. public, private, third/civil society sector) can seem too blunt when 
property rights can be layered, and a multiplicity of users can differ in their legal status from the 
owners. It is worth trying to understand how this third category of property can be governed. In 
some cases, it has been associated with the building of a ‘commons’, especially an urban commons 
(Kirwan, Dawney and Brigstocke, 2015; Bresnihan and Byrne, 2015; Borch and Kornberger, 2015; 
Stavrides, 2016; Chatterton, 2016). 
  
One result of this hybridisation of property forms is that there can be a de-coupling of asset value 
from land value through mutual housing schemes, which can also be a way to create more 
affordable long-term housing solutions. Because of de-coupling, mutual models can be a way of 
providing cheaper housing as well as more stable forms of tenure than private rental. Land value 
uplift can be captured and distributed in different ways, for example, sharing it locally with 
particular groups or communities (Droste, 2015; Moore, 2014; Chatterton, 2014; Engelsman, 
Rowe and Southern, 2016). Thus, mutual housing may challenge the commodification of housing 
and can be a way of supporting potentially different economic practices, as models that are part 
of a more diverse and prefigurative economic strategy (Gibson-Graham, 2008, 2003), and hence 
governance institutions.  
 
Regarding participation, it can be empowering to involve people in the provision of their own 
housing and therefore in producing their own environments, more than the carefully 
circumscribed regeneration initiatives of the 1990s (Atkinson, 1999; Colenutt and Cutten, 1994; 
Perrons and Skyers, 2003) through to the Neighbourhood Planning initiatives of the 2010s. 
Collective and democratic control of housing involves collective decision-making (Cornforth 
2004) that can lead to the increase of collective governance (Rosenberg, 2011; Bliss, 2009). 
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However, the governance of mutual housing remains under-researched, and this includes the 
collective practices by residents to participate and make decisions (Moore and Mullins, 2013; 
Lambert, 2012a). 
 
The role of the community is key when considering the governance of mutual housing. What can 
be created is a ‘gated community’ (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Ruiu, 2014; Le Goix and Webster, 
2008; Lee and Webster, 2006). The collective group involved, by definition, must exclude other 
groups (Joseph 2002), hence a ‘communitarian conundrum’ is displayed by most mutual housing 
projects including, most starkly, within co-housing (Chiodelli, 2010; Chiodelli and Baglione, 2014; 
Ruiu, 2014). The long-term “risk of a degeneration of co-housing the gated type is linked with a 
complete transformation of the grass-roots model (typical of co-housing) to the top-down 
speculative scheme (typical of gated communities)” (Ruiu, 2014, p.316). This is also echoed in the 
experiences of older housing co-operatives, where individuals have, in effect, been able to “carpet-
bag” the equity of the shared property (O’Driscoll and Muller, 2014). The result is that a process 
of enclosure is acted out spatially, with an impact on the community and with broader 
repercussions and repetitions across the urban context (Blomley, 2008; Hodkinson, 2012; Jeffrey, 
McFarlane, & Vasudevan, 2012; Lee & Webster, 2006). The extent to which this tension between 
enclosure and common-ness occurs is defined by each experience but is also related to the way 
forms of governance institutions evolve within each mutual housing group.  
 
In summary, these are topics of concern that serve as starting points and motivations to examine 
the governance institutions of mutual housing. While studies of contemporary housing have 
developed analyses of both the structural conditions that cause housing shortages and their socio-
material outcomes, this research is interested in investigating some of the solutions that have 
emerged, specifically in the form of mutual housing and their governance institutions.  
 
The empirical contribution of the research emerges from using governance institutions as a way 
of understanding the challenges and barriers to the set up and running of mutual housing. 
Furthermore, the theoretical contribution will be to see how the governance of mutual housing, 
perceived as a collective action problem (Bengtsson, 1998, 2000), can be understood through the 
institutions that people form (Ostrom, 1986, 1990, 2005). These are internal to the group, as 
micro-practices of governance, as well as in relation to their external context. The next section 
discusses the historical strands that are important to consider (further developed in Chapter 2) 
and outlines the theoretical framework used in this thesis (explored in greater depth in Chapter 
3).  
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1.3 Background on mutual housing governance  
 
Although the thesis examines contemporary models of mutual housing, these have emerged from 
historical-material trends that are both socio-cultural (i.e. related to consumption and lifestyle 
choices and aspirations) and economic-structural (i.e. determined by structural economic forces). 
These historical trends give a sense of the various waves or movements which stimulated mutual 
housing development. From examining these historical-material trends, one can induce and 
confirm a set of idealised institutional rules and norms, which can be then used to analyse the 
empirical data. 
 
One of the first historical strands is the co-operative movement, which emerged from mutual aid 
societies of the nineteenth century, with workers taking control of their own forms of 
consumption through the establishment of local grocer shops, forming the early credit unions and 
building societies (Holyoake, 1867, 1908; Hird, 1996). This movement then extended to housing 
co-operatives and co-partnership housing models (Birchall, 1988; Hands, 1975; Rowlands, 2009).  
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Garden City Movement, initiated by Ebenezer 
Howard, also had an important foundational idea of community control (Osborn 1950; Hall & 
Ward 1998; Howard 1965), through the “permanent ownership and control of the entire urban 
tract by the municipality (and) the use of the unearned increment of land value for the purpose of 
benefitting the community” (Batchelor, 1969, p.185). Drawing on such utopian thinkers as 
Bellamy, Morris, Kropotkin, and Spence (Clark, 2003), the proposals included the co-operative 
ownership of land (Holyoake 1867, 1893; Somerville 2007; Watkins and Carbery 1986).  
 
Therefore, the common thread connecting the co-operative housing movement and the Garden 
City movement in its early days was the formation of new institutions of mutualism alongside the 
provision of housing – institutions that captured and shared the value from the land and that 
created more direct control by residents or dwellers. The research in this thesis develops a 
framework to analyse these conditions of collective governance in the ways they are unique to 
mutual housing. 
 
One approach to understanding the institutions of governance can be through normative 
frameworks such as the Co-operative Principles as established by the Rochdale Pioneers 
(Holyoake, 1867, 1893; Fairbairn, 1994; Somerville, 2007; Watkins and Carbery, 1986). The 
Principles can also offer a way of evaluating a co-operative enterprise, including that of mutual 
housing, as they state how a co-operative should function or aspire to run. The International Co-
operative Alliance (ICA) defines a co-operative as “an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a 
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jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise” (ICA 2010), and asks all formal co-
operatives to adopt the principles, hence their normative nature. These state that a co-operative 
should: 
 
1.  Have voluntary and open membership;  
2.  Allow democratic member control;  
3.  Include members’ economic participation;  
4.  Demonstrate autonomy and independence;  
5.  Promote education, training, and information;  
6.  Ensure co-operation with other co-operatives; and 
7.  Maintain concern for local community.  
 
In the research presented here, the governance of groups is examined by using a theoretical 
framework focussing on the rules and practices of mutualism and of collective action. In this way, 
some of the internal normative assumptions of the Co-operative Principles can be unpacked.  
 
Some scholars have argued that these forms of mutual action, which mutual housing provision is 
part of, can be considered ‘prefigurative practices’, in the sense that they are an early indication of 
alternative institutions (Chatterton and Pickerill, 2010; Gibson-Graham, 2008; Vieta, 2014). The 
specific nature of the term ‘prefigurative’ – when applied to mutual housing – is the sense that the 
practices foreshadow a different provision of housing, not just resistant to the status quo, but 
which are experiments in learning how to self-organise and are therefore also alternative social 
and economic arrangements (Vieta, 2014). Scholars have written about how this has applied to 
forms of housing that are dweller controlled or self-managed (Ward, 1982; Turner and Fichter, 
1972; Turner, 1982). The idea of prefiguration is useful as it frames mutual housing practices as a 
way of establishing social and economic alternatives, and as a way of exploring the diversity of 
approaches within the contemporary political economic geography of housing.  
 
Dweller control can also be related to the proposal of autogestión or self-management (Lefebvre, 
2003; Vieta, 2014, 2010). Indeed, the right to self-management was also proposed by Lefebvre as 
part of his broader political vision concerning the right to the city (Lefebvre 1996; Brenner et al. 
2012; Purcell 2014). At the heart of the process of autogestión or self-management is the concept 
of “collective governance”, where institutions of governance are created collectively by those 
affected by the very institutions that are formed. Co-operative, alternative and prefigurative 
practices are all therefore inherent in the institutional forms that have emerged from the history 
of mutual housing. These can also be characterised as community-led, self-organised, and 
collective. The Co-operative Principles and the concept of self-management are useful in the sense 
that they connect with the notion of collective governance, but also the group’s self-management 
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of the housing provision process. However, the focus in this research will be on the way that 
institutions for collective governance are created and evolve within mutual housing groups.  
 
Thus, theories of governance institutions of collective action can be used and applied to 
mutualised housing groups to understand the crafting of these institutions. The approach taken 
by Elinor Ostrom and her co-researchers is one way to look at the crafting of institutions to 
manage resources collectively (Ostrom, 1990; Hess and Ostrom, 2011; Wall, 2014; Poteete, 
Janssen and Ostrom, 2010; Ostrom, 1986, 2005; Caffentzis, 2009). Much of Ostrom’s work 
looked at what attributes of common-pool resources were “conducive to the use of communal 
proprietorship or ownership and [which] others are conducive to individual rights to withdrawal, 
management, exclusion and alienation” (Ostrom and Hess, 2007, p.1). However, not all common 
property regimes involve common-pool resources and there are clearly-nuanced gradations of 
ownership, usership and property rights. One of the main relevant distinctions in her work on 
governance institutions is between common property and open access regimes. A further 
distinction is made between a common-pool resource (the shared good) and a common property 
regime (i.e. the set of social relations, which govern common property). Another useful distinction 
is between subtractive and non-subtractive resources (Ostrom and Hess, 2007; Hess and Ostrom, 
2011). Whilst most natural resources and other public goods can be subtractive, goods such as 
knowledge, language, and shared values are all non-subtractive, as one person’s use does not 
reduce the benefits other people may have from their use of the same resource. These distinctions 
are useful when developing the theoretical basis for understanding mutual housing governance.  
 
When looking at the governance institutions of mutual housing there are the different sets of 
actors involved. They are involved within the different moments in the provision of mutual 
housing by crafting their rules, practices and ideas. These moments form a structure of provision 
for mutual housing, which includes land ownership and tenure arrangements; construction, 
including design and build; and control, including use, ownership and management (Healey, 1991, 
1992; Ball, 1998; Healey, Purdue and Ennis, 1995; De Magalhães, 1999). An overview of the 
different moments is framed, which will be useful to look at the differences between different 
mutual housing models and used to derive a typology of these different mutual housing models.  
 
Mutual housing is also situated within the broader institutional ecosystem, which includes the 
supporting umbrella organisations that bring together different mutual housing groups. These 
include secondary co-operatives (Lambert and Bliss, 2001), public or government organisations, 
including for example, local authorities, the Greater London Authority (GLA), the Homes and 
Communities Agency (HCA), and locality and planning bodies which have also played a key role 
in the mutual housing sector (Skelton, 2002; Moore and Mullins, 2013). Private organisations and 
civil society groups also influence the sector; for example, the Building and Social Housing 
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Foundation (BSFH) and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation have been supportive and influential, 
especially in the initial formation of mutual housing projects and in the writing and dissemination 
of reports on best practice, conducting advocacy and lobbying.  
 
Housing groups, in turn, make use of umbrella organisations to form knowledge sharing and 
support networks. These have become part of a set of strategies for setting up and governing 
mutual housing provision. When this institutional ecology is mapped out, it becomes clear that a 
mutual housing group is not an autonomous entity but is instead located within, and influenced 
by, a wider set of practices, institutions, and networks forming part of the external influence on 
the mutual housing group. This institutional ecology of mutual housing can also be seen as part 
of the changing landscape of housing systems (Lang and Stoeger, 2017).  
 
In summary, this section has presented the theoretical threads useful to study the co-operative 
institutions for governance. The governance within mutual housing groups can be studied using 
Ostrom’s work, developing an institutional approach to look at self-management or autogestión 
within housing.  
 
 
1.4 Research questions, aims and objectives  
 
Despite a varied spectrum of mutual housing models and groups emerging over the last 50 years 
or more, there are currently few new groups being formed. Part of the reason is structural (i.e. 
broader issues linked to housing supply, availability of land and finance, austerity) as well as 
cultural (dominance of home ownership as aspiration, possible negative views of communal living, 
rising sense of individualism), but there are also such practical difficulties as the management and 
self-governance of housing – hence it can be considered as a collective action problem.  
 
The thesis therefore emerges from the need to understand mutual housing through the collective 
action involved and leads to a main research question, which addresses how mutual housing 
groups in London overcome the problem of collective action through self-governance. In this 
sense, ‘overcoming’ refers to the creation, setting-up and survival of the mutual housing groups. 
The historical development of collective governance in mutual housing groups is important in 
helping groups surmount the problems they face in their formation and development, and this 
research will make a valuable contribution to existing knowledge by exploring the problems in 
more depth. The research objectives are to understand better the collective governance of mutual 
housing groups in London and thus, understand the creation of different models of mutual 
housing and housing groups, and the challenges for the set-up and survival of such groups.  
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The research will provide both an empirical and theoretical contribution to the field of housing 
research. The former will emerge from the examination of London-based mutual housing groups 
and, through an analysis of their past and present governance practices, will provide a better 
understanding of their governance institutions, as well as the challenges and barriers the groups 
face in their set-up and ongoing management. Arising from this research the forms of governance 
institutions that can support current and new mutual housing groups can be identified. The 
theoretical contribution includes the development of an analytical framework that can be used to 
look at the collective ownership of assets, namely housing, that have a material form, and which 
are governed through a set of social practices and institutions.  
 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
Building on the history of mutual housing and its various forms – including housing co-operatives, 
co-housing and Community Land Trusts – the next chapter outlines how the different models of 
mutual housing can be understood through their moments of production and consumption by 
looking at an overall ‘structure of provision’ as applied to mutual housing. This allows for the 
development of a typology of mutual housing models, used to identify the cases in the research.  
  
Subsequently, Chapter 3 presents a theoretical exploration of an institutional framework for the 
analysis of mutual housing groups, used to understand the governance institutions of mutual 
housing in the empirical work. This is followed by an exploration of the three main evolving 
concepts used in the research, including governance, institutions and property. They are used to 
illustrate the way in which normative suggestions for understanding mutual housing can arise from 
the theoretical approach chosen.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the way in which the models of mutual housing and their governance 
institutions were looked at in the empirical work. Eight case studies were selected from across the 
six categories within the mutual housing typology. The chapter includes a discussion of the 
qualitative approach chosen and the analytical framework used, derived from the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter 3. There is also a further discussion on the qualitative method, 
drawn from narrative and oral history methods, as most of the empirical work is based on in-
depth, semi-structured interviews with members of different mutual housing groups and support 
organisations, as well as the attendance of meetings at different institutional scales. Included in 
the methodology section is also a discussion of the role of the pilot phase of this research, where 
preliminary findings were used to inform the main fieldwork as well as the research and analytical 
frameworks as part of an iterative and reflexive methodology of theory building.  
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The empirical chapters presented next (Chapters 5 to 9) discuss the main findings regarding the 
issues raised through the fieldwork and offer conclusions concerning the collective governance 
of mutual housing. Chapter 5 outlines the eight case studies used and gives a short history of each 
mutual housing group. The cases are divided into two groups – those that have been in existence 
for over ten years and those that are more contemporary in formation, usually in the process of 
being established during the fieldwork period.  
 
Chapters 6 to 9 offer more in-depth analysis of specific thematic topics of interest to understand 
the governance institutions of mutual housing. Thus, Chapter 6 focusses on the issue of access to 
land and property – the importance of partnership and the relational dynamics that mutual 
housing groups have with external institutions. It also discusses the issues of the groups’ use of 
their land or property and the future they have conceived for themselves, in relation to their assets.  
 
Chapter 7, also related to land and assets, focusses on the financial aspects of mutual housing and 
the experiences of the groups in this regard. Topics covered include their sources of finance, 
financial support from other mutual groups, their relationship with banks and other financial 
institutions, including crowd funding, and finally a discussion of the role of mutual housing in the 
decommodification of housing.  
 
Following these two asset-focussed chapters, Chapter 8 deals with the main governance practices 
and opens with an examination of the micro-practices of governance, including meeting practices 
for each case, the roles people have within the groups, how people join, their involvement, and 
the use of specific practices, such as talking, listening, and dealing with conflicts and risks. The 
chapter then moves on to analyse the experiences of rule creation and rule change, central to 
governance.  
 
The final empirical chapter explores some other key themes around mutualism that emerged from 
the analysis of the empirical work (Chapter 9). These include aspects of community-making, such 
as how a community is formed, how it changes and how members perceive or conceive their 
future. Aspects of knowledge are explored, including the skills needed and forms of trust 
developed within the mutual housing groups. The chapter concludes with some final 
considerations around mutual living that defined the groups, including some reflections on 
personal change from people involved in the mutual housing groups, and issues of gender and 
diversity within the groups. Chapter 10 summarises the theoretical contributions made through 
the empirical work to the understanding of governance institutions in mutual housing groups.  
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Chapter 2 
 
  
Mutual housing: A history and typology of contemporary provision 
 
 
What I want to see is not a mass solution, but a mass of small, local, 
small-scale solutions that draw upon the involvement, the ability and 
the ingenuity of people themselves. There will be muddle and 
confusion, duplication of effort, wasted cash and misappropriation of 
funds. But what makes you think this hasn't happened in the days of 
big, public solutions? (Ward, 1990, p.48) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The forms of mutual housing that have evolved during the twentieth century and that continue 
to exist in the UK today, include housing co-operatives, housing associations and other charitable 
entities, Community Land Trusts and, more recently, newer models such as co-housing and more 
autonomous networks of housing co-operatives (i.e. Radical Routes). Overall, there are an 
estimated 1,000 mutual housing organisations, of which half are ownership housing co-operatives 
of various types (Gulliver, Handy and Morris, 2013, p.4). In total, mutual housing groups own or 
manage less than 1% of the nation’s housing stock. This compares with 18% of housing in 
Sweden, 15% in Norway, 8% in Austria or 6% in Germany (Bliss, 2009; CECODHAS Housing, 
2012), which demonstrates that there have been different historical trends developments within 
the UK through both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This chapter pursues a 
contemporary archaeology of some of these mutual housing forms, including their policy and 
institutional context, and develops an understanding of how they are produced. Using a ‘structure 
of provision’ approach (Ball, 1986, 1998; De Magalhães, 1999; Edwards, 1995), an outline of how 
mutual housing is produced is given, and from this a typology of the contemporary forms of 
mutual housing is created, which will then be used to select the case studies across different 
models of mutual housing.  
 
 
2.2 History of mutual housing 
 
Among the important antecedents to contemporary mutual housing is the emergence of social 
housing in the nineteenth century in the UK and in London in particular. This occurred at a time 
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of increasing housing shortages due to industrialisation, the consequent rising working-class 
populations in cities and the concerns over the resultant concentrations of squalor, deprivation 
and ill-health (Engels, 1872). The increased awareness of the importance of public welfare 
developed, in part, to allow for the necessary reproduction of labour which, faced with worsening 
conditions in industrial inner cities, threatened the ruling classes with uprisings (Gallent, 2007, 
p.30). Philanthropic interest between 1830 and 1914 gave rise to dwelling companies, which 
provided housing for the poor, though with the aim of achieving a full return on initial investment 
– hence the generic term of 5 per cent philanthropy (Malpass, 2000, 2001; Ashworth, 1954; Tarn, 
1973; Birch and Gardner, 1981).  
 
The semi-philanthropic housing providers that resulted included such organisations as the 
Peabody Trust (1860s), East End Dwellings Company (1885), the Four Per Cent Industrial 
Dwellings Company (1885) and the Guinness Trust (1889). Municipal authorities also began to 
intervene to develop housing. The rise of municipal social housing was punctuated by a series of 
Housing Acts from the early twentieth century including the Housing and Planning Act 1919 
(Addison Act), the Wheatley Housing Act 1924, and the Greenwood Act 1930 (see Appendix F: 
List of Parliamentary Acts) – when local councils were given subsidies to build houses.  
 
Octavia Hill was a notable early philanthropist, whose approach to social housing was based on 
the refurbishment of rundown buildings rather than new builds, and she established a system of 
women housing managers (Clapham, 1997; Power, 1987; Malpass, 2000). The provision of 
housing through limited profit developments, such as model dwellings’ companies, charitable 
trusts, co-operatives and industrial and provident societies, continued until the end of the First 
World War. Housing associations (HA) emerged as a generic name for public utility societies that 
could borrow public funds of up to two-thirds of the value of new buildings and limited their 
dividends to rates set by the Treasury (Malpass, 2000, p.203). Throughout the twentieth century, 
their role in housing provision evolved in tandem with that of local authorities and private housing 
development (Malpass, 2001b). Housing associations have had to respond to changes in public 
welfare policy and have also been able to shape the sector’s transformation (Mullins, 2000).  
 
Co-operative housing had emerged earlier, during the nineteenth century, as a mutual organisation 
for the provision of housing. The early history of the co-operative movement can be traced to the 
Rochdale Pioneers and their establishment, in 1844, of a consumer co-operative in the northern 
industrial heartland of England (Holyoake, 1893, 1867). Among the early aims of the Rochdale 
Pioneers of 1844 was “the building, purchasing or erecting of a few houses, in which those 
members desiring to assist each other in improving their domestic and social conditions may 
reside” (Birchall, 1988, p.89). The Co-operative Principles (Fig.1) are derived from the essential 
Principles of the Rochdale Pioneers from 1844 and outline the characteristics of the autonomous 
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and mutual system founded by them. For each of the principles, a justification can be found in 
the constitution, rules, and practice of the original society, founded at Rochdale. Therefore, the 
Co-operative Principles are guidelines by which co-operatives put their values into practice and 
used today, although they have evolved.  
 
Building clubs and building societies, which had emerged earlier (Hird, 1996), were important in 
the early development of co-operative movement. The first building society was set up in the late 
eighteenth century in the Birmingham area as part of the early Midland Enlightenment (1775). 
These were created as fully mutual terminating financial institutions which dissolved when all 
members had acquired a house, in contrast to permanent building societies (Birchall, 1988; Hird, 
1996). 
 
A co-operative movement for housing evolved during the 1860s and 1870s from these early forms 
of organisation because of the strong need or demand for housing, coupled with the already 
established Rochdale Principles. In the UK, the role of local authorities in the provision of welfare 
housing in the early twentieth century then eclipsed the co-operative movement. Birchall (1988, 
p.92) argues that what was missing initially from the co-operative movement was stronger 
promotion, coupled with greater vision and practical sense. There were repeated institutional 
failures, financial limitations and changes of the mutual organisations as they grew and 
demutualised, sometimes even excluding the working-class people who had originally set them up 
and for whom they had been intended.  
 
Co-operative housing was promoted towards the end of the nineteenth century when structures 
evolved that allowed members’ contributions to be deposited in a building society: “At 
first…members used their money to buy materials and their skills to build houses. These 
developed into ‘money clubs’ –  simple savings societies, to build decent houses” (Hird, 1996, 
p.40). Through the co-ownership housing co-operative, members were given an equivalent 
shareholding in the properties, forming some of the first housing co-operatives. One of the first 
was Tenant Co-operators Ltd, founded in 1887, which began with a large proportion of outside 
stakeholders investing in housing for tenant members. They eventually became full co-ownership 
members as the value of the property grew and the tenants acquired equivalent shares. However, 
the ratio of tenants to investors remained low and properties were few and dispersed. By 1912, 
this organisation had supported the creation of 14 societies (usually terminating) which had built 
6,595 houses for a population of 30-35,000 people (Birchall, 1988, p.97).  
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1. Voluntary and Open Membership: Co-operatives are voluntary organisations open 
to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept the responsibilities of 
membership, without gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination. 
2. Democratic Member Control: Co-operatives are democratic organisations 
controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting their policies and making 
decisions. Men and women serving as elected representatives are accountable to the 
membership. In primary co-operatives members have equal voting rights (one member, 
one vote) and co-operatives at other levels are also organised in a democratic manner. 
3. Member Economic Participation: Members contribute equitably to, and 
democratically control, the capital of their co-operative. At least part of that capital is 
usually the common property of the co-operative. Members usually receive limited 
compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as a condition of membership. Members 
allocate surpluses for any or all the following purposes: developing their co-operative, 
possibly by setting up reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible; benefiting 
members in proportion to their transactions with the co-operative; and supporting other 
activities approved by the membership. 
4. Autonomy and Independence: Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help 
organisations controlled by their members. If they enter into agreements with other 
organisations, including governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so 
on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their co-
operative autonomy. 
5. Education, Training and Information: Co-operatives provide education and 
training for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so they 
can contribute effectively to the development of their co-operatives. They inform the 
public – particularly young people and opinion leaders – about the nature and benefits 
of co-operation. 
6. Co-operation among Co-operatives: Co-operatives serve their members most 
effectively and strengthen the co-operative movement by working together through 
local, national, regional and international structures. 
7. Concern for Community: Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of 
their communities through policies approved by their members. 
 
Figure 1: Co-operative Principles  
(ICA, 2010) 
 
 
Co-operativism also inspired Ebenezer Howard in his work on the Garden City. Drawing on both 
radical history and the emerging writings on town planning, Ebenezer Howard published To-
Morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform (1898) (Howard, 2010) and reissued it in 1902 as Garden Cities 
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of To-Morrow (Howard, 1965). Two main strands of thought intertwine through Howard’s work – 
the design of the utopian “Garden City”, and the form of its management through both social 
and economic institutions. The abstract proposal was based on a design that was to draw people 
away from the cities with the aspiration to increase social opportunities, including lower rents and 
higher wages (Howard, 1965). The Garden City also involved establishing a more equitable land 
tenure system, with the generation of clearly-identified revenue streams based on ‘rate-rents’, 
where residents paid for their services through rates. Those who invested in the initial 
development received a return (rent), some of which was then reinvested into the town (Awan, 
Schneider and Till, 2013, p.168). The assumptions included the possibility of buying low-cost, 
usually agricultural land, before development raised its value; that a mass migration or movement 
of people to the site from the city would occur; that the establishment of a new form of collective 
land tenure system would take place; and the success of that municipal governance structure (Hall 
and Ward, 1998).  
 
The first Garden City was set up through the formation of a company, First Garden City Ltd, 
which built the town of Letchworth. The estate is now owned by Letchworth Garden City 
Heritage Foundation and still broadly follows Howard’s principle of rate-rent, which has enabled 
the Foundation to develop a range of services and amenities. Letchworth has been breaking even, 
has paid off its debts and has now therefore partially fulfilled Howard’s original vision. 
 
However, other Garden Cities found their schemes undermined mainly because of financial 
difficulties that led to the termination of their public ownership status (Batchelor, 1969, p.199). 
The most difficult goal to achieve was the local or municipal control of assets, central to the 
original Garden City vision, as it depended on such external factors as land prices, forms of tenure, 
and institutional and financial structures. The embedded principles of cooperativism and 
municipal or local control of assets are, however, among the more interesting and important ideas 
distilled in Howard’s utopian planning project, where land ownership is reconceptualised as land 
stewardship for the collective or community benefit (Large 2010, Cabannes and Ross, 2014; Hall 
and Ward, 1998). 
 
Therefore, Garden Cities movement, despite being more influential for its design ideas, explored 
some radical options for collective control through the principle of land trusteeship. The land 
trust became a way of sharing land value, along with developing collective ownership practices. 
The concept of land trusteeship had been used to create the National Trust for example. Worker 
colonies and industrial villages, including Cadbury’s Bournville Village Trust, Rowntree’s New 
Earswick, were also early inspirational models for the Garden City movement. While the Garden 
Cities movement stimulated an enormous international following and the subsequent promotion 
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of new suburbs, the specific element of land stewardship and land value capture was generally 
lost. 
 
Following the First World War and the promotion of the local authority-led model of social 
housing provision (Homes fit for Heroes), housing co-operatives were sidelined by the 
overwhelming interest of local authorities in council housing and the building for private owner-
occupation (Birchall, 1988, p.98). After 1918, housing associations also failed to thrive, and the 
poor performances of the organisations contributed to their failing to overcome local authority 
opposition and scepticism through the 1930s. Housing associations remained marginal in the 
overall provision of housing, in part because of the stronger role played by municipal authorities 
(Malpass, 2001b, p.225). This was the pattern until the latter part of the twentieth century when 
housing associations experienced a resurgence in the 1970s due to the availability of central 
government funds supporting the establishment of housing associations and co-operatives 
because of the 1974 Housing Act (Gulliver, 2014b). After 1979, the introduction of a Right to 
Buy policy, resulted in a slowing down of local authority house building. The restructuring of 
housing provision following changes to the welfare state also led to most subsequent new social 
housing being provided through housing associations (Malpass, 2001a).  
 
The emergence of interest during the 1970s in devolved management and the transfer of 
ownership and control on local authority estates, was stimulated by the Co-operative Party, and 
subsequently taken up by the Labour Party when it came into power in 1974. The stimulus at a 
policy level occurred under the then Minister for Housing, Reg Freeson, who had first-hand 
knowledge of housing co-ops (Birchall, 1988, p.111). He commissioned a report on ways in which 
housing co-operatives could be promoted, including tenant self-management on local authority 
estates. The resulting Campbell Report argued that tenants could manage their housing as well as 
private landlords or local authorities, and it contributed to amendments to the 1975 Rent and 
Subsidies Act to include co-ops as beneficiaries of the grants and loans offered through the 1974 
Housing Act, including Housing Allocation Grant (HAG) funding (Birchall, 1988, p.111). This 
provided significantly increased levels of funding for the set-up of housing associations and co-
operatives and initiated an important period in the history of housing co-operatives (Hands, 1975; 
Birchall, 1988). One example is the historic Sanford Housing Co-operative in Deptford, which is 
chronicled by Hands (1975) in his overview of this wave of the housing co-operative movement 
(see Section 5.3 on Sanford Housing Co-operative).  
 
The main models for housing co-operatives that emerged during this period were common 
ownerships, tenant management, and ‘short-life’ housing. In common ownership co-operatives 
(also known as par-value co-operatives), members had a nominal £1 subscription, property was 
held in common and individual members were both tenants and common owners with no 
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individual equity stake. They could either be fully mutual, where all members were tenants or 
prospective tenants, or non-fully mutual, where some members were not tenants and some 
tenants were not members, though the tenants fell within the secure and assured tenancy regimes 
(Somerville, 2002, p.25). Tenant management co-operatives were voluntary associations of tenants 
holding an agreement with a landlord for housing and estate management (TMOs). Finally, short-
life housing co-operatives were also considered management co-operatives, but they had short 
leases on empty properties which they could manage as short-life co-operatives. Birchall (1988, 
p.113) highlights that, at the time, there was a need for a more favourable legal environment to 
promote common ownership, including the recognition in law of common (shared) interests of 
co-operative members as individuals and common owners, as well as the need to create a more 
favourable financial environment. Both points remain under-addressed and therefore relevant.  
 
For tenant management co-operatives, the problems appeared to be simpler and were limited to 
questions of control, not ownership, as there were fewer legal impediments. However, the process 
of negotiating management agreements with local authorities remained difficult. The lack of 
widespread promotion of the options available exemplified the caution that local authorities have 
typically exhibited towards encouraging self-management throughout their history. However, the 
historical shift in the role of tenants has depended on the “factors which influence the nature and 
scope of tenant organisation and … the mobilisation process, by which the perception of a 
common interest is turned into organisation and action” (Cairncross, Clapham and Goodlad, 
1993, p.179).  
 
By the 1990s, the forms of tenant involvement had broadened and become more extensive, 
covering service provision, estate management, policy and regeneration. Most tenant management 
organisations (TMOs) were formed following the Housing Act 1974 (Hague, 1990; McKee and 
Cooper, 2008). In addition, some TMOs chose to campaign for the transfer of ownership, not 
just management and, in the 1990s, one successful community group – Walterton and Elgin 
Community Homes (WECH) based in Westminster – officially became a resident-owned housing 
association and is possibly the first Community Land Trust (CLT) in London (Bunce, 2016; 
Rosenberg, 2011, 2012; Bailey, 2012). 
 
There are other community groups that are pursuing a similar strategy, now legislated through the 
Localism Act 2011 and the Right to Transfer legislation (Department for Communities and Local 
Government 2013). Some groups are using it as a strategy to prevent estate demolition and ensure 
the perpetuity of affordable housing stock in an area or estate faced with regeneration (Lees et al., 
2014). The legislation offers community-led ownership as a way of keeping ownership of housing 
stock managed by a TMO, in effect, ensuring a collective Right to Buy.  
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Another important legacy success story from the 1980s is the Coin Street Community Builders 
(CSCB), another early form of a CLT, as it owns the land, but is also an umbrella co-operative 
(secondary co-operative) that has set up subsidiary housing co-operatives on a contiguous part of 
London’s South Bank which was sold in the 1980s to a local community campaigning group 
(Tuckett, 1988; Baeten, 2000, 2001; Brindley, 2000). The legal ownership and governance 
structures of CSCB are very much like a large CLT. 
 
A next wave of housing co-operatives could be considered as the recent shift to a less formal style 
of co-operativism. This ‘new co-operativism’ (Vieta, 2010) is driven by similar issues that 
stimulated the original movement more than a century earlier but is structured around new forms 
of governance and is more closely related to the principles of autogestión (self-management) and 
autonomism. New co-operativism can have some of the following characteristics: it starts as a 
collective and bottom-up project because of social, political, cultural, or economic needs; it 
emerges from local-level politics, emphasising equitable and ethical approaches; it utilises strong 
practices of horizontal decision-making, which often include the collective ownership of social, 
cultural, or economic production; and it may exhibit strong connections with surrounding 
communities, including support for local community development initiatives (Vieta, 2010, p.3). 
 
Co-housing, as a movement, could be seen as part of this “new co-operativism” as its roots in 
Europe are distinctly radical, even utopian ones (Vestbro, 2000; Tummers, 2015; McCamant and 
Durrett, 2011; Hansen and Hanson, 1996; Field, 2004; Sargisson, 2012; Williams, 2005a; 2005b). 
Emerging in the 1960s in Denmark, the co-housing movement was inspired by feminist 
questioning of the structures of the family, creating urban spaces that were friendlier for children 
and for community-building (Sargisson, 2012; Jarvis, 2011; Vestbro and Horelli, 2012). Most 
forms of co-housing share some common features: they tend to be privately-funded and resident-
led; the physical and morphological design promotes residents’ interactions and encourages a 
strong sense of community, with extensive common facilities for daily use; they have high resident 
involvement in recruitment, production and governance; and they tend to promote mutualistic 
and collaborative lifestyles (Williams, 2008, p.269). 
 
Co-housing therefore had grass-roots, bottom-up origins, although is now increasingly being 
supported in some top-down ways, especially in Europe (Krokfors, 2012; Ache and Fedrowitz, 
2012; Fromm, 2012; Wankiewicz, 2015; Droste, 2015; Labit, 2015; Lille, 2015). There are a range 
of development models, which can include a resident-led model; partnership model, with housing 
associations for example (Pati, 2011); and speculative models of new build, self-build 
(Hamiduddin and Gallent, 2016; Parvin, Saxby, Cerulli and Schneider, 2011); as well as smaller, 
retrofit projects led by groups of residents. 
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Development constraints have included limitations on time and finance; the need for management 
and technical expertise; and the difficulties in finding appropriate sites in competition or 
negotiation with landlords, developers, and local authorities (Williams, 2008, p.270). The recent 
interest in co-housing is evidenced by the increase of established communities and of groups 
working towards setting up a co-housing community, as well as news articles and academic work 
in the UK and across Europe. Academic work has also focussed on co-housing as part of an 
increased interest in more sustainable urban forms of housing and living, including links with eco-
communities, for example (Williams, 2005a, Bergman et al., 2007; Mulder, Costanza and Erickson, 
2006).  
 
The mutual home ownership society (MHOS) model of housing co-operative is also 
representative of the new housing co-operatives which have emerged in the last ten years. The 
MHOS is a financial model of ownership, which separates out the housing from the land value. 
It can be used by co-operatives to raise finance from the private sector through banks and mutual 
building societies, as groups can set up as an MHOS and present a long-term and fully costed 
business case suitable for private sector or charitable bank financing (Chatterton, 2013; 
Chatterton, 2014; Conaty et al., 2005; Conaty et al., 2003). One of the key challenges that MHOS 
tries to address is how to provide housing in perpetuity for its members that guarantees 
affordability, defined as a maximum of a third of net household income to be spent on housing 
(Conaty, Birchall, Bendle and Foggit, 2003, 2005; Lewis and Conaty, 2012).  
 
Another way to guarantee affordability is through a Community Land Trust (CLT), a model that 
began to be used in the UK in the early 2000s. This can be defined as locally-based, not-for-profit 
organisations who own land and property in trust for the benefit of the community (Diacon, 
Clarke and Guimarães, 2005). CLTs offer, in theory, a community-led response to housing 
problems and can (again, in theory) provide affordable housing for low-income residents 
(Engelsman, Rowe and Southern, 2016). The CLT model has been used to bring empty homes 
and local amenities back into use for community benefit in some parts of the UK (Moore, 2014; 
Thompson, 2015; Bunce, 2016). 
 
A series of pilot projects have been carried out, including the Capturing Value for Rural 
Communities (2003-2005) and the CLT National Demonstration project (2007-2009), which 
involved establishing CLTs with affordable housing in the UK. These were top-down initiatives 
to support bottom-up projects. Around 14 pilot CLTs had been set up by 2010 (Large, 2010, 
p.196), mostly in rural areas with typically low land prices and stable populations. More recently, 
there has been increased interest in whether and how this model can be used successfully in urban 
areas. A similar mechanism was used by a few post-regeneration schemes, such as Single 
Regeneration Budgets and New Deal for Communities, to develop an asset base as part of their 
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longer-term strategy, thus continuing to fund regeneration work after the direct grant funds 
finished (Colomb, 2009; Dargan, 2009; Bailey, 2012). Under the Housing and Regeneration Act 
2008, a Community Land Trust (CLT) was defined as: 
 
A corporate body which is established for the express purpose of furthering the social, 
economic and environmental interests of a local community by acquiring and managing 
land and other assets in order to provide a benefit to the local community and to ensure 
that the assets are not sold or developed except in a manner which the Trust's members 
think benefits the local community (Part 2, Chapter 1, Clause 79)  
 
This was followed by the Localism Act 2011 (Colenutt, 2011). Although CLTs are not mentioned 
or made explicit, there are powers which can be related to CLTs, such as Community Right to 
Build (and the related enfranchisement rights) and the Community Right to Bid, which were 
included in the Localism Act. More recently, the Community Right to Transfer was enshrined in 
law, supposedly making it easier to bring land back into use if local authorities or other public 
bodies own it.  
 
Several policy, political or technical barriers have been noted in the literature on CLTs (Diacon, 
Clarke and Guimarães, 2005; Moore and Mullins, 2013; Rowe, Engelsman and Southern, 2016; 
Hill, 2015; Engelsman, Rowe and Southern, 2016). First, CLTs are not mainstream and more 
measures are needed to disseminate knowledge about their role as a new and innovative, although 
reformist, form of real estate development (Rowe, Engelsman and Southern, 2016). Some 
examples of policy approaches could include establishing a national framework and structure to 
support CLTs, developing appropriate models and governance structures, finding ways of 
involving the private as well the public sector, and identifying sources of land as well as finance 
and overcoming existing barriers to set up (Diacon, Clarke and Guimarães, 2005, p.22). Recent 
findings on CLTs for London have echoed the importance of a clear business plan; the need for 
a clear financial model and a group structure; and the ability to raise loan stock funding (Bunce, 
2016; Greater London Authority, 2004). These findings were all finance- and management-
orientated and therefore offered little insight into governance issues and the barriers to achieving 
success, or how to accommodate the evolution and innovation within schemes.  
 
An aspect worth highlighting is the difference between the CLT and co-housing models of 
mutualised housing (see Moore & Mullins 2013; Mullins & Moore 2013). CLTs are a broader 
community-based model used to secure local housing. Any accountability, however, does not lie 
just with the residents’ own management body but rather with a community body that manages 
the CLT and, as such, could be more philanthropically orientated through a management board 
comprised of local supporters, rather than the households themselves. This philanthropic purpose 
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has meant that most CLT housing projects have focussed on the provision of some affordable 
housing. Furthermore, there seems to have been a greater acceptance by local decision-makers 
and policy-makers of the land trust model rather than the more specific co-housing model, 
perhaps due to the political influence of local community groups wishing to set up a CLT (Moore 
and Mullins, 2013; Mullins and Moore, 2013). Due to the accountability to broader community 
agendas and needs, the CLT’s plans may seem more politically feasible or even palatable.  
 
In summary, mutualism has been a guiding theme as people seek greater local control for the 
direct users and beneficiaries of such housing and has been part of the social housing movement 
since its inception. At the same time, groups have also felt increasing pressures around land, 
including financialisation (Loon and Aalbers, 2017; Moreno, 2014; Robertson, 2014; Aalbers, 
2015). Thus, mutual forms of housing have, in a sense, become a form of resistance to some of 
the more extreme effects of the property and land market pressures (Rowe, Engelsman and 
Southern, 2016; Engelsman, Rowe and Southern, 2016). Resulting models of mutual housing have 
therefore included housing co-operatives, co-housing and CLTs.  
 
 
2.3 Contemporary mutual housing provision 
 
History has left us with a legacy of different forms of mutual housing. To understand the range 
of mutual housing models it would be useful to move away from the term ‘housing’ as used to 
mean the dwellings built and lived in, or merely as a product with an exchange value, and to view 
housing as a process. In this way, mutual housing can be defined through its process of provision. 
In this process, systems and agents are connected by their interests and the cultural forms of 
interacting, which are institutionalised (Bourdieu, 2005; Healey, 1992).  
 
The idea of mutual housing as a process embedded in a ‘structure of provision’ builds on the work 
in real estate and planning literature of scholars such as Ball, Healey, and Edwards, who have used 
this approach to analyse land development and the role of the different actors and agents involved, 
including developers (Ball, 1986, 1998; Healey, 1992; Edwards, 1995; De Magalhães, 1999, 1998). 
This approach also echoes the work of scholars who work in a more cultural and material way, 
looking at housing as a consumption process, developing the ‘systems of provision’ approach 
(Fine, 2002; Bayliss, Fine and Robertson, 2013; Robertson, 2014). Both these sets of scholars have 
framed their research on the built environment, specifically housing, through an understanding of 
the set of actions and processes that a product (housing) needs to go through to be both produced 
and consumed. 
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Ball (1998) explains, the focus of the structure of provision approach is on the different moments 
through which social agents move, their networks of relationships and the organisations they 
form, and the institutions and markets involved. These “social relations of building 
provision…are seen in an historically dynamic way” (Ball, 1986, p.448).  Mutual housing is 
produced through a system that is constituted by different moments of provision and by agents 
involved at each moment, including the partnerships that are formed, along with their roles and 
functions. The necessary functions of agents or moments of provision include the following: 
finance, land ownership including promotion and development of the scheme, construction, 
consumption or management and use into the future. The kinds of relationships that then govern 
the provision are determined by the agents involved in each function at every stage – from pre-
development, through to mediation, production (i.e. construction) and then use through 
realisation and consumption, which in this case is applied to mutual housing (Ball, 1986, 1998, 
1982). The following are the corresponding main moments for mutual housing: 
 
 Land ownership – This includes the initial ownership of land, the process of land 
assemblage or access to property. It includes the possibility of asset transfers between 
agents, such as between the state and a community group, or the buying of land or 
property on the open market. Bound up in this moment are the structural effects of 
land distribution, land prices, speculation or land banking, and the historical 
consequences of forms of accumulation and financialisation of the built environment, 
which all operate as an ongoing dynamic that makes access to land by mutual housing 
groups more difficult. The mutualisation process would include forms of co-ownership 
or common ownership of land or property, as expanded in Chapter 6.  
 Financing – All groups need to access financing or credit to buy the land, build, design, 
refurbish or buy the housing to set up the mutual housing group. This would include 
accessing mortgage financing from banks or building societies. Raising funds to buy a 
site for a project could also be achieved through other means, such as loan stock, fund-
raising or even crowd funding. The mutualisation of this stage could include a greater 
partnership between financial institutions and the mutual housing group, or financial 
instruments geared towards collective funding of the mutual housing development – 
either through a mutual home ownership society (MHOS), loan stock or crowd funding, 
or par-value shares in the enterprise for example. This is explored in Chapter 7. 
 Promoter – It is usually the group itself that plays the promoter role, but this could be 
in partnership with an umbrella organisation or other local community groups also 
desiring to develop the mutual housing group, which can also include top-down 
promotion. The group develops its own governance institutions as part of the 
promotion of the project and establishes strategic relationships as required.   
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 Construction (design and build) – This moment encompasses a series of sub-
activities, that include the stages of overall design, planning, build, project management, 
construction, and development or refurbishment of housing units. The mutualisation 
at this stage could include what role architects have, who the developers are, and what 
the role of the final inhabitants of the dwellings is during design or even construction, 
such as in self-build projects where ‘sweat equity’ is included as part of the build. 
 Ownership and use of the houses once built – This moment includes the forms of 
tenancy and ownership of housing once it has been built and the control over the value 
capture of the assets held, who the dwellers or users are, how they are involved in the 
ownership and management, and other issues related to running the group. Again, this 
would involve the set-up of a legal co-ownership entity for example, or other forms of 
mutual ownership organisation.  
 Management – This is only treated as a separate moment in the sense that it involves 
the residents in the ongoing management of the housing stock, and the governance of 
the mutualised housing. Therefore, two separate moments are included here – the first 
could be project management of the actual build stage; and the second is the 
management of the mutual housing once it has been built, or through the build process 
and beyond. It also would include the groups’ dynamics – how conflicts within the 
group are resolved and how alliances or collaborations emerge between groups and the 
relationship with external groups or the wider community. 
 
All these are distinct though overlapping moments that produce mutual housing. Each of them 
will involve the participation of dwellers and can draw upon agents from a variety of sectors 
(private, public, users themselves, or civil society or community groups) with different levels of 
decision-making power. 
 
The state is in most cases important in providing the land, while in other cases it develops the 
necessary legislation or provides support through funding. From an institutionalist point of view, 
the state is the guarantor of property rights, as well as the other institutions, such as financial, 
planning and land regulations. The state also performs an administrative regulatory role and can 
step in as an active agent on behalf of the ‘public’ if necessary – i.e. when building public housing 
or allocating social housing tenancies. Each different model of mutual housing interacts with the 
state in a different way. What the structure of provision approach is less explicit about is what 
happens at the scale internal to the group and is weaker on the relational aspect both between 
agents and within the process. Therefore, the internal dynamics within the groups need to be 
looked at, with their own governance institutions using different theoretical approach. Before 
exploring further this approach (in Chapter 3), it would be useful to come up with a typology of 
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mutual housing, to develop the case studies. The typology can benefit from the insights of the 
structure of provision approach, which in this work will only be used instrumentally as a 
descriptive framework to map out the differences between mutual housing models. The typology 
developed in the next section.  
 
2.4 A typology of mutual housing models 
 
In this section, a typology of mutual housing provision is drawn out, which is used to understand 
the range of mutual housing models, and for the specific purpose of guiding the selection of case 
studies. Other typologies include Woodin et al. (2010, pp.23–24) who identifies four broad 
categories of mutual ownership: including community based, co-operative and mutual, charitable, 
and municipal or State-owned. Parvin et al. (2011, p.10) develop a typology based on the 
institutional partnerships needed for a variety of self-build models of housing; Gulliver et al. (2013, 
p.28) outlined mutual housing organisations in the UK by type and region. Birchall (1988) 
developed a useful breakdown of the conditions for housing co-operative development using a 
horticultural analogy of how co-operatives take “root and grow”. Tummers (2015) developed an 
overview typology of different co-housing types across Europe. What each typology has done is 
summarise the mutual models and their institutional form.  
 
Another way of developing a typology that covers the different models outlines the forms of 
ownership (co-operative, co-housing, CLT) along with the agents and functions of provision, to 
create a framework to understand the models of mutual housing. This draws on the structure of 
provision approach highlighted in the previous section. The forms identified as important models 
of mutual housing provision are the following:  
 
- Housing co-operative, which can have three main models – fully mutual or par-value, 
short-life, and radical; 
- Co-housing, within which there are two main models – private-led and intentional; and 
- Community Land Trust (CLT). 
 
The following moments can be considered for each: land ownership of site; financing; 
construction (design and build); ownership and use of the houses once built; and management (as 
covered earlier in Section 2.3). At each moment there is an important conjunctural element – the 
bringing together of dwellers, agents, techniques and practices, institutions and materials, 
networked at critical moments. The models of mutual housing identified earlier in the chapter are 
outlined with their moments of housing provision (Fig.2). The figure also includes a selection of 
examples of mutual housing in London, which forms the basis for the case studies presented in 
Chapter 5. 
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The sets of agents can be from across the private – public spectrum, and include private 
companies, the users, the community groups (such as for Community Land Trusts), the public 
and not-for-profit sector organisations (see Parvin et al., 2011, p.10). There are different possible 
mixtures of agents or partnerships for each moment of provision, and different sets of 
partnerships that evolve for each model through their provision process. Other external agents 
can act as facilitators or institutional regulators, including banks and other finance organisations, 
special funds (i.e. CLT funds) set up to support a particular model, professional or industrial 
bodies (including Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), Royal Institution of British 
Architecture (RIBA), Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), and the Housebuilders Federation, 
for example), private sector groups, third sector groups, local authorities and government bodies 
such as Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) and the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG).  
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 Moments in the provision of mutual housing  
Form  Land Finance Design and 
Construction 
Ownership and 
use 
Management Cases 
Housing 
Co-
operative: 
fully mutual
Leases from co-op 
owned properties 
Private users rent, housing 
benefits, originally grant 
funding support with 
charitable fund raising, plus 
sweat equity 
Self-build, professional 
involvement or already 
built, with sweat equity 
investment  
Users with par 
value equity share 
Private users 
form committees 
w/professional 
management 
team  
Sandford 
Housing Co-
operative, 
Grand Union 
Housing Co-
op 
Housing 
Co-
operative: 
short-life 
Short term leases 
from unused HA/ LA 
properties 
Private finance, affordable 
rent, housing benefits, 
charitable sector, plus sweat 
equity 
Already built with sweat 
equity for build and 
maintenance 
Users with short 
term lets  
Users 
committees w/ 
professional 
management 
Backdoor 
Housing 
North 
Kensington 
short-life 
Housing 
Co-
operative: 
Radical 
Routes 
Private users involved 
in founding a 
communal house 
from private sector 
Rootstock, private users and 
sweat equity  
Usually already built Private users and 
volunteers 
Private users and 
volunteers 
Sanford 
[affiliated] 
Co-housing: 
intentional 
Private users / State 
land transfer 
Private user funding and 
charitable fund raising, plus 
sweat equity 
Professional involvement 
with user lead and user 
involvement in self-build 
Private users with 
shared communal 
spaces 
Private users LCHC,  
OWCH 
Co-housing: 
private 
Private users buy land 
on open market 
Private user funding Professional involvement 
with user lead 
Private users with 
shared communal 
spaces 
Private users  Co-housing 
Woodside 
Community 
Land Trust 
(CLT) 
Community Land 
Trust sets up own 
legal entity with land 
bought on market or 
through public land 
transfer 
Private sector funding, 
community support through 
membership, grant support 
from state and charity 
Professional involvement 
with user participation 
through self-build (maybe)
Users and 
community 
members able to 
access shared 
services.  
Mixed board 
including 
surrounding 
community 
members  
East London 
CLT,  
Brixton Green 
– Somerleyton 
Road Trust 
Figure 2: Models of mutual housing, their moments of provision and case studies 
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2.4.1 Housing Co-operatives 
 
Beginning with housing co-operatives, the groups’ land ownership or their access to land or 
property can differ widely. Fully mutual co-operatives do not necessarily have to own the land but 
might be able to lease it. In contrast, the short-life housing co-operatives are essentially managing 
properties for a short period of time, using a short-term lease agreement with the landlord or 
freeholder, usually a Housing Association or local authority.  
 
A recent innovation has been the mutual home ownership society (MHOS), which can work for 
co-operatives or shared equity co-operatives as well. In such cases, they do not own the land, 
which instead is held as a community owned asset by a locally accountable, democratically-
controlled Community Land Trust (CLT).  
 
The ‘radical’ co-operatives of the Radical Routes network are usually small (under twenty 
residents) and use existing properties bought from the open market. The fundamental criteria for 
acceptance is evidence demonstrating the group’s commitment to forms of social change activism 
– with members spending a significant proportion of time involved in positive social change 
(O’Driscoll and Muller, 2014); hence it can be called intentional or ‘radical’. Some housing co-
operatives are also affiliated members, joining the summer gatherings and offering support 
through the Radical Routes Network (e.g. Sanford Housing Co-operative).  
 
Financing terms for housing co-operatives have changed in response to financial and economic 
conditions in the housing market, as well as through the development of policies and tools to 
subsidise and promote particular institutions. This has also been a learning process whereby 
shared property forms have become more accepted. The Housing Act 1974 introduced social 
housing grants, which could be accessed by newly forming housing co-operatives for their set-up. 
Known as housing allocation grant (HAG) funding, it played a key role in the support of new 
housing provision and accounts for most of the fully mutual housing co-operatives set up during 
the 1970s and 1980s that have survived. The introduction of the Housing Act 1988, however, 
changed the rules supporting housing co-operatives and the grant funding was shifted to 
supporting private finance borrowings and housing providers had to demonstrate a successful 
track record in management before registering. As a result, housing co-operatives received less 
direct support and either had to sign direct management agreements with housing associations or 
suffer from their autonomy in an environment geared towards larger housing providers (Malpass 
and Victory, 2010).  
 
Short-life co-operatives survived as they were self-financed, with rental properties on short-term 
leases from housing associations or local authorities. More recently, the Radical Routes network 
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of co-operatives has decided to address the challenge of financing new housing projects using 
their own resources and by setting up a loan stock financing system. Concerns regarding the 
financial aspects associated with the set-up and running of housing co-operatives are explored in 
Chapter 7, as these have affected their governance institutions.  
 
The next steps in the provision of co-operative housing are the design and build stages. In most 
cases, the extent of mutualisation or ‘mutualism’ is difficult to assess. The initial design and build 
stages are not as important as the actual living arrangements and ongoing maintenance practices 
instituted within each co-operative. In the case of short-life property, a landlord such as a housing 
association or local authority licenses or leases a property to the co-operative for rent, either on a 
fixed term basis or on an open period with a notice of termination of one to three months. 
Members occupy it under a tenancy agreement, and in many cases, carry out refurbishment to the 
property. For example, Phoenix Housing Co-operative (Bethnal Green) is modelled on this 
principle. It provides homes for members but also uses the opportunity to improve the skills and 
employability of those who volunteer to get trained while helping with the refurbishment works. 
In most groups forming today, the design and build process is carried out from scratch and can 
involve both a team of architects and the future residents in a series of co-design workshops. 
These can explore themes such as communal facility layouts, the role and function of the common 
house, the energy strategy and internal dispositions (Chatterton, 2013, p.1665). The final 
construction can be carried out by contractors and not involve much self-build or self-provision, 
apart from the overseeing of the project and community building exercises on weekends. 
 
Following on from the design and build stages there are the forms of ownership of the houses 
once built or occupied (see also Appendix E). Some form of shared ownership rights is embedded 
within housing co-operatives in their different models. For example, under a fully mutual, 
property ownership is not outright, nor is there any direct ownership of the equity by the co-
operative. Rather, members of the co-operative can access the shared right to the benefits of 
housing. Hence the co-operative is not based on equity ownership but benefit ownership, which 
influences the property models and understandings of common property rights. Within the short-
life co-operative, again there is even less of a sense of ownership over the physical or material 
good, but only access to the benefits of the property (i.e. its use as shelter or dwelling) within a 
contractually-decreed timeframe from the owner, usually a housing association or local authority.  
 
Under the MHOS or shared equity co-operative, there is a stronger connection between an 
individual’s ownership and the property, through their share of equity (Chatterton, 2014; Lewis 
and Conaty, 2012). This arrangement, however, is beginning to cause some problems as people 
wanting to move out are unable to realise the market value of their property’s equity and instead 
are only able to receive an amount reflecting the affordable level which the property was kept at 
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due to separation between the value of land (as held by the separate land-owning mutual) and the 
property itself (as owned by the individuals living in the properties).  
 
Regarding the sell-off of equity within housing co-operatives, some people have highlighted the 
potential ‘carpet-bagging’ that this property arrangement can lead to when a small number of 
people can force the break-up of a co-operative. The process is completely legal, and it is common 
that “co-operatives are broken up and the assets distributed among members – also known as de-
mutualisation” (O’Driscoll and Muller, 2014, p.43). Therefore, if the land is owned by a separate 
mutual entity (it can be a Trust for example, as in the case of a CLT) the equity value of the 
housing is separated out from the land value.  
 
The final moment in the provision of the housing co-operatives described above relates to the 
governance structures for their control – ownership and management. There are both deliberative 
and democratic processes, with collective behavioural change and the spaces in which to do both, 
as explored further in Chapter 9.  
 
Finally, in considering the moments of mutualised housing provision (see Fig.2), it is important 
to bear in mind the wider institutional context supporting change in different ways. There are 
umbrella organisations, support organisations and secondary co-operatives that offer sharing of 
knowledge and co-operative practices between groups, rather than just internally. They advocate, 
provide management services and perform a wider policy-making and advocacy role in the 
institutional ecology of mutualised housing provision. For housing co-operatives, some examples 
of these include, at a national level, the Confederation for Co-operative Housing (CCH), the Co-
operative Development Society (CDS) and, at a regional level, the London Federation of Housing 
Co-operatives, the London Co-operative Housing Group and smaller local umbrellas such as the 
South London Housing Co-operatives. The Radical Routes Network is another example, and the 
Catalyst collective, a co-operative consultancy which, over the last 17 years, has worked with over 
200 housing co-operatives, about 75 worker co-operatives, some charities, and a variety of 
different companies with co-operative aims. These are all important agents that form part of the 
wider support and governance networks, fulfilling a role in support, providing management 
services, sharing knowledge and providing an important role in advocacy and policymaking as 
well as opens new institutional spaces for the mutualisation of housing. 
 
 
2.4.2 Co-housing 
 
The next model of mutual housing to consider is co-housing. There seem to be four main 
characteristics of co-housing (Williams, 2005a; Field, 2004). The physical design of the co-housing 
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is developed as a discrete neighbourhood that makes use of architectural and urban design features 
to maximise intentional and incidental social contact between neighbours; private space is kept at 
a minimum and, instead, there are more shared communal facilities; the size of the community 
should support neighbourhood dynamics, which by rule of thumb is between ten and forty 
members; the residents control and manage their own neighbourhood from its creation to its 
operation (Hansen and Hanson, 1996; McCamant and Durrett, 2011; McCamant et al., 1994). 
  
In terms of land ownership of the site, access to a suitable site is one of the most difficult 
challenges encountered by a group wanting to set up a co-housing scheme (Tummers, 2015; 
Mulder, Costanza and Erickson, 2006). Because of their size, most sites need to be made available 
by a local authority, which should in theory, be able to dispose of its land. Alternatively, some co-
housing groups have found land from the market, using their own private equity and have 
therefore tended to be more exclusive.  
 
The financing of co-housing, unless it has a specific ethos or intention to provide so-called 
‘intermediate housing’ – or affordable housing, as in the case of LILAC – must come from private 
sector sources or from the members themselves. The German model of Baugruppen uses a similar 
process (Hamiduddin and Gallent, 2016). The Baugruppen (group build), also known as a 
Baugemeinschaft (a construction joint venture – or partnership – for the group build), incorporates 
for the build period. The Baugruppen can therefore build more cheaply by saving the costs because 
of a less speculative building model of co-housing (Lloyd, Peel and Janssen-Jansen, 2014) and 
because of economies of scale that collective schemes can deliver (Hamiduddin and Daseking, 
2014). Another non-UK example is the Fideicomiso, a fiduciary trust used by architects for the 
contracts to build apartment blocks in Argentina (Brown et al., 2013; Adamo, 2013; Cristini, Moya 
and Bermudez, 2011; Redstone et al., 2013). This is important as a legal and institutional structure, 
allowing for the development of housing by a group of people working as direct clients with an 
architect. The similarity between the Baugruppen and the Fideicomiso is not only as funding and legal 
mechanisms, but also in the use of participatory processes of planning and design.  
 
Much attention is given to the layout of interiors and the communal spaces, both interior and 
exterior, so that contact between neighbours is maximised (Williams, 2005a; Marcus, 2000). Future 
residents and the architects are involved in joint workshops to arrive at an agreed co-design, as 
already described for other mutual housing projects, and future residents might even be involved 
in the build stages through self-build elements. 
 
Another interesting dynamic in the build phase has been the relationship between and the 
respective roles of housing associations and developers (Moore, 2016). Co-housing development 
groups are forming partnerships with housing associations or developers, who regard this as a 
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new sector with growth potential. Co-housing developments are effectively pre-sold, which 
reduces sales’ risks as well as eliminating the costs associated with marketing. Prestige and media 
coverage have also tended to benefit developers’ overall standing and their marketing impact. The 
support of the Homes and Communities Agency has created markedly better financial terms for 
social housing because of its policy in support of mixed-tenure co-housing. Finally, it was noted 
that the co-housing groups tended to have environmental concerns driving their designs, such as 
reducing carbon footprint consumption and developing neighbourhood energy provision.  
 
The specific ownership of the houses depends on the legal entity that the group chooses to use 
to develop their project. A co-housing community is not defined by its legal structure, which 
would reflect the specific needs and aims of the group. For example, some are fully mutual co-
operative; others are set up as social enterprises, while others are purely private entities. While 
there are clearly overlaps with the models explored above, in some cases co-housing schemes 
might not be ‘affordable’ or at properly social rent, or include intermediate market properties, 
such as the recently built Copper Lane co-housing project in Hackney, London (Moore, 2014a). 
The most common form of legal structure used is the company limited by guarantee (CLG) and 
this serves as the management organisation for the co-housing project. In such cases, the main 
advantage is that CLGs are widely used for social enterprises and are therefore familiar to funders 
or lenders who will be more likely to approve their use. Their main disadvantage is that there is 
no share capital, so the CLG cannot raise equity and can only accrue debt through mortgages or 
loans.  
 
Historically, the second main legal entity was the industrial and provident society (IPS), which has 
now become regulated under the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014. This 
Act now covers Co-operatives (for the benefit of members) or BenComs (for the benefit of 
community). The co-operative type, also used to set up a housing co-operative, has the advantage 
that it has fewer administrative and statutory requirements than a CLG and is also a model that 
can be used, in theory, to raise substantial capital from investors through share options. The main 
disadvantage of both these models is that there is less awareness of their financial viability amongst 
advisers, lenders and funders. The BenCom must operate for the benefit of persons other than 
its members, with a major advantage that it would be possible for it to have charitable status. 
Again, it would have fewer administrative costs and the ability to raise capital from investors 
through a shares issue. It would be suitable for larger co-housing communities, which may have 
smaller subsidiary associations, and suitable for Community Land Trusts or other community 
assets, such as village shops, bakeries or pubs for example (See Appendix E for more on legal 
structures).  
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The governance aspects vary between the different co-housing schemes that exist. Some have 
highly developed groups for participating in all aspects of communal life, especially when there is 
a large group of people, whereas smaller co-housing groups have more informal, but maybe more 
frequent contacts. However, one important aspect is that the groups are closed – only residents 
are involved in management – and the rules for entry and exit reflect the tenancy arrangements 
and how tight-knit the co-housing group is as a community. This signals a difference with larger 
mutualised housing groups, including CLTs.  
 
The umbrella organisation for co-housing in the UK, the Co-housing Network, has been 
increasingly active in the promotion of co-housing during the last ten to fifteen years. It has also 
been involved in work across the mutualised housing sector in bringing experiences of different 
groups together, in publishing and organising conferences and seminars, as well as in facilitating 
research into co-housing. As they state on their website: “The UK Co-housing Network works 
with other community-led housing sector support organisations to help shape the policy and 
financial framework to enable the delivery of more mutual housing solutions. This is achieved 
through working in partnership with the Mutual Housing Group” (Gooding, 2007). Again, this 
shows an increase interest in mutual models of housing.  
 
 
2.4.3 Community Land Trusts 
 
The newest model of mutual housing, with roots in some of the oldest antecedents around 
collective land ownership, is the Community Land Trust (CLT). In terms of land acquisition and 
ownership, the CLT model was originally based on the acquisition of low cost land, holding it in 
trust off the market to preserve its affordability, and building homes for rent or part ownership, 
as in Howard’s Garden City. This mechanism clearly distinguishes the land as a shared resource 
or ‘commons’, which is held in trust by the CLT and leased to the householder or Trust, and the 
housing or other community assets built on the land.  
 
Financing mechanisms of CLTs can be much more open than for other forms of co-housing since 
members of the wider community, not just residents or householders, are beneficiaries of the 
eventual project. Access to grant funding can also be easier since a business plan can include the 
receipts of private housing rentals to cross-subsidise more affordable housing in a mixed tenure 
model. Usually, a business plan demonstrates how the CLT can capture value from assets it owns 
and produces.  
 
In terms of the production, the design and build process is very like co-housing projects and may 
include support from a greater number of partners such as housing associations (HAs) and 
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developers. Housing Associations can have an important role in helping develop and manage 
mixed tenure schemes that allow for asset value capture and cross-subsidy of more affordable 
housing (Moore, 2016; Pati, 2011). In the case of the CLT, it is the ownership and governance of 
the housing or asset after development that is different to other mutual housing models. The 
management organisation is usually headed by a Board comprising representatives of residents, 
local community interests as well as professionals who would not necessarily be living in the CLT 
housing or in the direct vicinity. Thus, in contrast to the smaller, more defined groups running 
co-housing or even housing co-operatives, CLT management has members from a much wider 
constituency.  
 
The recent experience of the Community Land Trust movement in Scotland has been supported 
by a framework of law in Scotland created in 2003 for community landowners (CLOs). Although 
this is rooted in historical community land takeovers, such as Stornoway Trust which was the first 
community owner on the Isle of Lewis in 1923 (Satsangi, 2007) There have been community 
buyouts of islands creating CLTs, such as the Isle of Eigg (1997) and Gigha (2002), as well as 
estates and forests (McIntosh, 2004; Satsangi, 2009). Thus far, twelve community owners have 
provided 300 housing units and are managing assets valued at over £50 million. This land trust 
movement has been part of the wider land reform movement in Scotland (Wightman, 2000; 
Wightman, 1996; Wightman, 2013; McIntosh, 2004). Campaigning had an important role in 
transforming the possible legislation around community ownership in Scotland. Similarly, 
campaigning has been important for CLTs in London, including the historic Coin Street, 
Walterton and Elgin Community Homes (WECH) and the more recent East London CLT 
(Bunce, 2016; Rosenberg, 2011, 2012; Bailey, 2012). These communities form part of wider 
housing movements and are therefore also tapped into wider institutional networks.  
 
Community Land Trusts can differ substantially in their governance aims and structures. Marcuse, 
for example, defined three legal forms of ownership: CLTs can be either “empty – available to 
any group for any purpose; moderate – to deal with serious but limited problems for a limited 
group; or full-bodied – handling both immediate problems but with a broad social justice 
perspective pushing transformative content and actions” (Marcuse, 2013). In theory, a spectrum 
exists ranging from exclusionary use, resulting in the empty form, through to a model based more 
explicitly on principles of social justice, either favouring disenfranchised people who have limited 
access to housing, or fulfilling a democratic role at a local, neighbourhood level for greater 
enfranchisement, which can result in the so-called full-bodied form. The CLT’s position in this 
spectrum range depends on such factors as: how the idea of ‘community’ is used or made 
operational or how the constituency of the CLT is conceived and who the members are; the 
political role of the CLT and its connections with campaigns dealing with local housing-based 
issues; and, lastly, the CLT’s economic role, and how it is able to decommodify the land it owns, 
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offering an opportunity for different forms of wealth creation, and the provision of such 
economic advantages as security of tenure and long-term forms of investment (Large, 2010; 
Lambert, 2012b).  
 
There is much to be learnt from the current examples and their link to the history of community-
based asset ownership and control (Bailey, 2012; Moore, 2014; Moore and McKee, 2012). Of 
importance is the role of partnerships between public and third sector organisations, such as 
housing associations (Moore, 2016) and the role of CLT as intermediaries, as “part of a wider 
‘movement’ of community ownership, as opposed to a one-off housing scheme within the 
confines of their local community” (Moore, 2014b, p.47).  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Mutual housing can be understood as an historical form of housing provision in the UK, reaching 
back to at least the beginnings of the co-operative movement and to the birth of social housing 
in the nineteenth century, if not further. There are strands that go back both in practice and in 
theory – from the provision of housing for poor or older people during the Middle Ages, to the 
utopian thinkers of pre-socialist thought (Coates, 2001; Herring, 2002; Miles, 2007). This chapter 
explores the origin of the particular forms of mutual housing that exist today, and shows that they 
are rooted in the self-help, collective and communal traditions as forms of bottom-up housing 
(Ward, 2002; Turner and Fichter, 1972; Turner, 1978; Tummers, 2015; Moore and Mullins, 2013) 
as well as the philanthropic and municipal movements for the provision of social housing arising 
in the late Victorian era (Malpass, 2000, 2001; Harloe, 2008; Hall and Ward, 1998).  
 
The contemporary models resulting from this historical trajectory consist broadly of co-operative, 
co-housing and Community Land Trusts (Woodin, Crook and Carpentier, 2010; Gulliver, Handy 
and Morris, 2013; Gulliver, 2014a). To develop the understanding of how these models are 
produced, it is useful to bring in literature from the structural institutional work around structures 
of provision (Ball, 1998; De Magalhães, 1999; Edwards, 1995). These theoretical frames form the 
basis to build a typology of the different forms of mutual housing provision in Section 2.3. The 
functions within each moment of provision are then described more fully to ascertain the way in 
which mutualism occurs within each moment, thus determining the overall level of mutualism. 
The typology developed then forms the basis for a deeper explanation of the specific moments in 
the structure of provision for mutual housing (Fig.2). These provide a foundation for 
understanding the institutions of mutual housing and their governance.  The use of the structure 
of provision framework as applied to mutual housing as outlined in this chapter provides the 
framework to understand the institutional ecology for mutual housing. However, internal 
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governance institutions are established as a form of collective action around the control and 
management of mutual housing, as members of the groups craft their own set of rules, norms and 
practices, both informal and formal. These internal institutions have evolved within historical, 
cultural and social settings, as described above. The next chapter will develop an analytical 
framework that can be used to understand better the collective governance of mutual housing – 
the micro-practices developed by groups in their response to managing mutual housing together. 
38 
 
   
39 
 
Chapter 3      
 
 
A theoretical framework of mutual housing governance institutions 
 
 
The growing interest in the ‘commons’ as a concept embracing assets 
and rights which we share among us, either in closed groups or in open 
forms, is a valuable sign that there is coming to be support for 
ownership forms above and beyond simple exclusive private 
proprietorship.  (Edwards, 2015, p.51) 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The governance of mutual housing is based on the generation of collective action by the group. 
Specific forms of collective governance emerge from the experiences of mutual housing groups. 
This chapter explores the theoretical basis used to understand the governance institutions that 
have developed to manage mutual housing as a collective action problem.  
 
Mutual housing involves multiple actors or stakeholders working towards a shared or mutual end, 
engaged in collective action. Ostrom (1990) offers an analytical framework which can be used to 
look at the institutions and rules for co-operative and collective action, which was developed to 
understand the governance of commons (Ostrom, 1990; Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2010). As 
one of the principal scholars on the ‘commons’ and on governance institutions, Ostrom was useful 
to draw on. Furthermore, the work could also be tested for its potential application in planning 
research through the collective governance in mutual housing. 
 
It is important to understand that the commons are not just a way of describing forms of shared 
assets or natural resources. Linebaugh (2008) explains that to “speak of the commons as if it were 
a natural resource is misleading at best and dangerous at worst—the commons is an activity and, 
if anything, it expresses relationships in society that are inseparable from relations to nature” 
(2008, p. 279). Therefore, applying a theory of collective action to mutual housing is based on 
seeing mutual housing not just as assets, but to look at the relations within mutual housing groups 
and how its governance involves the design or crafting of the necessary institutions to manage the 
housing collectively. 
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The concept of ‘crafting’ recalls Sennett (2008, 2012) who explores in an historical and sociological 
way how humans have made things by developing crafts and rituals, including of working and 
living together. The governance of mutual housing therefore involves crafted practices of 
mutualising, and what could be called ‘commoning’ activities (Linebaugh, 2008). This chapter 
outlines the main definitions – including the idea of the mutual housing commons, and the 
practices of commoning, including governance, institutions and property – to develop an 
institutional framework for the analysis of mutual housing. 
 
 
3.2 Mutual housing: From commons to commoning 
 
Theories of collective action and the commons have emerged within the social sciences as a way 
to understand and map the relations, as well as struggles, of groups of people (i.e. commoners) to 
control resources (commons) through processes of commoning (Roggero, 2010; Linebaugh, 2008; 
Bollier and Helfrich, 2015; Bresnihan, 2015; Kirwan, Dawney and Brigstocke, 2015), including 
housing (Noterman, 2016; Bresnihan and Byrne, 2015). An important part of the literature 
developing the concept of the commons has come from understanding common pool resources 
and common property regimes (Dietz, Ostrom and Stern, 2003; Ostrom, 1990; Isaac et al., 2010). 
Through this strand of work, the governance of the ‘commons’ was related to the institutions 
governing collective action to manage goods among multiple actors who worked together to 
achieve a set of rules and norms by which their shared goods were allocated (Ostrom, 1990, 2000). 
Ostrom and her co-scholars demonstrated how people can construct rules that allow them to 
exploit the environment in an ecologically sustainable way, without the need for government 
regulation or the assumption of a binary option in property forms; i.e. either public (state) or 
private ownership. The work was important, first, for understanding the governance of 
‘commons’ and, secondly, for indicating a direction for the study of economics that offers a richer, 
more heterodox approach, eschewing the simplistic dichotomies of either the market and the 
State, or private and public.  
 
From Ostrom’s observations of the institutions crafted for the governance of different forms of 
property or resources, she developed eight design principles for the management of common pool 
resources. These design principles were essential elements or conditions for the success of these 
institutions to maintain the resources. They were normative and speculative, since they were 
derived from successful examples and have not been replicated widely (Ostrom, 1990, pp.90–91). 
Furthermore, Ostrom pointed out that for the design principles to be credible, they must also 
affect the incentives to conform, join in and replicate the institutions across time (see Fig.3 below).  
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Ostrom’s theories emerged from working on the problem of collective action. There seem to be 
two “problems” here – the first is theoretical and is the problem of how to model collective action 
and the second is empirical and it is how to understand on the ground experiences of the creation, 
the difficulties, the challenges of successful collective action. The first is a problem of modelling 
collective action or “how to model social dilemma situations in light of the repeated evidence that 
early theoretical predictions have not been supported” (Ostrom 2010, p.155). Ostrom’s empirical 
work demonstrated the fundamental flaws in the assumptions underlying the earlier and influential 
piece by Garrett Hardin entitled the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), where Hardin explored 
the so-called Herder Problem, using it as a theoretical-allegorical warning of the dangers associated 
with situations where there is a public resource, generating private benefits and with shared costs. 
Hardin argued that it was possible that groups of resource users would not recognise the dangers 
of overexploitation and would over-use the resource shared because of individual gain. Ostrom 
and her colleagues began to research how this ‘tragedy’ had repeatedly been overcome in many 
empirical settings with specific institutions to manage the commons. Hardin’s position was 
amended in a later work, where he recognised the error of confusing a ‘commons’, which had 
shared management institutions, with an ‘open access resource’ (Hardin, 1994). In this later paper, 
he made an explicit distinction between the unmanaged (or un-owned) commons, subject to 
uncontrolled extraction and therefore degradation, and managed (or owned) commons, where 
property rights can prevent misuse of the resources. 
 
Figure 3: Eight design principles for managing a commons  
  
1.  Define clear group boundaries. 
 
2.  Establish rules to govern use of common goods to match local needs and 
conditions. 
 
3.  Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules. 
 
4.  Make sure the rule-making rights of community members are respected by 
outside authorities. 
 
5.  Develop a system, whereby community members can monitor members’ 
behaviour. 
 
6.  Use graduated sanctions for rule violators. 
 
7.  Provide accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution. 
 
8.  Build responsibility for governing the common resource in nested tiers from 
the lowest level up to the entire interconnected system - or the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
 
(Ostrom, 1990, p.90) 
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Hardin, however, had tapped into an older political discourse that had accompanied the centuries-
old appropriation of the commons, chronicled by historians (Neeson, 1996; Thompson, 1991; 
Linebaugh, 2008; Mingay, 1997). According to that political discourse, the “sloth, idleness and 
misery” (Thompson, 1991, p.163) of the serfs in feudal England were an obstacle to the 
development of agriculture and had led to the enclosures of common land and the attacks on 
communal practices, which were considered as anti-progressive and unproductive (Peters, 1994; 
Goldman, 1997; Linebaugh, 2010). Hence, Jeremy Bentham believed that “the condition most 
favourable to the prosperity of agriculture exists when there are no entails, no unalienable 
endowments, no common lands, no right of redemptions” (see Polanyi, 1944, p.189).  
 
Hardin failed to acknowledge the possibility that institutions of governance could be created to 
manage the common resource as a self-organised system and failed to recognise that pre-existing 
institutions could also be a feature of any such problem. An “appropriate response is not 
necessarily to create new institutions; an alteration in existing institutional arrangements may 
sometimes be sufficient. Even when new institutions seem desirable, they must be analysed within 
the context of the existing set of institutions with which they must interact” (Cole, Epstein and 
McGinnis, 2014, p.11). Therefore, there are two points made here – that institutions can be 
created, but that there could also be in existence institutions that were unrecognised, capable of 
resolving some of the collective action problems of the governance of shared resources.  
 
Ostrom’s interest in the commons and in collective governance arrangements was inspired by her 
work analysing the collective management of water basins in California (Ostrom 1990). This has 
echoes of Marx’s own inspiration: writing for the Rheinische Zeitung about the theft of wood in 
Germany and the transformation of commons as a commodity form, led him to study political 
economy more carefully. Ostrom’s theoretical basis was derived from different schools of 
thought, closer to the liberal, free-market school based on the ideas of Adam Smith, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Friedrich Hayek, among others, and she also included reference to the 
Haudenosaunee or Iroquois Confederacy1 (see Wall 2014 on Ostrom’s intellectual history).  
 
Boettke, an Austrian School economist, points out that, throughout the history of political 
economic thought, social order has been attributed either to the invisible hand of market 
coordination (Smith) or to the heavy hand of state control (Hobbes): 
                                                            
1 Some aspects of governance worth noting of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy included having a women’s 
section in their Great Law (Johansen and Mann, 2000, pp.122–129). They used the guiding precept of 
consensus (“No matter was ever closed as long as anyone in any council wanted to discuss it” (Johansen & 
Mann 2000, p.123); the principle of twins (moieties) in the structure of councils, clans and nations of the 
league; the possibility of three courses of action during discussions: to accept, reject or table a measure; and 
the use of political reciprocity, rather than hierarchy, in decision-making. 
43 
 
 
[Ostrom’s] work on local public economies and common-pool resources focusses on actual 
“rules in use” (as opposed to the “rules in form”) that decentralized individuals and groups 
rely on to make decisions and to coordinate their behaviour to overcome social dilemmas. 
It yields an optimistic message about the power of self-governance to succeed even in 
difficult situations (Boettke, 2009) 
 
Therefore, one can see how there is a strong sympathy for Ostrom’s work from an individualist 
and liberal-market perspective. Although rooted in methodological individualism (Fine, 2010; 
Caffentzis, 2009), her work looked at how groups come to negotiate rules, customs and 
institutions to manage particular ‘common’ goods. This is the second “problem” of collective 
action. Ostrom saw empirically how, through various voluntary associations, groups could 
transform the open unregulated commons situation from a potential ‘tragedy of the commons’ to 
an ‘opportunity of the commons’. Decentralised groups could develop rule systems that enabled 
social co-operation which emerged through voluntary association. She saw, for example, how that 
emphasis on community action could be a way of empowering the less powerful (Wall, 2014). 
Therefore, following Wall, the task here is to use Ostrom’s insights to help understand the how 
more mutual solutions in housing can be developed and how these groups address the problem 
of collective action within mutual housing groups – i.e. to understand on the ground experiences 
of the creation, the difficulties, the challenges of successful collective action, through the 
experiences of mutual housing groups. 
 
The four basic types of goods identified by Ostrom (2005, p.24) are categorised by their 
excludability and extractability. For mutual housing, viewed as a material and physical good, the 
subtractability is high but the difficulty of excludability is low – much like private goods. However, 
mutual housing needs governance institutions that are collectively developed and crafted for the 
group to function effectively. Therefore, it is not the actual good of housing which is understood 
as being the arena of the collective action problem – but it is the governance of the mutual 
housing. This involves an ontological shift from considering the provision of mutual housing as 
merely the physical attributes of the resource, to a position where the provision of mutual housing 
is considered through the social attributes, namely the governance institutions themselves.  
 
Ostrom’s work does elide some important questions that other scholars of the commons have 
tried to reveal more explicitly. There are the broader issues of structural and exogenous inequality, 
including the violence that has accompanied the structures of exploitation, imposed on groups 
managing their resources by a processes which Marxists have studied as primitive accumulation 
(Marx, 1973, p.777; Harvey, 2010, p.58), accumulation by dispossession (Glassman, 2016) or a 
process of capitalist valorisation (Caffentzis, 2010; De Angelis, 2007; Federici, 2004; McCarthy, 
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2005). As Bresnihan points out (2015, p.38), there are questions around the historical and social 
reasons that resource scarcity exists, which can apply to the structural conditions of the ‘housing 
crisis’ too. This also includes issues around power, expressed or latent (Lukes, 1974).  
 
Furthermore, as Goldman points out (1997, p.1) there are different epistemic communities that 
have used the commons discourses. Caffentzis (2010) notes how the resurgence of ‘commons’ 
thinking can be mapped out as a “confluence of streams coming from opposing perspectives” 
(2010, p.23). The institutionalist approach is broadly interested in understanding the practices and 
institutions developed for the management of resources in common, as does Ostrom (1990). 
Another approach, articulated by writers such as Federici (2004), Negri and Hardt (2001, 2004, 
2009), de Angelis (2005, 2007) among others, have tried to understand the historical dimension 
to forms of resistance to the enclosures of particular resources and the building of new spaces of 
production (De Angelis, 2007; Chatterton, Hodkinson and Pickerill, 2010; Chatterton, 2010, 2013; 
Hodkinson, 2012; Gibson-Graham, Cameron and Healy, 2013). These scholars articulate a more 
dialectical or co-constitutive position, which uses an idea of commons that is created both against 
and as part of the enclosure or privatisation process. A commons is created because of the threat 
of enclosure: “arguably only in reaction to invasion, dispossession or other threats to accustomed 
security of access that the concept of common rights emerges” (Goldsmith, Hildyard and 
McCully, 1992, p.126). In the same way, many housing campaigns emerge as a reaction to 
conditions, threats of demolition or expulsion, and mutual housing has emerged in a similar way 
– as a reaction to the paucity of provision under the capitalist-welfarist system. De Angelis (2007) 
puts forward a definition of commons as “social spheres of life (that) provide various degrees of 
protection from the market. It is either capital that makes the world through commodification 
and enclosures, or it is the rest of us – whoever that is – that makes the world through counter-
enclosures and commons” (2007, p.145).  
 
Both Federici’s position (an historical-feminist one) and Negri and Hardt’s position (a broader 
and more overtly political-theoretical one) echo this. Indeed, the latter’s concept of the commons 
is not that of pre-given commons, as in its more historical usage, but rather, that a commons is 
socially produced. Hardt and Negri (2009) also push the discussion of the commons beyond the 
dualistic framework of public versus private ownership and see the commons as an effect of 
sharing and co-operation, with an inclusive, productive and processual logic, which can be 
organised politically (2009, pp.15–16). The productive and processual logic can also be applied to 
mutual housing, which have particular institutions of governance, and through the mutual housing 
institutions, an emergent ‘commons’ of mutual housing.  
 
Some scholars have pointed out that the institutionalist approach risks being too neutral and 
apolitical (Wall, 2014; Bresnihan, 2015; Fine, 2010). There is no recognition either on how the 
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same commons approach can be used politically to address the continuation of enclosures, whilst 
ignoring wider structural capitalist dynamics of accumulation, dispossession and challenges to 
contemporary processes of social reproduction (Goldman, 1997). Nonetheless, Ostrom (1990) 
does offer a useful analytical framework, from an institutionalist perspective, to understand the 
emergent institutions of commoning within mutual housing. Building on Ostrom’s work, we can 
also draw on the more critical theoretical work, and look at “the commons as a political concept 
and strategy, (and) understand the ‘how’ and ‘what’ the practices of commoning are” (Bresnihan 
and Byrne, 2015, p.38), or the everyday “doing” of the commons (Linebaugh, 2008) as applied to 
mutual housing.  
 
Figure 4: Design points of orientation for commoning rules  
 
1. As commoners we clearly understand the resources cared for 
and with whom the responsibility is shared. Common resources 
are created together and as commoners we maintain, and 
guarantee use together.  
2.  As commoners we use the common resources that we create, 
care for and maintain, using the means (time, space, technology 
and quantity) available in a given context. As commoners we are 
satisfied that there is a fair relationship between contribution 
given and benefits received.  
3.  As commoners we enter into or modify our rules and 
commitments, and every commoner can participate in this 
process. Our commitments serve to create, maintain and 
preserve the commons to satisfy our needs.  
4.  As commoners we monitor the respect of these commitments 
ourselves, or mandate others whom we trust to help reach this 
goal. These commitments are reassessed to see whether they still 
serve their purpose.  
5.  We work out appropriate rules for dealing with violations of our 
commitments, determining kinds of sanctions, depending on 
context and severity of violation. 
6. Every commoner can make use of a space and means for 
conflict resolution. We seek to resolve conflicts among us in an 
easily accessible and straightforward way. 
7.  We regulate our own affairs and external authorities respect that.  
8.  Every commons is part of a larger whole. Therefore, different 
institutions working at different scales are needed to coordinate 
stewardship and to co-operate with each other. 
 
(Source: Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2010, pp.226–227; Bollier and Helfrich, 2015, pp.48) 
  
The eight design points of “orientation for commoning rules” (Fig.4) were developed at a Summer 
School on the Commons (June 2012). Participants adapted the eight design principles as 
formulated by Ostrom which distilled the lessons from a large number of ethnographic case 
studies from around the world: “Approaching the commons from the perspective of active 
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commoners, meaning the people who create and maintain working commons…provided a 
template for the following points of orientation for commoning” (Bollier and Helfrich, 2015, 
p.48). The template can be adapted theoretically for mutual housing (Fig.5), as a set of principles 
for designing or crafting the governance institutions of mutual housing 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Design principles for commoning rules in mutual housing governance  
 
1A. Defining authorised use: The community of those who have the right 
to live, use, or be involved in the management of mutual housing.  
1B.  Define boundaries: The boundaries of the mutual housing are clearly 
defined for the separate usage rules and governance rules.  
2. Costs: Costs for using and maintaining the housing are proportional 
to the benefits those users receive from using and managing the 
housing.  
3A.  Decision-making: Inclusive decision-making means that everyone who 
benefits from or is affected by the use and management of the housing 
makes choices about it. This includes decision-making on housing 
allocation and on rules and responsibilities for use, for example. 
Members of the community operate with respect and mutual regard 
for each other.  
3B. Adapting the rules: Members adapt the rules and culture of the group 
to their needs, the local needs, quality and conditions of the housing 
and other emergent commons. 
4A. Knowledge: Members share knowledge and skills affecting the 
conditions of the housing and other emergent commons.  
4B. Monitoring: Members of the group or supported by and accountable 
to the community can monitor and report on use and maintenance of 
the housing, and the rules of use. 
5. Accountability: Violators of the rules or norms can face sanctions, 
proportional to the seriousness of transgression. These are applied by 
members of the mutual housing group and others accountable to the 
group.  
6.  Conflict resolution: The mutual housing group has inexpensive, rapid 
and easy access to mediation for effective conflict resolution. 
7. Local governance: Mutual housing groups’ autonomy and self-
determination is recognised and supported by local authorities and 
other groups – local or umbrella organisations.  
8. Coordinate with related groups: Mutual housing groups are part of 
larger umbrella groups or networks of groups, with coordination 
among groups. Larger scale governance can support activities and the 
coordination of shared services, governed by the principle of 
subsidiarity assigning governance tasks to the lowest level possible 
unless ineffective.  
 
 (Adapted from: Ostrom, 1990; Bollier and Helfrich, 2015) 
 
Therefore, crafting of governance institutions for mutual housing is a form of commoning, which 
is useful as an updated and more comprehensive set of principles (Fig.5) than, for example, the 
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Co-operative Principles (Fig.1). However, in the same way that the Co-operative Principles 
outlined in the previous chapter are normative, both the design principles for managing a 
commons (Fig.3) as well as design principles for commoning applied to mutual housing (Fig.5) 
are also normative and speculative. Therefore, the chapter will now develop a theoretical 
framework to analyse governance institutions within mutual housing groups in London. 
 
 
3.3 Institutional framework for analysis 
 
To understand instances of successful collective governance, Ostrom collected empirical studies 
as examples of how ‘commons’ were governed sustainably and equitably in a decentralised, 
collective way. The governance theory Ostrom developed looked specifically at the institutions 
that groups of people developed to manage these ‘commons’ and considered the need to reflect 
on institutional change, which she developed into the Institutional Analysis Development 
framework (IAD) (Ostrom, 1986, 2005, 1990). Included in her analysis was also the importance 
of outside political regimes in affecting internal variables and the need to share information, 
including about transaction costs, all of which had not been considered by previous models of 
collective action.  
 
There are a few ways of modelling social dilemmas or collective action problem to understand 
how to best resolve the problem of collective action. “Collective-action problems occur when 
individuals choose actions…in an interdependent situation” (Ostrom, 2010, p.155). These 
collective action problems can be analysed as games that can reproduce the social outcomes in a 
given social dilemma or situations. In experimental economics games used include public good 
games, common-pool resource games, games of trust, the dictator and ultimatum game, and 
famously, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Ostrom, 1990, p.182). 
 
It was assumed, from a behavioural perspective, that individuals would be not only be interested 
in maximising their short-term gains (Ostrom, 1990, 1986; Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2010). 
This contrasts with models which demonstrated that individuals would not co-operate to achieve 
collective benefits, as described in Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) and Mancur 
Olson’s Logic of collective action (Olson, 1971), both of which built on the assumptions of rational 
choice actors caught in social dilemmas.  
 
Also, in behavioural theory, the factors that affect human decision-making are assumed to include 
the level of information actors possess. For example, the actors involved may initially possess 
incomplete information about the structure of the situation though, with time, they acquire more 
information depending on the intensity and repetition of interactions between actors. Actors may 
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also have preferences about the outcomes that are selfish, but these are combined with other 
preferences that may be altruistic or normative, which will also affect their decisions on a longer-
term basis. Actors involved also typically use a range of decision-making techniques (heuristics) 
that allow them to approximate net benefits (Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2010, p.223). These 
techniques evolve over time and use by the actors and by the groups they belong to. Overall, 
therefore, collective action depends on the development of learning and adaptation on some level, 
of non-selfish preferences and norms, and on the development and use of decision-making 
techniques and heuristics. Trust also plays a central role in influencing collective action in these 
situations, in bringing people together to learn from one another as well as rely and depend on 
one another as an aspect of mutualism.  
 
Returning to the eight design principles (Fig.3), these can be used as the outline for a theoretical 
framework that can be used to understand governance institutions in mutual housing groups. 
Some terms can be made more specific to the nature of mutual housing, by drawing on other 
literature, on the typology developed (Fig.2) and empirical work. Concepts of scale, forms of 
control and governance, and historical context are drawn from Woodin’s historical review of 
community and mutual ownership (Woodin, Crook and Carpentier, 2010). Woodin constructed 
a typology of different mutual and community forms of ownership developed and these ranged 
from common or customary ownership, based on shared usage, ‘rights in common’ and the shared 
construction of rules-for-use, through to municipal ownership, based on the State-led provision 
of collective needs.  
 
The form and extent of control is also important in Somerville’s work, where community control 
is exercised by “any group of people who live in the same neighbourhood or community, share a 
common interest, and exercise the power to choose, on an informed basis, the content and extent 
of their involvement in what happens in that neighbourhood or community” (2002, p.4). 
Community control can be over on a range of assets, from housing, land, the provision of services 
or other community interests. Here we see community control as a form of governance, with 
governance institutions created for and by, specifically, the community involved in mutual 
housing.  
 
The governance institutions created will depend on the membership of the group (the number of 
people involved), the extensity or scale of the mutual housing, the conflicts involved, including 
methods of arbitration, negotiation, and the role of different groups within the mutual housing 
form (see Ostrom, 1990). The rules will depend on the availability of data for understanding the 
above, including budgetary and asset information. To transform the rules, there must be an 
understanding of the number of decision makers who regulate membership and participation, the 
diversity and source of innovation and of conflict, the rules in use for changing rules, such as 
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constitutions or norms, and the diversity of skills and roles of leaders. To monitor and enforce 
the rules there must be information of the size (i.e. scale and extensity) and form of management 
of mutualised housing, the techniques for exclusion, and the methods of enforcing, supporting, 
and educating.  
 
Information regarding internal norms and so-called discount rates would be based on what 
important informal rules and norms are, which allow people to be involved in decision-making in 
the mutual housing group, the availability of information and knowledge of related norms, norms 
of trust and reciprocity and other factors such as physical proximity to one another, social network 
density and institutional thickness. Information is also needed about the past context and 
institutional decisions, which can be based on the culture and history of the mutual housing 
experiences. There are also requirements set by external authorities, such as local government, 
partners, funding institutions, legislative and planning bodies – which can be summarised as the 
policy and state context. In summary, the institutions of governance of mutual housing can be 
understood by looking at the themes outlined in below.  
 
Figure 6: Framework to understand mutual housing governance institutions 
 
1. The historical, social and cultural contexts  
2. The role of internal institutions 
3. The role of external institutions 
4. The specific rules and norms for governing the mutualised 
housing group 
5. The procedures for changing rules and norms 
6. The monitoring, enforcement, incentives and punishments used 
to keep rules and norms 
7. The ways knowledge is shared, and trust is developed within the 
group 
 
 
The emergence of a mutual housing group is an historical event, because it is a collective response 
to historically-specific social and economic contexts of housing issues. However, people involved 
in such an historic event cannot simply be assumed to share a common interest in the goal and 
purpose of mutual housing. This is where the importance of governance institutions comes to the 
fore since they can build a sense of their shared common goals and keep them relevant to the 
group despite individuals’ separate interests, including the introduction of monitoring and 
punishment rules and norms.  
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The themes of interest described can be used as a basis for data collection across the different 
forms of mutual housing models. It will be possible, based on these results, to answer the specific 
research question of how mutual housing groups in London overcome the problem of collective 
action through self-governance, and the sub-questions that emerge from this overall question on 
how mutual housing groups are governed, and what forms of collective governance result from 
the experiences of mutual housing groups in London. A more detailed presentation of the main 
themes follows:  
 
 
 
1. Historical context, including the evolving social and cultural context of the 
experiences: 
The first theme consists of the information that exists and circulates within the group on the past 
and the context of the mutual housing group. This includes the wider history and socio-cultural 
context of the housing experience. This theme of institutional practices could be divided into two 
parts: it can relate, at a group level, to how members talk about and define themselves according 
to their past experiences, how stories are recorded, including official documents such as minutes 
taken, and documents held, or the group’s oral history and memories about the history of the 
housing experience. Then there are also broader historical contexts, which include wider social 
and cultural norms of society that may have also influenced the mutual housing group’s formation 
and decisions made.  
 
2. The role of internal institutions: 
The group is defined by its membership, including the number of people involved, their jobs, 
experiences, class, income, etc, as well as the extensity or scale of the mutual housing group. It 
could also include how people in the groups talk about and define themselves both as members 
of the group or as mutual housing group, along with their own perceptions of rules and norms 
within the group, and the formal and informal meetings held.  
 
3. The role of broader institutions: 
Broader or external institutions include the legal, financial, planning and other institutional 
arrangements organised from outside the group. Land ownership and modes of finance are also 
institutional arrangements, dictated by outside structural conditions. These are described and 
determined by the relationship that the internal actors to the mutual housing group have with the 
outside actors or networks of institutions, such as the local authority, external partners, funding 
institutions, legislative and planning bodies. One important set of relationships includes the 
umbrella organisations or other secondary organisations which support the activities of the mutual 
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housing group at a stage in their development. In summary, they are the policy, market and state 
contexts in which mutual housing experiences evolve.  
 
4. The specific rules and norms for governing the mutual housing group: 
Rules and norms within mutual housing groups that are used for their own governance can be 
formal and informal; can be prescriptive or proscriptive. The specific rules cover membership of 
the group, qualifications for access to the housing, and the practical running of everyday matters 
in the mutual housing group. There are also rules dealing with conflict resolution, including 
methods of arbitration and negotiation, as well as the role of different actors within the group. 
The rules and norms are also affected by the group-members’ knowledge concerning legal, 
planning and policy-wide issues that affect the strategies and options available to the group.  
 
5. Rules (formal and informal) to change the rules and norms of governance:  
Constitutions or norms are needed so that the rules can be changed. In any group, there must be 
flexibility to change the rules and processes in place. This would be like the first set of institutional 
practices but related more to the groups’ rules regarding elaborating and changing their rules (e.g. 
how often, by whom and how).  
 
6. Monitoring and enforcement, including the evaluation and control of rules and 
norms:  
To monitor and enforce rules and norms, there must be information regarding the size of the 
mutualised housing (i.e. scale and extensity), its form of management, the techniques for 
exclusion, and methods of enforcement, support, and education. The monitoring of the rules will 
also depend on the availability of data for understanding the above, including budgetary, financial 
and other types of asset information. The ability to enforce rules would be related to the types of 
sanctions that would be applicable.  
 
7. Shared knowledge and understandings within the mutual housing groups of their 
rules, norms and governance processes:   
Information circulates internally to the group, including forms of sharing as well as forums or 
activities which allow for sharing. There is also the role of education and broader influences or 
forms of knowledge introduced to the group, which can shift understandings of internal norms 
and rules. Spaces where this happens could include meetings, committees, and training or 
education sessions, as well as other forms of encounters. The ‘encounter’ is an event that 
materialises into new institutional alternatives (Merrifield, 2013, 2012; Perugorría and Tejerina, 
2013), but the sharing of knowledge and understanding is also dependent on how or where the 
housing is located, including its density, its shared spaces, and the dispositional and design 
elements of the shared and communal spaces.  
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Sharing and understanding would also be dependent on social network density and the frequency 
of interactions; how established or widespread the norms of trust and reciprocity are; and the 
availability of information to establish trust. The shared understanding and ability to act on 
knowledge within the group, as well as within broader institutions, could be summarised as social 
capital and its creation within groups (Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Lang and Novy, 2014; Maloney, 
Smith and Stoker, 2000; Rydin and Pennington, 2000; Rydin and Holman, 2004). It is also part of 
a broader pedagogy of co-operation, which includes encounters, activities, and tasks that lead to 
the shared knowledge and understandings that are formed within mutual housing groups. 
 
 
3.4 A theory of collective action for mutual housing 
 
Moving from the institutional framework developed from Ostrom’s work, this final section looks 
more closely at how key concepts, such as governance, institutions and property, can be used in 
the case of mutual housing. Because of the theoretical discussion, normative claims can be made 
about these concepts and their use, as applied to mutual housing.  
 
‘Governance’ is usually used as a concept in relation to the role of the state and market. Mutual 
housing provision is necessarily at the interface of state and market processes, and between public 
and private processes. The second concept is that of ‘institutions’, which also operates at the 
interface between external relations and internal practices, between the state and market, and 
between public and private, and which are– the repeated social practices that perform the function 
of social ordering. How both these concepts are related to the idea of ‘property’ are essential in 
understanding collective, community-based or mutual forms of property arrangements, such as 
those found in mutual housing.  
 
 
3.4.1 Governance 
 
The concept of governance focusses attention on “the processes and ways of governing, different 
ways of doing politics, [including] new, informal and formal, relationships between actors drawn 
into increasingly complex patterns of decision-making and distinctive relationships between the 
state and civil society” (Blakeley, 2005, p.149). Governance shifts the attention onto how the 
process of governing occurs outside of the remit or direct control of government. Governance is 
therefore a broader term than government because it looks at the social practices and institutions 
that go beyond the State, and that are involved in creating rules and order through laws, norms, 
power or language (Bevir, 2003, p.1). Scholars have written about the shift from government to 
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governance over the last 40 years, within urban studies (Stoker, 1998; Swyngedouw, 2005; 
Kooiman, 2003; Newman, 2001).  
 
Two important aspects are worth highlighting. The first is that there is some empirical reality that 
can be studied to understand what governance in a situation is. This comes from a pragmatic-
realist perspective. The second is that governance is also a normative and idealist condition of 
what management should be carried out, how it should be organised and therefore what a group 
should aim for. Schmitter (2002, p.52) defines governance as “a method/mechanism for dealing 
with a broad range of problems/conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory 
and binding decisions by negotiating with each other and co-operating in the implementation of 
these decisions”. The implied strong idealism here is based on the communicative rationality of 
all actors involved, an assumed equality of power relations, as well as shared perfect knowledge 
where “horizontal, non-exclusive and participatory (stake)holder-based governance… [can be] 
symptomatically oblivious to the contradictory tensions in which these forms of governance are 
embedded…[including] democratic content” (Swyngedouw, 2005, p.1995).  
 
The dual use of ‘governance’ is also highlighted by Healey (2009), who writes how it is used as an 
analytical description of the processes that are mobilised to regulate social action; and how 
governance is mobilised by practitioners themselves in a particular transformation, becoming 
associated with the move from “a bureaucratized welfare state focused on universal service 
delivery to the more ‘entrepreneurial’ modes of governance” (Healey, 2009, p.302; cf. with Harvey, 
1989; Jessop, 1998, 2002). In this way, what is highlighted is the way in which “governance theory 
analyses power not (only) as ‘social control’ but as ‘social production’. It moves away from fixed 
ideas about power as a commodity rooted in particular institutions to more fluid ideas of power 
developed and negotiated between partners” (Taylor, 2007, pp.299–300). Therefore, seeing the 
collaborative as well as the conflictual processes within governance is important to understand 
how governance is produced.  
 
As well as considering how governance is produced, it is also important to consider looking at 
changes in governance. Bevir’s account of governance (2012, p.5) “whether conceived as social 
organisation or as a set of new politics, is as a series of disparate social practices that are constantly 
being created and recreated through concrete and meaningful human activity”.  
 
Therefore, all societies are governed through a complex pattern of rules that order and regulate 
economic actors and their interactions. The state and the market are not separate entities, nor 
reifications of a set of networks; rather, there is an aggregation of meaningful actions that coalesce 
into contingent, shifting and contested practices. Governance becomes also the process of 
transforming institutions, when they are open to contestation and change.  
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To understand governance processes, it is necessary also to acknowledge how people have 
different narratives and genealogies on governance. Bevir (2012) develops a decentred theory of 
governance which places the importance on the different narratives people have:  
 
Narrative refers first to the stories by which the people social scientists study and make 
sense of their worlds. Narrative refers, secondly, to the stories by which social scientists 
make sense of the narratives and actions of those they study. In organization studies, there 
is a growing literature on storytelling that is consistent with this idea of narratives as an 
insightful way of analysing governance. (2012, p.8) 
 
The use of different narratives to look at governance within one given situation opens to an 
analysis which considers these different narratives (Bevir, 2003, p.201). A definition for 
governance becomes the narratives about the patterns of changing rules. The objective of this 
research is to understand the production of these patterns of rules, using narratives that individuals 
have about their roles, and understand what these patterns of rules are in systems of self-
organisation used to control mutual housing.  
 
There is a useful connection to be made here between self-governance and self-organisation 
(Rauws, 2016; Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992). Connolly (2013) touches on this in his analysis 
of the many ways in which self-organisation as a concept has been used, beyond those associated 
with market rationality in neoliberal thought. He points to various forms, not only within 
anarchism (Kropotkin, 2012), where self-organising properties of multiple systems lead to creative 
and collective self-amplification (Connolly, 2013, p.15). Thus, it is possible to imagine non-
capitalist economic self-organizing emerging from neoliberal state policy (see Gibson 2014). 
 
Ideas of self-governance can also have utopian projections (Pinder, 2015, 2002). This is where the 
organising principles of direct action, self-help, mutual aid, voluntary association, and self-
organisation can play an important role: “practicing ethical economic interdependence and 
liberating the self, including practices of work–life time balancing, surplus sharing, care for our 
encounters with human and nonhuman, commoning of property, investment in reparative action 
for environments, and investment in infrastructure to support future generations” (Gibson, 2014, 
p.286). 
Utopian projections can also be considered a ‘going beyond’ – a concept used by Marxist scholars 
such as Merrifield and Holloway (Merrifield, 2014; Holloway, 2014, 2010), who see it as part of 
the challenge of (social) alterity. Therefore, “the experiments with social alterity (e.g. the social 
economy) have a place in the mainstream and not just on the margins” (Amin, 2005, p.630). 
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Ward, an anarchist planner, describes the tendency in history of a movement towards free and 
voluntary social arrangements and an emergence of mutualism, where “autonomous and 
voluntary working-class associations have continued to provide their members with services that 
have been directly under their own control rather than originating from the market or the State” 
(Wilkin and Boudeau, 2015, p.2). Both Ostrom and Ward demonstrate how ‘governance’ is useful 
beyond both state and market discourses as it includes the collective ability to create rules to 
control production and management. This is a definition that echoes Healey, who uses 
‘governance’ to mean “the array of activities and agencies involved in collective action in an urban 
area” (Healey, 2009, p.441).  
 
Emerging from governance theory is also the work of Foucault, who developed governmentality 
theory. With reference to role of the state and other institutions of domination, he argued that 
governing is made up of a range of strategies, techniques, and procedures (Rose and Miller, 1992). 
Governmentality was Foucault’s term for how institutions are imagined beyond the state, and 
which offer a way of understanding how specific forms of knowledge and power emerge, develop 
and decline: “Governmentality…was a much more expansive – and expanding – notion that 
involved all manner of organisations, routines and strategies which make knowledge powerful and 
power knowledgeable” (McKinlay, Carter and Pezet 2012).  
 
Foucault used governmentality also as a concept to understand the subjectivities created by 
organising practices and techniques, including mentalities and rationalities, through which subjects 
are governed and power is socially produced. Foucault’s thinking on governmentality and counter-
governmentality radically changed the ways that we theorize governmental power, for example as 
not only coercive and dominating, but also as productive of new subjects and forms of subjection 
(see, for example, Allen, 2003: Hardt, 2011).  Interestingly, governmentality can be seen as a bridge 
conceptually between the control of a population and the potential of creating new individualities 
or “the notions of the individual’s capacity to make themselves with, through and against these 
practices and institutions” (McKinlay, Carter and Pezet 2012). 
However, the experiences which are being observed in this work are in most cases the organic ‘on 
the ground’ organisations by people who are in some way attempting to resist, transform or 
challenge existing discourses and understanding of housing and community. In its traditionally 
understood forms, Foucauldian analysis is often argued to be a structuralist top-down framing 
approach which is not the most useful conceptual framework for the social forms of life explored, 
especially when looking at the lived experience of mutual housing groups who attempt to develop 
different governance strategies.  
 
The counter argument to this does exist, in which it can be stated that there is a positive 
conception of power that Foucault elaborates on whereby every power relationship involves a 
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form of resistance to it but is, at the same time, productive of subjectivities of what could be called 
counter-governmentalities. However, as shall be shown in the empirical material, the governance 
techniques or governmentalities which have evolved or emerge in mutual housing groups are not 
always clear-cut forms of power relations or even counter-power relations. Thus, the central 
aspect of power which is embedded in Foucault’s governmentality approach does not fit well in 
cases where mutual housing is not necessarily seen as counter-hegemonic, nor is it emerging or 
reacting to an imposed structure of governmental power.  
  
In summary, the concept of governance has been explored as a set of collective practices and 
norms that the people involved have control over and about which they have their own narratives. 
Also highlighted briefly were the relations between governance and self-organisation, pointing 
towards an understanding of governance of mutualism and collective action. Finally, a distinction 
was offered between governance and governmentality, the latter using power as a central, a priori 
ontological theme. This raises methodological as well as theoretical-conceptual issues. The use of 
Ostrom as a governance framework is more malleable and useful to look at mutual housing groups 
and allows for power dynamics to be explored in a much more systematic way, without 
presupposing necessarily the domination or counter-domination of the either the state’s role in 
governance or of a sovereign other.  
 
 
3.4.2 Institutions 
 
The concept of ‘institutions’ refers to the patterns, rules and norms established by groups, used 
for their governance – or the techniques for governance. From a sociological position, institutions 
are a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged types of social structures and 
organising relatively stable patterns of human activity (Turner, 2004) and “are the more enduring 
features of social life” (Giddens, 1984, p.24).  
 
Institutions can be simply considered as “the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (North, 1990, p.3) and can be divided into explicit legal institutions and informal 
institutions, which are “conventions, norms of behaviour, and self-imposed codes of conduct”, 
along with the enforcement mechanisms associated with those norms (North, 1991). The utility 
of North’s approach is his emphasis on studying institutional change rather than institutional 
persistence. In part, this had arisen out of earlier work on institutions when examples that had 
existed for a long time led to a sample bias. Importantly, “understanding institutional change 
requires us to understand both how institutions are created and the process of social dynamics 
that lead some institutions to persist and others to disappear” (Wallis, Galiani and Sened, 2014, 
p.31).  
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The Bloomington political science workshop set up by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom developed 
institutional analysis to understand the problem of collective action through institutions of self-
governance. The institutions of governance refer to the patterns of rules and norms established 
by groups. The rules that the groups both adopt and adapt to are based on the “shared 
understandings that certain actions in particular situations either must, must not, or may be 
undertaken, and that sanctions will be taken against those who do not conform” (Ostrom, 1998, 
p.10). In addition to rules, there are norms – which are more informal and can be considered as 
the beliefs and understandings held and shared by the group that govern individuals’ behaviour. 
The form of institutional analysis which Ostrom developed considered institutions as structures 
and mechanisms of social order and co-operation that determined the behaviour of a group of 
individuals. The institutions were the shared rules and norms created – formal (rules and laws) 
and informal (rules-in-use and norms) – and that evolve as part of the process of governance. 
 
To talk of institutional change is also to engage with a more processual, teleological account of 
institutions. Such a processual account could also include a description of the human good or 
social benefit that is produced (Miller, 2014), and which can be understood as:  
 
 (1)  Produced, maintained and/or renewed by means of the joint activity of members of 
organisations (e.g. schools, hospitals, governments, business firms) i.e. by 
institutional role occupants;  
(2)  Made available to a whole community (e.g. food, security, banking services); and  
(3) One which ought to be produced (or maintained or renewed) and made available to 
the whole community because they are desirable (as opposed to merely desired) and 
such that the members of the community have an (institutional) joint moral right to 
them. (Miller, 2010, p.4) 
 
These institutional principles can be applied to mutual housing and the idea of community implies 
some form of participation in the institutional arrangements, relative to the reach of the social 
institution in question (Miller, 2014). The concept of community therefore presupposes a group 
– the collective – that somehow self-identifies and acknowledges a share of rights over a shared 
good. Somerville describes community governance as “process of decision-making that takes 
place on a scale appropriate for, and regarded as legitimate by, identifiable communities” 
(Somerville, 2005, p.120). Here community is mainly considered to be a community of place – a 
group of people linked by where they live, work or spend much of their time, thus spatially 
constrained or specific – as opposed to a community of interest, practice or purpose. A 
community of place is created through the creation of a shared imaginary that bonds people 
through their interest in a space. Community conceived in this way connects governance and 
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territoriality. There is also a strong normative democratic notion embedded in the idea of 
community governance – a form of stakeholder democracy, which is territorialised (Somerville 
2002). There is also a risk that embedded power relations persist, such as local oligarchies 
(Somerville, 2005, p.125), which can easily be overlooked. At a conceptual level, ‘community’ can 
be used acritically and could also have deep paradoxical, even conservative, disciplinary or 
exclusionary purposes, which reveal a darker side to the idealised notion of ‘community’ (as 
explored by Joseph 2002). These tensions are confirmed by the empirical material discussed in 
Chapter 9.  
 
The governance of mutual housing involves the management of collective rights, which include 
the creation, and sometimes innovation, of ‘alternative’ governance practices; these may be 
contrary to the mainstream or hegemonic way of approaching the production, management and 
control of housing. The institutions themselves, however, are not necessarily different between 
groups despite the subjective circumstances of those involved might be less conventional, and 
therefore they can be part of a wider creation and spread of new social tools or inventions (Whyte, 
1982; Meehan, 2013; Kincaid, 2004). At a local scale they are a source of institutional innovation 
(Moulaert, Martinelli, Swyngedouw and Gonzalez, 2005; Gerometta, Haussermann and Longo, 
2005; González and Healey, 2005; Pickerill and Maxey, 2009). The innovatory practices in this 
case specifically concern the development of institutions for a community or group, and their own 
collective control of assets, such as property and land. For example, Meehan (2013) notes how 
Community Land Trusts are an example of institutional innovation based on the invention of new 
real estate tools for the shared distribution of captured land value, including development value. 
Successful experiments can become institutions. Some experiments that may originally have had 
radical or progressive aims are then deflected from their original mission through pragmatism, 
survival and chance (Meehan, 2013, p.130). 
 
The wider point Meehan makes, however, is that although internal governance institutions may 
be experimental, they nonetheless must interact with the broader institutions of finance, policy, 
and governance to succeed. Therefore, they cannot be wholly autonomous or operate at a 
contestatory level alone. The extent to which they defy convention is addressed by part of this 
research – including how less conventional or more marginalised, peripheral practices become 
used in more mainstream situations. Bresnihan (2015), who writes about urban commons and, 
with reference to independent cultural spaces in Dublin, asks what happens to them if they are 
invisible or insulated from public institutions. There are ways in which, paradoxically, these 
experiments resist their stabilisation, proliferation or, indeed, institutionalisation.  
 
The challenges are not only from outside the group. For example, hierarchies can emerge within 
groups. Deleuze and Guattari call them ‘micro-fascisms’ – that can emerge at both the personal 
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and collective levels (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p.214). The dynamics of enclosure can be 
prompted within mutual housing groups as well, and groups can range from having open, 
institutional arrangements to more closed, inward-looking arrangements (see Lee & Webster 2006 
on gated communities, for example). The idea of open-ness or closed-ness can also be used as a 
way of understanding the access people have to the institutions of governance within groups to 
manage their property.  The next section explores further the theoretical foundations of property, 
which emerge from the framing of mutual housing in the research.  
 
 
3.4.3 Property 
 
It is important to see how property, which can include land and its appurtenances, is used and 
conceived of by a group or collective in the context of mutual housing. In the following 
discussion, property will be looked at as a legal form, which includes the tenure arrangements, to 
help understand the forms of community or collective forms of property ownership.  
 
The legal forms associated with the formalisation of rules dealing with property use correspond 
to a complex set of rights that are bundled together as part of the institution of ‘property’. The 
‘bundle of rights’ defines the relation between resources needed for mutual housing development 
(i.e. land, capital, labour, and knowledge, as explored in Chapter 2), and organises these relations 
as a nested set of rules. If property arrangements are considered as a ‘bundle of rights’, then a 
more nuanced approach to understanding the role of mutualism is required when the ‘bundle of 
rights’ is allocated to a group of people rather than just one private entity. The approach taken by 
new institutionalists (such as Ostrom) helps to understand property as a shared good. It contrasts 
with the utilitarian, Lockean, or Hegelian position, which focusses primarily on individuals as the 
subject of property ownership through their individual use, possession and labour as a 
precondition for the creation of property, as well as a condition for the creation of the sense of 
the individual (Gilbert 2013). Instead, conceiving property as a ‘bundle of rights’ facilitates the 
development of a more complex understanding of a relational, transactional and non-
individualistic nature of property.  
 
Another example is given by Haila (2007, p.9), who distinguishes between Roman law and 
common law in approach to land property: “The Roman law tradition identifies ownership with 
the thing owned, whereas the common law regards ownership in terms of a bundle of rights, 
obligations and interpersonal relationships arising from the control and enjoyment of property”. 
This ‘bundle of rights’ approach to property emphasises the transactional and relational notion of 
property rights (see Lash 2009). The ‘bundle of rights’ approach is a function of a genealogy of 
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property relations that emerged in the common law system from pre-capitalist economic systems 
through the more advanced economies of the capitalist-industrialist period, until today.  
 
In Grundrisse, Marx contrasted the role of property relations of communal production in pre-
capitalist times with production for exchange (Marx, 1973, pp.171–172). Polanyi also showed that, 
in the move from the feudal to the capitalist-industrial period, there was also a corresponding shift 
in property relations (Polanyi, 1944). Central to Polanyi’s thinking was the concept of fictitious 
commodities. Land, labour and money are all embedded in non-economic institutions and cannot 
be treated as purely market commodities because of the way that they are ‘embedded’ in social 
relationships, subject to moral and ethical considerations, as well as religious beliefs or communal 
life. Land (and therefore property) cannot be viewed as just a market commodity, and any attempts 
to decommodify land, labour, or capital would have to focus on the creation of new types of social 
organisations – both of consumption and production – such as worker co-operatives or mutual 
housing.  
 
Ostrom argued that common ownership forms of property are significant, not just private or 
public: 
 
Economic activity is not merely split between the alternatives of market and state but can 
be regulated by collective social activity. Even where property is privately owned, user rights 
may exist for a variety of individuals and communities rather than for a single owner. In 
fact, she conceptualised a wide diversity of property rights, ownership systems and forms 
of governance. (Wall, 2014, p.3) 
 
Another way to understand the relationship of property to contemporary forms of mutual housing 
is to look at tenure, which has an impact on the forms of mutual housing developed, as explored 
in Chapter 2. Cabannes (2014) describes collective and communal tenure regimes in housing. 
Collective or communal tenure refers to any community-based tenure system, in which some form 
of collective authority, such as the extended family, clan or other social grouping, controls the 
allocation rights (Rolnick, 2012, p.7). Resources under communal tenure may, in practice, be used 
and controlled individually or collectively by members (Otsuka and Place, 2001). Within 
communal tenures, some portion of land and resources may be managed as common property. 
Communal tenure “refers to a situation where a group holds secure and exclusive collective rights 
to own, manage and/or use land and natural resources…Communal tenure can be customary and 
age-old, its rules relying community decisions, or it can be newly designed for a specific purpose” 
(Anderson, 2011, p.3). Thus, tenure is one useful category with which to understand the different 
mutual housing property rights (Bruun 2015, pp.161–162).  
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Collective and communal tenures are forms of tenure that emphasise dependence on a group, not 
on “single titleholders with absolute ownership, but on social relations, mutual obligations and a 
variety of rights in the commons” (Bruun, 2015, p.161). This can also be applied to mutual housing 
as a “layered pattern of nested and overlapping claims and rights of access and use”. In the 
modern, urban context:  
 
…local communities of residents can be seen as stewards or caretakers of a housing 
commons that they have the right to use and dwell in, but they may not have the right to 
sell their flats, because the housing commons is at the same time a common good that 
belongs to members of the larger society who have a moral right of access to affordable 
housing and the right not to be excluded from the commons (Bruun, 2015, pp.161–162).  
 
Importantly, there is a sharing of rule-making, whether these are customary or in law, and 
therefore the ‘commons’ refers not only to material resources and physical spaces but to social 
and cultural values that give rise to moral obligations and which allow the allocation of rewards 
and sanctions because of the shared use (Gudeman, 2001, p.28). 
 
There is therefore a dual ontological nature of housing, as framed in this research. As Bresnihan 
points out, housing can be considered as a ‘resource’ in its different forms - it is both a material 
good and knowledge “combined, used and cared for by and through a collective that is not only 
human but also non-human” (Bresnihan, 2015, p.95). This ontological multiplicity of the nature 
of housing is an issue when considering its value as a resource – not just as a commodity for 
consumption or as a set of abstract units that are an output of a development process, but as a set 
of relations, skills, as well as embedded social values, all of which are the emergent properties of 
the collective governance institutions used to create mutual housing.  
 
The legal basis for the form of property ownership associated with mutuals (as explored in 
Chapter 2) was established under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965 in the UK, 
replaced recently by the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014. In addition to 
the above Acts, there is the commonhold law that was passed as part of the Commonhold and 
Leasehold Reform Act 2002, which introduced a new category of property ownership (i.e. the 
commonhold) into law in England and Wales. This form of property ownership involves the 
freehold tenure of part of a multi-occupancy building (typically a flat) with shared ownership of 
and responsibility for common areas and services – similar to a strata title in Australia (Dredge 
and Coiacetto, 2011; Easthope et al., 2014) or condominium systems that are widespread in the 
USA and some European countries (Oxley and Smith, 1996; Banks, O’Leary and Rabenhorst, 
1996; Hansmann, 1991). These legal forms demonstrate the concretisation of different forms of 
property regimes with accompanying forms of property rights that transcend the binary forms of 
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private and public or state property, and support co-operative models of property ownership 
(Hansmann, 1991).  
 
In summary, by viewing property as a bundle of rights and emphasising the transactional and 
relational nature of the way the bundle is constituted, a different notion of property merges which 
is not merely as commodity but based on mutual obligations and shared responsibilities. Different 
property regimes and tenures need governance institutions to support them. Therefore, a theory 
of collective action for mutual housing intends to do just that: reveal the governance institutions 
that have been crafted by groups.  
 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
The theoretical framing of mutual housing using the new institutionalist view of collective action 
allows for a structured formulation of institutions, governance and property in the case of mutual 
housing. The framework may underplay the importance of power struggles, structural inequality, 
and differences between individuals and how they organise into groups. However, it is useful as 
it helps to understand the co-constitution of property and enclosure, and the ability of self-
governance and self-management in the light of inequality of access to land and resources, which 
is also highlighted in the theories around the commons.  
 
In the section exploring the forms of commons approaches, three main currents were highlighted: 
the commons as resource, the commons as knowledge, and finally the commons as relational and 
transactional. “The commons is not land or knowledge. It is the way these, and more, are 
combined, used and cared for by and through a collective that is not only human but also non-
human” (Bresnihan, 2015, p.95). The link to ideas around the commons is one way of opening 
theoretical differences but also provides possibilities for understanding the governance of mutual 
housing as a form of collective action made up of both the material, in the form of land and 
housing, and non-material, in the form of knowledge. Accordingly, the governance of mutual 
housing was framed as a collective action problem, which focusses on how people craft the 
institutions of governance to manage that form of property.  
 
In summary, the aim of the research is to understand better the institutions that make up mutual 
housing in its different models as they currently exist in London (see Chapter 2). Ostrom’s work 
is useful as it frames governance in terms of how groups craft their own governance institutions. 
This chapter, in the final section (3.4) outlines the use of concepts of governance, institutions and 
property to clarify how the theory of collective action and commons, as developed by Ostrom 
and, later, others from different perspectives, can still be useful to develop the institutional 
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framework for analysis. In the next chapter, an outline of the research questions will be given and 
explored in greater depth, along with some methodological considerations, before the institutional 
framework developed is applied to explore cases of mutual housing in London to understand their 
specific institutions of governance.   
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Methodology: Researching mutual housing groups in London 
 
 
One needs information from many other settings to begin to gain the 
empirical base necessary to improve our theoretical understanding of 
how institutions work and how individuals change their own 
institutions.  (Ostrom, 1990, p.xiv) 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The research is centred on the individuals’ involvement in governance within mutual housing 
groups, and the institutional dynamics therein, usually during periods of time when the groups 
were evolving or undergoing changes. The case studies were a way of understanding governance 
practices and the process of setting up and managing mutual housing. This chapter presents the 
research methodology used to examine the governance institutions of mutual housing. The first 
section covers the research questions and sub questions. The second section develops the 
rationale for a qualitative, case study-based approach, while the third section details the 
operationalization, including data collection, interview process for the case studies.  
 
Preliminary research was conducted, referred to below as a pilot phase (see Section 4.5), as a series 
of interviews were conducted which served to refine both the research questions, as well as the 
interview schedule used during the subsequent main phase of fieldwork and analysis. The chapter 
then looks at the analysis phase of research and considers some of the methodological challenges 
encountered. A final section discusses the ethical considerations used during the research.  
 
 
4.2 Research aims and question 
 
The main research aim was to understand how contemporary mutual housing groups in London 
overcame the problem of collective action. The research objectives were to clarify how mutual 
housing groups were set up and evolved, considering the internal governance institutions created, 
as well as the changing broader institutional contexts of planning, legal and finance. The research 
aims emerged from the research problem, which stated that there is a lack of understanding 
concerning the range of mutual housing models, the contributory factors creating this range, how 
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the models are created and managed, how their governance functions, and how collective 
governance problems are overcome in mutual housing groups (see Chapter 1). Since both formal 
and informal institutions interact to shape experiences of mutual housing, the main research 
question that emerged was what the institutions were developed and used by mutual housing 
groups for their self-governance.  
 
First, a range of mutual housing models were looked at – from co-operative housing through the 
co-housing movement to Community Land Trusts (CLT). The different models of mutual 
housing were explored, and a typology of mutual housing groups was created by using a structure 
of provision approach (Chapter 2). This approach was useful to determine the differences in the 
mutual housing group models and hence it was used – basically as a descriptive ordering device - 
to create the typology of models used to determine the categories and examples used for case 
studies. 
 
To understand the forms of collective governance that were used within mutual housing groups, 
the main theoretical framework was developed based on the institutional approach from Ostrom 
(Chapter 3). This research framework was based on the following main themes: the context of the 
mutual housing group (including access to land and finance); the actors involved; the patterns of 
interaction determined by the rules, norms and strategies used by the actors in the different 
situations; and forms of knowledge, including trust, used as part of their governance strategies. 
Within each of these core research themes, there was a range of aspects which formed sub-
questions and thus provided the basis for the research interview schedule (see Appendix A).  The 
themes for inquiry were derived from Ostrom’s work, analysing what could be called ‘the crafting 
of institutions’ for the governance of collective resources (Ostrom, 1990, 2000; Poteete, Janssen 
and Ostrom, 2010), as well as the work around institutional analysis and development (McGinnis, 
2011; Hess and Ostrom, 2011).  
 
While Ostrom’s work is useful as a descriptive framework, this current research has endeavoured 
to use an element of her work to move towards a more explanatory framework, and to apply it to 
understanding mutual housing governance institutions. Themes of interest were derived, a priori, 
from Ostrom’s descriptive analysis about the crafting of institutions for collective governance and 
these were then used to develop the framework for the questions used for data collection. 
Consequently, a secondary output from this research resulted in the empirical examination of the 
applicability and explanatory power of Ostrom’s institutional approach to understanding 
collective action in managing shared goods, namely housing, which is also useful when considering 
broader debates in commons research and commoning.   
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4.3 Qualitative case study approach 
 
The research follows a qualitative approach based on semi-structured interviews of case studies 
to examine governance institutions (Abu-Lughod 2007; Yin 2009). The range of case studies were 
selected based on the typology of different mutual housing forms that was developed prior to the 
fieldwork (as detailed in Chapter 2). The methodology followed was therefore small number 
(small-N) case study approach (see Blatter and Haverland, 2012). Specifically, the analysis used 
falls under Blatter and Haverland’s congruence analysis approach where the small-N research is 
carried out using case studies “to provide empirical evidence for the explanatory relevance or 
relative strength of one theoretical approach in comparison to other theoretical approaches” (ibid. 
2012, p.144). However, the methodology to does involve the comparison between two theories, 
but the application of a theory from one context to a very different context, hence the emphasis 
on congruence in a more abstract sense – congruence between the theory and its empirical 
application. The contribution of this methodology within small-N research can take four forms, 
including the “refining of specific theories within a paradigmatic research program; develop a new 
theoretical synthesis within or across paradigms; strengthening the position of a theory in 
comparison to other theories in a theoretical discourse; and bolster the aspiration of new theories 
to be recognised…” (ibid., p.150). Aspects of the second and the fourth category emerge in the 
research presented here.  
 
The principle contribution is really in terms of supporting the recognition of a new theory to be 
recognised – both in the field of planning more broadly, and the governance issues which we, as 
planners, tend to analyse at the urban scale, and more specifically, by seeing housing as a collective 
resource, to understand its governance in a new way.  
 
There is also the aspiration of the second possible contribution, as stated by Blatter and 
Haverland, namely developing a new theoretical synthesis across paradigms. This is not about the 
use early in chapter 2 of the Structure of Provision approach, which as I explained there was only 
used as a tool to create a typology of mutual housing models and to draw out and explore the 
differences between the models themselves, a priori.  The synthesis which I touch on is linked to 
differing paradigmatic conceptions of the commons as used on one hand by Ostrom in her work 
and by the neo-Marxist political theorists and historians on the other. This was explored in 
Chapter 3 and what connected them was the institutions which underpinned the governance, 
which were institutions of practical commoning. These will be touched on in later in the 
reflections in the conclusion and point towards in potential further work.   
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Therefore, the analysis of the case study material enabled both the differences and commonalities 
between mutual housing models to be explored by also testing out the explanatory power of a 
theory generally used in different field of work. The model forms of mutual housing detailed in 
Chapter 2 represent a synthesis of both a literature review and empirical research on projects 
under way on the ground. A dynamic process was used to develop this typology, moving from 
the field to the desk, in an iterative way. The research that emerged drew on grounded theory 
work (see Charmaz 2006; Burawoy 1991; Bryant & Charmaz 2007) with the pilot fieldwork phase 
(see Section 4.3.3 below) allowing for the typologising (see Chapter 2) in a substantive way. 
However, there were significant steps which meant that the research was not fully grounded 
research. The initial theoretical framing which drew on Ostrom’s governance of commons work 
was a way of focussing the empirical work on governance institutions within the groups and 
drawing attention within interviews to the institutions, explicit and implicit related to the internal 
governance of the groups. Hence, it is not possible to say that the research was fully grounded.  
 
However, there are two specific aspects that are drawn from grounded research. These include 
the extra empirical elements which emerged through interviews, of the more subjective kind, 
which evolved into the final empirical chapter 9. The other aspect is the structuring of the 
empirical chapters, which do not directly reflect Ostrom’s original theoretical framework but have 
to do with the most important contextual and material concerns of the mutual housing groups -  
namely how they access land and how they find finance. Therefore, it will be clear reading through 
the empirical chapters when the research purports to be ‘grounded’ and when it does not, although 
it is arguable whether the term can be applied at all.  
 
Nonetheless, the core premise of this research is that there are specific governance institutions 
that are crafted and evolve within mutual housing groups. The qualitative case study approach 
built on the idea that institutions are social constructs – they are not just constraints or 
opportunities regulated by rules (see Chapter 3). In traditional institutional theory, institutions are 
“human-constructed constraints or opportunities within which individual choices take place and 
which shape the consequences of their choices” (McGinnis, 2011, p.4). The emphasis in this 
research was on how institutions are socially constructed and how that construction is understood 
through people’s own narratives and lived experience (Ellis and Flaherty, 1992). The assumption 
was that there would be a shared understanding by different people in same group of shared 
governance institutions for collective action. The qualitative approach explored these individual 
narratives of governance and shared experiences in an iterative, critical constructivist, grounded 
theory approach, rooted in abduction (Shank, 2008, pp.1–2).  
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The method also alludes to what Lefebvre (1996b, p.141) calls ‘transduction’ – where an iterative 
relation between the conceptual and empirical material, or the theoretical and practical realms, 
results in a virtual framework which then becomes the lens through which the virtual object of 
study is viewed. In this research, the virtual object of mutual housing is understood through the 
theoretical-conceptual level of institutions, governance and property (explored in Chapter 3) and 
the empirical material gathered through interviews and fieldwork (Chapter 5-9). Understanding is 
reached in an iterative way (hence transduction) using mutual housing as the virtual object. Purcell, 
echoing Lefebvre, shows how using this virtual object as a heuristic device, is also a practical tool 
in utopian experimentation: 
 
We begin by closely examining actual-but-inchoate practices that are currently taking place 
in the city, and then we extrapolate them using theoretical reflection to produce, in thought, 
a more fully developed version of them, a virtual idea that shows us what kind of world 
they would produce if they were allowed to flourish and pervade the city. (Purcell, 2013, p. 
319) 
 
Mutual housing is not only a series of empirical realities but is also made up of these “inchoate 
practices” still struggling to emerge and flourish. The case studies were all ongoing examples of 
“flourishing” – some had been around for years and people were able to describe long-term 
changes within the groups, whereas other groups were just forming and were in the process of 
struggling to become established.  
 
The empirical observation work was carried out in the field, online and in person (Creswell, 2009, 
pp.175–176). Multiple sources and types of data for each case study were used: these ranged from 
interviews through to published and online information, including board reports, press reports, 
advocacy documents and other publications. The data analysis was inductive, since the patterns 
and categories for analysis were drawn both from theory, but also deductive as the codes emerged 
from the material itself. The codes were the unit of analysis used to look at the text. The themes 
were the more general topics under which codes were grouped (see Appendix B).  
 
A general framework was created for data collection, and this resulted from a period of moving 
between theory and practice on the ground: for example, by conducting initial interviews in the 
pilot phase. The meanings that the participants gave to certain words also challenged the 
preconceived theoretical framework – concepts of importance to the researcher were mentioned 
using different terms and vocabulary. This process of interpretation was useful in the analysis 
stage when recreating the specific narratives of the participants’ own ideas on governance, 
institutions or mutual housing. The scope of the qualitative research work was also modified 
because of the pilot phase, with new themes of interest being focussed on. The approach was to 
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use many case studies to explore the breadth of the typology of the provision of mutual housing, 
rather than use in-depth, intensive case studies and thus support the theoretical framework used 
to build further on it (see Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
In a methodological sense, there was an aspect to this work that was rooted in phenomenology, 
as the research used the lived experience of a small group of individuals of an event or 
phenomenon (Cresswell 2007). The roots of phenomenology for social scientific research are to 
be found in the work of Sartre and Heidegger, but Cresswell develops a methodology based on 
asking participants two broad, general questions: (1) What have you experienced in terms of the 
phenomenon? (2) What context of situations has typically influenced your experiences of the 
phenomenon? The first of these questions very much underpins the present research, as it 
concerns people’s own experiences of the governance procedures in mutual housing groups. It 
offers a way of exploring in more detail people’s own narratives about their involvement and their 
accounts of the governance institutions of mutual housing. Creswell also covers the case study 
approach, like Yin (2009) and Stake (2005), who consider the case study as an empirical inquiry 
that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context especially when 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear” (Yin 1994, p.13). 
 
Furthermore, the case study inquiry “copes with technically distinctive situations … relies on 
multiple sources of evidence … [and] benefits from prior development of theoretical 
propositions” (Yin 1994, p.13).  When Yin’s own criteria are applied in this research, the case 
study approach is used to investigates the phenomenon of mutual housing in London using data 
points that are multiple and distinctive, with many variables of interest. Additionally, multiple 
sources of evidence are used, and the theoretical framework was developed to use these multiple 
sources to explore the institutions of governance within these mutual housing groups.  
 
The research questions of how mutual housing groups are governed and what forms of collective 
governance result from the experiences of mutual housing groups in London, are appropriately 
answered using case studies. The propositions underpinning this research topic are that specific 
forms of governance institutions exist for mutual housing and these are dependent on the context 
created by internal group dynamics and the relation they have with broader institutions. These 
practices of formal and informal institutions interact to shape the experiences of mutual housing 
groups and are used by them to overcome the problem of collective action through self-
governance.  
 
The use of case studies is exploratory to a certain extent, as the research is orientated towards the 
purpose of understanding the institutions of governance of mutual housing, rather than towards 
a distinct proposition (Yin 1994, p.20-21). The unit of analysis is the group of people involved in 
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the governance of mutual housing, and their experiences in the set-up and management of specific 
mutual housing groups, rather than the housing itself, the land that is occupied by the housing, or 
the set of policies which allow the mutual housing to flourish. The following section sets out in 
more detail how the research was operationalised and how the units of analysis as data were 
collected, together with a discussion of the data sources.  
 
 
4.4 Operationalising the theoretical framework 
 
The institutional analysis in Chapter 3 developed Ostrom’s work to examine the specific internal 
governance arrangements of mutual housing groups in London. It was used to develop the 
specific set of questions to be used for data collection and consequent analysis of internal 
governance institutions. Broadly speaking, the theoretical framework focusses more on the 
existing internal micro-practices of governance within the groups. The research case studies were 
used to examine the governance institutions for mutual housing. The inquiries focussed on 
understanding, for each group, the historical context, the internal and external actors involved, 
and the rules, norms and strategies involved, including the role of knowledge and trust.  
 
The main themes to be covered (see Figure 6) were translated into an interview schedule, to be 
used for interviews (see Appendix A). After the pilot phase it became clear that because of the 
open-ended, semi-structured format of the interviews, it would be rare and indeed difficult within 
one conversation to avoid moving from one question to another, and therefore the headline 
themes became points of reference during the interview. The questionnaire was then also used as 
a prompt during interviews to discuss with the interviewee if they had missed anything out from 
their account. More than a prompt for the researcher, the questionnaire also became a prompt for 
the interviewee to explore things that they had missed, which could even include related items not 
included in the questions on paper.  
 
The same list of questions in the interview schedule was also adapted to interrogate grey material 
and other archives. Clearly, in using such a qualitative approach in each of the case study 
interviews, the questions raised, and the ensuing discussions ranged from the very specific to the 
abstract. Thus, interviews were conducted by focussing first on the experiences of the individuals, 
then on the facts they knew and subsequently moved on to the wider topics that could be 
interpretative, more reflexive, subjective, and even more intimate. The questions were categorised 
progressively from the specific to the abstract.  
 
The original intention had been to look at a minimum of two case studies from each of the models 
in the typology of mutualised housing forms (see Fig.7 below, revised from Fig.2). The aim was 
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to have at least three interviews per case conducted with members of the organisations who either 
live there, were involved in the management of the group, or who were involved in the foundation 
or running of the group. The individuals interviewed were sufficiently aware of the group’s 
internal rules and norms to be able to reflect usefully on them, although there was less awareness 
of the external institutions that had shaped and guided the development of the mutual housing. 
The extent to which they could answer the questions was not determined beforehand but emerged 
during the interviews. In cases where there was little or no knowledge of external institutions, this 
was an interesting and useful finding, situating the informant as an active member of the mutual 
housing group, despite having sometimes scant knowledge of the wider institutions of 
governance. 
 
Figure 7: Mutual housing models, case studies chosen and considered 
Mutual housing model Case study used Other case studies 
considered 
 
Housing co-operative   
Short-life  
 
 
Fully mutual  
 
 
 
Intentional/Radical Routes 
Backdoor Housing Co-
operative  
 
Grand Union Housing Co-
operative (GUHC) 
Sanford Housing Co-operative  
 
n/a 
Phoenix, North Kensington, 
Brixton  
 
Coin Street Housing Co-
operatives 
 
 
MAJ 
The Drive 
Ursus Housing Co-operative  
Co-housing   
Private 
 
 
Intentional 
Co-housing Woodside  
 
 
Older Women’s Co-Housing 
(OWCH) 
London Community Housing 
Co-operative (LCHC) 
Copper Lane, 
Hackney Co-housing 
 
 
Community Land Trust   
 East London Community Land 
Trust (ELCLT 
Brixton Green – Somerleyton 
Road Trust 
RUSS, Coin Street 
Community Builders, 
WECH, Naked House 
 
 
The analysis phase interrogated more closely the findings emerging from the sub-questions, 
specifically the external institutions, to look more closely at the relationship between external 
agencies and mutual housing groups for the specific themes of land and planning, finance and 
funding mechanisms, and finally, governance. Regarding the impacts of policies on mutual 
housing groups in London, this required housing policy-makers and representatives of housing 
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institutions. The role of institutions external to the mutual housing groups is in supporting the 
establishment of the groups through such means as access to land, modes of finance, governance 
support, local authorities, community groups, and government agencies.  
 
Umbrella organisations, such as the secondary support co-operatives and other horizontal 
organisations to which the mutual housing groups are connected, led to interviews with umbrella 
organisation representatives, workers, community representatives, and other organisers from 
outside the mutual housing groups. The umbrella organisations included the CLT Network, UK 
Co-housing Network, CDS Co-ops, London Federation of Housing Co-operatives, Radical 
Routes network, South London Co-operative Network, and the Lambeth housing co-operative 
campaign group, Lambeth United Housing Co-operative (LUHC). 
  
The case study information not only included interview data but also documents were sought 
which referred to internal policies that groups for their governance and decision-making, 
allocations and protocols. Most groups also had a website with a lot of information and news 
articles along with other forms of media (Facebook, Twitter feeds) added to the wealth of data 
regarding different forms of communicating and sharing information within groups. Further 
sources of data include local housing organisations and such local history archives as the London 
Metropolitan archives, the Bishopsgate Institute, the British Library, the anarchist Infoshop 56a 
and Mayday Rooms, as well as local borough archives.  
 
 
4.5 Pilot phase 
 
The pilot phase or preliminary research allowed for the testing of the theoretical framework 
through interviews and preliminary empirical work; the testing of research aims, objectives and 
questions; and, finally, the empirical evidence needed for the development of the typology 
developed in Chapter 2 of mutual housing models.  
 
The pilot phase used the theoretical framework to focus on individuals’ experiences of living and 
working within the mutual housing sector and how those individuals’ roles shaped the structures 
for the delivery of mutual housing. While institutions were clearly embedded within the groups 
visited, they were also important external ones offering support and enabling and developing 
policy around the delivery and the provision of mutual housing.  
 
Emerging from the pilot phase was the understanding that most mutual housing models have 
support organisations and are also inserted into different sets of vertical structures for sharing 
knowledge and resources. These can consist of relationships ranging from the informal to formal, 
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as well as the different national or regional support organisations. Thus, the role of support 
organisations, such as umbrella organisations or secondary co-operatives, allows mutual housing 
groups to form, not necessarily as autonomous entities, but as organisations that both influence 
and are influenced by, a set of established practices within the wider field of mutual housing. In 
turn, the examples of experiences are used by the umbrella organisations as exemplars and shared 
as case studies – they are used as objects of learning, as well as of advocacy and policy making.  
 
The relationship that mutual housing models have with the wider, more dominant institutions 
could be interrogated and analysed in the same way. We can see why historically they may have 
been relegated to subordinate positions – mainly for structural reasons, but also to a lesser extent 
because of internal governance reasons, and then forced to deploy what strategies they can to 
emerge and exist. For example, by positioning themselves as exemplars, through advocacy, 
campaigning, or more radical direct action, they establish new institutions. These strategies for 
setting up and governing mutual housing provision involve different sets of institutions, from the 
individuals’ experiences through to the group’s, to the umbrella organisations and other external 
institutions. Within the framework of institutional analysis drawn from Ostrom, it would 
correspond to looking at how and why new institutions are crafted, and what they are influenced 
by – both internally and externally. These questions can be answered both by interrogating the 
rules internal to the group, as well as looking at the outside influences on these rules and norms 
shaping the internal institutions.  
 
One of the difficulties of the pilot work included being able to meet enough people with the time, 
patience and willingness to talk about their experiences in being involved in mutual housing 
projects as they were usually volunteers. Sometimes the topics covered were very personal and 
challenging because of the intimacy of talking about their own living arrangements. At other times, 
the process was involving, even cathartic, as the interview became an opportunity to reflect on 
and explore both what they had experienced, the problems they were currently facing and what 
the future held. 
 
In summary, the results of the pilot interviews showed that the next round of detailed interviews 
had to be more focussed on the specific questions around land, finance and governance, namely 
the rules, norms and strategies being employed by the mutual housing groups.  
 
 
4.6 Analysis 
 
Interviews were based on an interview schedule (see Appendix A) to cover conditions for each 
theme covered, and included semi-structured, in-depth questions. This allowed for the collection 
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of specific data around modes of organising and of governance, such as meetings, constitutions 
and rules. The interviews were recorded and transcribed and subsequently coded and analysed. 
The transcription and analysis of the interview data used the software program Atlas.ti, a tool for 
analysing qualitative data according to codes, which can allow for coding, memo writing, sub-
coding and a range of qualitative tools which can compare occurrence of themes and codes.  
 
The seven main themes and sub-questions in the interview schedule (Appendix A) were first 
translated into a series of codes used to analyse the material and highlight the moments when 
individuals referred to a set of experiences. A series of sub-codes emerged from the data, in 
addition to the pre-defined ones, which was found to be a richer way of exploring material. Partial 
open coding allowed for the data coding of important sub-categories of information around the 
core themes (see Appendix B for codes used).  
 
Therefore, an iterative and reflexive directed approach was used, which relied on the data to yield 
codes when focussing on themes of interest that remained un-coded. In this way, there is space 
for codes to emerge from the text (see MacLure 2013) during the analysis phase, through a coding 
technique which uses initial coding then proceeds to more open coding, specifically axial and 
selective coding, in a dynamic way (Benaquisto 2008, p.86-87). 
 
Individuals being interviewed focussed, within the broad category of rules and norms for group 
management, on the most important aspects according to them. As such, the interviews were 
structured around the context as experienced by the individuals, using their perceptions of the 
internal group dynamics and their relationship with external institutions. The results reflected 
interviewees’ own positionality and their access to knowledge, depending on their social roles and 
identity within the group. This could be dependent on their level of past and current involvement 
in management, how they had been treated by the group and whether they had concerns or 
sensitivities around particular issues. 
 
  
4.7 Methodological challenges 
 
This section offers some reflections on the methodological challenges of the approach followed 
in the research. The institutional approach defined by Ostrom’s work on crafting governance 
institutions in situations of collective action was applied to mutual housing. The first 
methodological difficulty arose in the research process when moving between the theoretical 
framework to the analytical one. This movement was not linear but iterative. Furthermore, the 
original theoretical framework developed by Ostrom is speculative and descriptive, and therefore 
to use it as an analytical framework needed some elaboration, which turned out to be both 
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theoretical and empirical. The rules in Ostrom’s work were applied to mutual housing as a 
theoretical framework for the problem of collective governance in housing, in contrast Ostrom’s 
original work which had been focussed on the governance of mainly natural resources i.e. 
irrigation basins, community forestry, fisheries management regimes. Another move was made 
from that theoretical framework to using it as an analytical one was through a pilot phase (see 
section 4.5), which not only improved the specific questions to explore through interviews but 
also to develop more carefully the areas that would be useful to analyse through the empirical 
material from interviews with mutual housing group members. Therefore, this movement 
between theoretical and analytical frameworks was a result of an iterative, as well as reflexive 
process during fieldwork. The theoretical framework was used to develop the questions to ask 
during interviews and the analytical framework was developed using the themes used for analysis, 
some of which emerged during analysis. Furthermore, this was a process that occurred both 
during fieldwork and during the analysis stages. The material was defined into themes, and the 
final coding emerged from the analysis process, as new codes were added in to capture points of 
interest and repetition, building on the directed approach, but in an iterative way (Hsieh and 
Shannon, 2005). Some of the codes that were added during analysis became the main points 
explored under aspects of mutualism (see Chapter 9). 
 
The other point, methodologically, was the challenge of using case studies that were found to be 
grouped in two distinct timeframes – those that existed since the 1970-80s and were well-
established groups; and those cases that were more contemporary examples, in most cases 
emerging in the last five years. These latter group evolved considerably during the timeframe of 
the fieldwork. This posed some challenges, including finding narrative continuities between the 
two groups and dealing with the changes still occurring within cases. The continuities between 
groups emerged at a qualitative level through the analysis stages, which allowed for a critical and 
reflexive tracing of commonalities. Interviews were also conducted with group members who 
were significantly uncertain about their own future, but who could provide useful as well as critical 
reflections as the projects progressed.  
 
Apart from the case studies falling roughly into two main groups, if classified chronologically, the 
selection of case studies proved problematic for two principle further reasons. Firstly, given the 
range of typologies proposed across mutual housing groups the aim was to obtain some interviews 
with a range of groups. However, it was clear that housing co-operatives are much more numerous 
in London than are the more recent cases of CLTs or co-housing. These more recent incipient 
forms of mutual housing did not offer a representative range of cases from which to select from. 
Indeed, at the time of beginning the research, urban Community Land Trusts were extremely rare 
in the country (Young Foundation, 2011). Thus, the newer mutual housing groups were in all 
cases exceptional and exemplary just for the nature of their rarity. In contrast, the older mutual 
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housing groups were exemplary not for their rareness, but for having survived for such a long 
period time (some 30 years plus in a few cases). In these cases of survival, they offered some 
telling empirical evidence around the governance of the collective action problem of managing 
housing.  
 
Secondly, both sets of cases offered some useful empirical material around the evolution of 
governance rules within groups through differing structural periods of time, both at a policy and 
cultural level too. Contrasting the older groups with younger groups was not necessarily a question 
of contrasting like-for-like cases but indeed quite different cases where evolution of governance 
had happened within differing time scales. The temporal contrast however meant that evolution 
within the older groups was chronicled and narrated at a different scale phenomenologically 
speaking, than the younger groups. Both mutual housing groups offered narratives of change and 
evolution within groups, but essentially at different speeds, which leant their accounts differing 
sense of perspective.        
 
It would be important at this stage also to highlight how there were a few limitations with the 
qualitative data. First, there was an uneven number of interviews per case (see Appendix C for list 
of interviews). This was in part due to the relationships established with the actors from the case 
studies, access to willing interviewees and the efficiency of the snowballing contacting technique 
used to identify interviewees. As a method snowballing has its difficulties regarding the 
representativeness of interviewees, selection bias and gatekeeper bias (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). 
However, snowballing was used in this research as a practical technique for contacting people, 
and not as a sampling technique in a formal or statistical sense. As Saunders (1979) points out, 
the reputational method is useful and is based on the linkages between individuals whose 
reputation is recognised by many within the community. Interviews were snowballed in the 
direction of those whose reputation in the group was more established. These would include 
generally those who either had held power or were currently in positions of power. It included 
also people who were more integrated into the social networks within the mutual housing group. 
Hence, only very few people I interviewed were people who in their demeanour during interviews 
were shy, retiring or had not been involved in the running of the groups in some way. This clearly 
would have biased the results towards the opinions of the more out-going and active members of 
the group. However, the sorts of questions being posed, and the problems being explored were 
quite general about the history and governance experiences of interviewees. Thus, even from 
those with reputational status there would have been useful material to gather more generally 
about the governance of the housing group. In contrast, the more subjective elements which are 
brought out in Chapter 9, would clearly reflect the more active voices. Attendance at events and 
meetings was another way of finding people to interview. Again, the bias there would have been 
towards more sociable and outgoing members, willing to talk to the curious stranger sitting in the 
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corner taking notes. Therefore, there is a recognition here of some of the biases involved in this 
research, but also more broadly with this form of qualitative research.  
 
In addition to interviews, some groups allowed access to their archives. GUHC had a series of 
oral history interview recordings from ten years ago [#2, #8, #9, #11 GUHC oral history tapes 
were the ones which people had consented to be listened to], and photographs which were useful 
as prompts during interviews, for example. In general, all the older cases had more people willing 
to be interviewed, because of a lack of time constraints on their part compared to members of 
newer groups and had a genuine interest in talking about their experience. In contrast, the newer 
groups had fewer people available because of their own time constraints, and a wider interest in 
their groups’ activities from other researchers and media had made them wary of the time burden 
of more interviews. This demonstrated the high volume of interest there is from academia as well 
as professional and media attention, sometimes to the detriment of the group’s own existence. In 
some cases, in the newer groups, there were greater uncertainties about their own future and their 
position, which made it more difficult for people to talk. Whether the data collected on the newer 
groups allowed for empirical saturation is questionable (Lewis-Beck, Bryman and Liao, 2004), as 
fewer interviews were conducted on the newer groups (see Appendix C for full list of interviews). 
 
Secondly, the actual case studies did not entirely reflect all the models in the typology in Chapter 
2 (see Fig.7). Missing were private-led co-housing, radical housing co-operatives, and more short-
life housing co-operatives. However, there are very few of the first two models established in 
London (Copper Lane co-housing is the only private-led group; MAJ and the Drive are examples 
of housing co-operatives that are part of the Radical Routes Network). As for the latter category, 
there was initial contact with three other cases, which fell through during the period of research. 
In one instance, the main contact stepped down from being chair and no further contact was 
established with the group. In another case, timing commitments made it difficult for the group 
to engage in the research.  
 
Access was also limited to more confidential information, such as minutes or past board reports, 
which would have been useful data sets to work with. Research participants referred to various 
events, decisions, rules made, or explicit norms established which could have been more 
thoroughly verified in such documents. A more systematic evolution of groups would have been 
derived, although the research that emerged could have been similar in scope. The reliance on 
narratives meant that the analytical stage of the empirical research was concentrated more on the 
stories of members, and their own subjective experience, a valid and important contribution to 
the qualitative research on institutions through personal perceptions and oral history. However, 
having said that, many groups did not necessarily have formal minutes of all stages in decision-
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making, especially in the incipient stages of the groups, which were the stages that were the most 
interesting to understanding the group’s evolution.  
 
 
4.8 Ethical considerations 
 
During the preparation for interviews, procedures relating to good practice were developed from 
those outlined by the British Sociological Association (BSA 2002). There was a need to comply 
with the ethical-bureaucratic definitions stipulated by the university (Gillian and Pickerill 2012), 
but at the same time there was the awareness that the position of researcher was a privileged one 
compared to the informants, some of whom had precarious living arrangements or were involved 
in housing activism, for example. Therefore, there was a contrast between the ethical demands set 
by the university and the different set of ethical concerns that arose during the research.  
 
Both the individual respondents as well as the representatives of institutions had a range of 
sensitivities when responding to the wide-ranging interview schedule used for this research (see 
Appendix A). In the case of institutional respondents, there were sensitivities over definitions 
used in policy frameworks and any possible financial implications that arose from spending 
decisions. At an individual level, there were sensitivities about some people's experiences in 
relation to external actors or institutions with whom they had had some challenges or issues in 
the past. It was also possible that some people involved in mutual housing groups would be 
concerned about expressing opinions on behalf of all the group, or on community issues – 
although, in general, most were usually very interested to tell their stories. This raised some 
interesting issues of positionality – both for the researcher and the interviewees.  
 
Allowance was made for groups who felt that their housing situation was vulnerable, and during 
the case studies it was made clear that respondents were under no obligation to give responses on 
such topics, and that comments or opinions would be made anonymous and would remain 
confidential. It was also found that the interviews provided a space for respondents to express 
their thoughts and opinions on housing conditions and the challenges and successes that they 
were working on or had experienced. The interviews also became spaces to exchange knowledge, 
develop reflexive understandings, and share critical insights.  
 
There was an aspiration that, at a later stage, there would also be the possibility of sharing best 
practices and find ways of working which might be useful for the group being interviewed and 
for other groups involved in setting up mutual housing schemes. This issue also led to some 
ethical as well as methodological concerns around the limitations for reflexivity and co-research 
which the methodology had allowed for. There was a tension between a desire to be more 
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involved in supporting groups and being involved in mutual housing and in the wider housing 
struggles happening in London at the time, and concentrating on the research, which was much 
more about the internal governance of usually successful groups. Whilst having a strong interest 
in and respect for exploratory methodologies such as co-research and participatory action 
research, the extent of using these as research tools was limited but could be a fruitful avenue for 
further research.  
 
Finally, a pro-forma statement was created and had attached different categories of anonymity 
(see Appendix D for consent form). Attention was given to anonymity as the research involved 
peoples’ own observations, experiences and personal impressions. The research also included the 
recording of conversations as well as the observation of a range of proceedings at group meetings 
and activities, which were all stored in a password-only accessible computer and in an encrypted 
format.  
 
 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
The chapter examines some aspects of methodology which were considered important to 
highlight and reflect upon. The qualitative approach was based on case studies to look at the 
governance institutions in mutual housing through individuals’ narratives of their experiences. 
The small-N case study approach was used as it draw on a range of cases which could be used to 
look at a range of both localised and historically distinct contexts for a similar phenomenon, i.e. 
collective governance of mutual housing. The institutions involved were complex and causality 
was not necessarily based on single factors, but at the same time offered a glimpse into effect of 
specific institutions.  
 
In addition, and drawing on Blatter and Haverland (2012), the small-N methodology taken was a 
modified congruence analysis approach, where case studies are used qualitatively to provide 
empirical evidence for the explanatory relevance of one theoretical approach but to a different 
paradigmatic context. I argue therefore that in addition to the two subtypes outlined by Blatter 
and Haverland (2012, p. 145) in which two theories are compared through full congruence analysis 
using either a competing theories approach or complementary theories approach, here the 
congruence testing is of only one theory but to different empirical context. Hence, one could coin 
a third congruence subtype of translatability or possibly that of a trans-congruence analysis.    
 
The case studies were selected through an information-orientated selection (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 
p.13), that is to maximise the utility of information from the cases selected. The cases were 
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instances of both the extreme or deviant cases and paradigmatic cases, as the newer cases were 
selected on the basis that they existed, and there were very few others in existence in London. As 
for older housing co-operatives, these were selected through a gatekeeper, usually someone who 
was met outside of the group and introduced me to the group.  
 
A method of reflexive and iterative abductive mode of reasoning was used during analysis of data. 
The initial theoretical framework was derived from theory, which had been inductively developed 
from empirical research by Ostrom. This was then tested through a preliminary pilot phase to 
refine questions in the interview schedule (Appendix A) and then refined again through the coding 
process (Appendix B), as new codes were added to the ones drawn from theoretical framework. 
The chapter concludes with the methodological challenges, and touches on some of the ethical 
considerations and concerns.  
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Chapter 5  
 
 
Introduction to the mutual housing cases 
 
 
I am here because I like it and I have put a lot into making it the way I like it. 
Nobody would want it to be different. This is the ideal. The feeling of ownership – 
we created this. But not everyone has the same feeling and appreciates what has 
happened here. [B. from GUHC] 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The mutual housing cases studied represent a range of models of mutual housing groups based in 
London. They are roughly split between the older groups founded during the 1970s, through to 
the present, with newer groups that are in the process of development. The former and older set 
of cases were part of a wave of groups established between the late 1970s and early 1980s and 
have undergone changes in terms of their collective governance, adapting to internal group 
dynamics as well as external institutional pressures. There were more interviews with older group 
members, who were more willing to be interviewed, or had more time and availability. Most 
members had been involved in management of the group and therefore had useful knowledge 
and impressions on the governance institutions, their evolution and change.  
 
In the interviews with newer or more recent groups, the interviewees were more guarded because 
of the uncertainty of the groups. Most had also been part of long-running campaigns or other 
efforts to find land and financing. In most cases, this process had been an important part of their 
journey as a mutual housing group. Therefore, their development and set-up as a group, involved 
learning collective governance through experimentation and discovery. During this stage, rules 
and norms are created and established, and the groups’ governance structures are developed, 
tested and refined. The process of crafting mutual housing institutions must be considered from 
before the groups find land or live in the mutual housing, indeed from when groups begin their 
process of formation.  
 
Each case study was developed through a series of interviews during which respondents were 
encouraged to explore not only their formal, shared history and governance practices within the 
housing group, but their own individual role and subjective experiences. The participants’ 
narratives became an important contribution to understanding the group. In many cases, a 
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relationship was created with the respondents and the housing group, as interviews and visits took 
place over several months. Returning to successive meetings, of specific committees or general 
meetings, and attending communal activities and parties, were all part of the research effort to 
observe and engage with the life of the housing group as it developed (as explored in Chapter 4).  
Figure 8 below shows the distribution of the eight mutual housing groups covered in the research.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Location of mutual housing cases in London 
 
Key to Figure 8 
North London: 
Older Women’s Community Housing OWCH – OL 
Co-housing Woodside (ceased July 2016) – WO 
 
East London: 
East London Community Land Trust – St. Clements – EA 
Grand Union Housing Co-operative – G R 
 
South London: 
Brixton Green – Somerleyton Trust – BR 
Sanford Housing Co-operative – SA 
 
West London: 
Backdoor short-life housing co-operative – BA 
London Community Housing Co-operative – LO 
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5.2 Grand Union Housing Co-operative 
 
The Grand Union Housing Co-operative is based in the borough of Tower Hamlets in Bethnal 
Green, East London. Set up formally in 1977, it has around 140 members living in 79 dwellings 
that form a triangular block just south of Victoria Park, Bethnal Green. The north side terrace of 
the triangular block runs parallel to the Regent’s Canal and Victoria Park. The other three rows 
of terraced housing make up the triangular block – hence the nickname of the housing co-
operative, the Triangle – that forms an inner area of gardens, which were once unfenced and had 
a pathway from one end to the other, known as the Yellow Brick Road.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Grand Union Housing Co-operative (‘The Triangle’)  
An aerial view of Victoria Park with the housing co-operative, outlined at the bottom left-hand 
corner [Photo: GUHC] 
 
 
Prior to becoming a co-operative, most houses had fallen into neglect. These were squatted and 
made habitable. Despite at least two attempts at eviction, the houses were eventually bought in 
stages by the co-operative, reoccupied and refurbished over the years. 
 
86 
 
[The houses had been] allowed to run down for many, many years, just a few people living here…the clear 
thing was 'Don't do any work on them and they'll move out in the end,' but we replaced them, we were 
given the keys sometimes by people who were going, so we took them over slowly. [There is] the famous story 
of when a house emptied out, they'd come along and put concrete down the toilet, that was their way of 
closing a property - 'the wreckers' and we'd go out and face them, on a purely personal basis and in the end, 
they just didn't come any more, that was it, they just weren't going to do it. We're talking 50/60 years ago 
now …. [Then] we had a licence agreement … this was with the Conservative GLC [B. from GUHC] 
 
The co-operative emerged in an area affected by the ‘planning blight’ of the 1970s. The GLC and 
local authorities were emptying houses assigned for demolition to build a road through the area 
to the east, connecting with the M11 at the Blackwall Tunnel on the other side of the park: 
 
The street was compulsory purchased because there was a plan after the war, to put a brand-new road, 
straight down Hackney Road, straight through Bishops Way, straight through the park. This was planning 
blight, that's what I was always told. So, all the houses were compulsory purchased, to be knocked down 
and the compulsory purchase was probably early '70s. The blight on Hackney Road was amazing, it was 
really bad [P. from GUHC] 
 
By the mid-1970s the plans had either stalled or been put aside. A small group of people organising 
informally through a network of squatter’s active in the area had managed to keep the terraced 
housing standing by occupying the houses, refurbishing and, as a result, bringing about a new 
community in the area. 
 
Following this period, formalisation of the group began to take place, stimulated from both within 
the group and externally. Internally, the residents organised themselves – establishing regular 
meetings, an office and developed rules for governance of the group, including forming reciprocal 
links of sharing and trust. Externally, government policy towards housing changed – both at the 
London-level and nationally. The introduction of the 1972 Housing Finance Act and 1974 
Housing Act supported the establishment of new housing associations (Malpass 2000, Gulliver 
2014). The reforms implemented via the 1974 Housing Act, were “associated with new financial 
arrangements, designed to increase the output of housing associations, bringing them into a more 
prominent position in housing policy, but also leading to significant changes in associations as 
organisations” (Malpass 2000, p.155). Housing co-operatives used the same legislation to 
incorporate formally, and in this way, they could access grant funding used for the foundation of 
new housing groups.  
 
Therefore, the Grand Union Housing Co-operative became an officially recognised group partly 
to initiate discussions with the local authority and the Conservative-led GLC of the time (in power 
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between 1977-1981) for the receipt of grant funding and to access loans from banks for their 
establishment as a co-operative and the management of their housing stock. Over several years, 
the Grand Union Housing Co-operative managed to acquire most of the houses on the Triangle, 
first under leasehold and some under short-life contract:  
 
I think it was 38 houses the first time. So, we bought the first lot and then [the] rest of the co-op, which is 
Waterloo Gardens, Bishops Way – the main terrace. The reason that we bought Sewardstone Road first, 
rather than Bishops Way, in my opinion, was a lot of people on Bishops Way didn’t want to be done first, 
it was almost like a schism, they felt slightly posher, so they were in what we would call a more precarious 
position until the mid-1990s, when we borrowed more money to purchase the rest of the co-op. [P. from 
GUHC] 
 
Currently, the co-operative is run by a management committee which meets monthly. Meetings 
are attended by the chair, vice-chair, secretary and treasurer, along with around five to ten 
residents nominated every year. The chair is external to the co-operative and is invited as a neutral 
support, being a long-standing member of a housing co-operative in south east London. A general 
meeting is held three times a year and is open to all members. Most residents above 18 years of 
age are members, although there are a few children of current members who have not sought 
membership yet, and some people staying on a short-term basis in the co-op.  
 
The day-to-day running of the co-operative is conducted by three part-time salaried staff: a 
housing manager, administrative assistant and maintenance co-ordinator. A tenancy sub-
committee meets to discuss allocations and issues concerning tenants, such as rent payments and 
disputes. In addition, there is a works subcommittee, dealing with the maintenance programme, 
which is a rolling schedule of assessment, works and emergency issues, along with other projects 
such as greening and gardening. There are also members who organise other, smaller initiatives 
such as a regular newsletter, socials, day-trips to the seaside, and other yearly events. Of note is 
the annual general meeting summer party and the New Year’s celebrations, with the latter 
becoming famous for the New Year’s procession that takes place around the Triangle, led by a 
member playing the bagpipes, and with current and old members of the co-operative, along with 
neighbours and friends joining in.  
 
This fully mutual housing co-operative established in the late 1970s is therefore a good example 
of the housing co-operative story of the mutual groups that emerged in that period. It highlights 
how particular collective governance techniques emerged over the years, forming a unique set of 
practices defined by the group, and from which lessons in collective governance can be drawn. 
The size of the co-operative allows for new members to be integrated. Older members’ children 
are now becoming adults and, in some cases, choosing to become full members. Although there 
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is a minimal churn in population, there is clearly stability as well. The case helps illustrate how 
housing co-operatives have survived.  
 
 
5.3 Sanford Housing Co-operative 
 
Sanford Housing Co-operative is the oldest purpose-built housing co-op in the UK. Founded by 
the Society for Co-operative Dwellings in 1973, it has currently around 120 tenant-members living 
in 14 terraced houses and a block of flats. The Society for Co-operative Dwellings (SCD) was set 
up in 1968 by a group of students with the vision of working together to create housing co-
operatives, which were to be designed and operated “on a basis of mutual aid, and not economic 
exploitation” (Hands 2013). They were interested in seeing how the co-operative principles as 
espoused by the nineteenth-century Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers could be applied to 
housing (see Fig.1). 
 
One of the founders, John Hands (1975, 2016) has described how, despite the group’s ethos of 
practical idealism, the conditions at the time were “dauntingly unfavourable”.2 There was little co-
operative culture in the UK. There was no supportive legislative framework for housing co-
operatives, the housing market was dominated by landlords and by individual ownership, with 
little understanding or support for forms of collective, non-state ownership of property; plus, 
there was a lack of funding for new forms of housing and few, if any, support organisations for 
housing co-operatives.  
 
The SCD spent around five years campaigning and looking for land. In 1973, a plot of derelict, 
ex-industrial land was found between two railway tracks in Lewisham at Sanford Street. Lewisham 
Council agreed to hand over the land with the condition that no families would be housed on the 
site as it was then a former industrial site. At this point, SCD registered Sanford Co-operative 
Dwellings as a legal entity, designs for housing on the site were drawn up, and planning 
applications prepared and submitted to Lewisham Council. This was the first ever purpose-
designed and built housing co-operative for young, single people. Lewisham approved the plans 
and a lease agreement drawn up.  
 
Funding was also mobilised, with the Housing Corporation agreeing to a £200,000 mortgage loan 
and a further £200,000 being provided by the Commercial Union Insurance Company. 
 
                                                            
2 John Hands’ account of his involvement with CDS in the Sanford set-up can be found as a record of a 
speech he gave upon returning to the co-op after 40 years (Hands 2013) and in his books (Hands 1975, 
2016). 
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[Sanford] was purpose-built, it was set up by this organisation called SCD by this guy called John Hands, 
he was the main guy and David Rodgers [who became CEO for 33 years of the Confederation of Co-
operative Housing] – they were the two main names who initiated this whole thing. SCD – Society for Co-
operative Dwellings – which later evolved into CDS, allocated people to live here, it was all built and then 
they chose the people to move in and they all just moved in and everyone got chucked in together […] Once 
that first round of tenants was put in the ownership got passed over to the tenant members, so SCD would 
have handed it over to them step back and at that point it became completely independent and there wasn’t 
any management involved at that point. They had to work on their own policies and procedures. [T. from 
Sanford] 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Sanford Housing Co-operative mural  
[Photo: Sanford] 
 
 
Sanford was formally opened by October 1974 and after a year SCD transferred the lease and the 
collective ownership of the buildings to the members of Sanford Housing Co-op. The first year’s 
AGM noted that the co-op had made a surplus over and above the mortgage repayment, in part 
because its members were able to supply the management services needed. The general meeting 
voted for half of the surplus to go to further co-op education, and half to a local homeless charity.  
 
Over the last 40 years, the communal areas have developed, with a large Portakabin regularly used 
as a community space. The most recent infrastructure additions have been the installation of 
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woodchip eco-boilers and the building of a bike shed. The co-op has a full-time staff member 
hired from CDS (Co-operative Development Society) – a housing officer who deals with 
management. In addition to having management support provided through CDS, the co-operative 
is an affiliate member of the Radical Routes network – an umbrella organisation for co-operatives. 
Radical Routes member co-operatives hold quarterly ‘gatherings’ – democratic management 
meetings to decide on their policies, practices and principles (Fox, 2012, p.18). 
 
The fourteen houses are each shared by between eight and ten single people, who have individual 
rooms and a communal kitchen with living room. Each house has a representative who is a 
member of the Committee of Management (CoM), which holds monthly meetings. These CoM 
meetings are preceded by a general members’ meeting held two weeks beforehand. The general 
members’ meeting provides a discussion forum for anyone to bring proposals which are then 
formulated through discussion and brought forward to the CoM meeting. A week prior to each 
CoM meeting, the Secretary prepares an agenda, which is shared with each house so that they can 
discuss the issues. The CoM involves house representatives, officers, a secretary, chair and vice 
chair, and treasurer. Participants either create ad hoc working groups when issues arise or refer to 
established working groups (e.g. for membership, rent arrears and outreach), which meet more 
regularly.  
 
Meanwhile, the area has changed substantially since the co-operative was built on the ex-industrial 
piece of land and the co-operative has recently bought their freehold from the council: 
 
Quite rightly we started to be concerned about the fact that …when this place was first built it was 
wasteland. This particular site because of the position of it between the railway tracks was deemed unfit for 
families, so that’s why it was single occupancy. … There was nothing around, [but] now this particular 
area of London is top of the list of development. Deptford is undergoing a lot of changes, a lot of investment, 
a lot of developers coming in building a lot of new luxury flats [T. from Sanford] 
 
So, in a way, albeit post hoc, this case exemplifies the role that housing co-operatives can have in 
defending affordable housing from rising land prices, gentrification and the lack of provision of 
affordable housing. This is a common thread that, in some form or another, can be observed in 
each case study. The next case, for example, of a short-life housing co-operative set up in the early 
1980s, is a group that is now being threatened by changing tenure patterns, a decline in housing 
availability and the changing role that housing associations have in developing, managing and 
allocating housing.  
 
 
5.4 Backdoor Housing Co-operative 
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The Backdoor Housing Co-operative is a short-life housing co-operative formed in 1980 with 
properties mainly dispersed over an area of North Kensington, and with some flats further west 
in Acton and Ealing. The co-op was set up by a group of students, many from Imperial College 
London, who were either medical students or master’s students. As a student collective, they 
initially had a radical, anti-establishment, anti-Thatcher ethos, and funding for its registration came 
in part from Imperial College, with support from the Student Welfare Officer at the time 
(Laviolette, 2008; Laviolette and Cubero, 2011).  
 
Concerned with the problem of housing students in London, they initially approached the 
Richmond Churches Housing Trust, the Kensington Housing Trust (now Catalyst Group) and, 
later, the Notting Hill Housing Trust for empty or under-used properties in the area. They were 
able to acquire leases on a portfolio of temporarily leased properties located across an area which 
stretched from Shepherds Bush in the west to Royal Oak in the east, from the Notting Hill area 
in the south up to Harrow Road, North Kensington in the north. These properties were allocated 
to co-operative members on short-term lease agreements with the respective housing association, 
in exchange for rent and management. Most properties were leased through the Co-operative 
because they were either not in a condition to be rented out by the Housing Association or were 
going to be demolished or refurbished as a block and individual units could therefore be used on 
a short-term basis. 
 
Backdoor Housing now mainly leases from two housing trusts under a licence agreement, and 
functions as the legal landlord for the leased flats. The members act on its behalf as the custodians 
or guardians of the property in which they live. They are thus responsible for paying the rent and 
utility bills, as well as for moving out within a minimum notice period of 28 days once the housing 
association, for whatever reason, cancels the agreement. In this way, access to housing is available 
for people who may not necessarily be eligible for permanent social housing accommodation 
because of their status as students or would be placed low on waiting lists. There is therefore an 
implicit acceptance by the members of the co-operative of their precarity and transience.  
 
The co-operative has grown steadily, with a spurt in recent years, and now has over 60 members 
and manages 50 flats – some of them shared. The increase has been a result of the availability of 
many empty properties as a large phased decanting process that has been taking place as part of 
the regeneration programme of the Wornington Green Estate, North Kensington. While in the 
beginning of the co-operative, the properties used to be quite dispersed across the neighbourhood, 
over the last five years of expansion in numbers, they have become more concentrated. However, 
the co-operative is now under considerable threat as an organisation since the council regeneration 
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programme on the Wornington Green Estate is reaching its final phases. A member from 
Backdoor noted that “…at the moment it’s tough times certainly for the handful of people involved. Historically 
I'd say it's actually been quite rare that we can't re-house Co-op members, but when several flats go back at the 
same time, i.e. in a block, then it can get difficult” [S. from Backdoor]. The new voids they can get are 
fewer and further west than before, introducing the risk of dispersal of the group and a loss of 
cohesion as the group lives further apart 
 
The management committee is made up of the chair, a secretary and the treasurer, who are the 
key contacts for the housing associations and deal with allocations, membership, rents and 
finance. The chair has been in position for over 20 years and acts as a maintenance manager for 
small issues. The co-operative holds general meetings approximately six or seven times a year, 
roughly every month and a half:  
 
A lot of decisions that are taken between the general meetings by the executive are then ratified by the 
meeting, effectively, but on a day-to-day basis, we do have a couple of key unpaid members of staff…two 
secretaries at the moment, one who deals with allocations and membership and then me, who's chairman in 
a sort of honorary way. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
The case offers insights into a very particular form of housing co-operative that operates within a 
niche of the housing property market. The short-life housing co-operative serves partly as a 
property guardian and partly as a short-term housing letting agency – offering the members cheap, 
although temporary, housing. Thus, most original members tended to be students or precarious 
young workers. While some members have been able to move into more stable forms of 
employment, they have continued to live in the co-operative because of its convenience – both in 
terms of the area and the cost.  
 
The other noteworthy aspect which this case highlights is the reduced importance placed by 
current members on the original principles of the co-operative movement (see Fig.1), even though 
these principles drive the opinions and ideals of a few people involved in the management of the 
co-operative. Laviolette (2008, p.135) noted this in his ethnographic work on the same co-
operative ten years ago although considers this to be relevant in an historical sense since the co-
operative had been founded on “strong ideological grounds ... informed by non-conformity and 
the rejection of standard socio-political systems particularly the ruling Conservative government 
of the time. Over the years such ideological positions have substantially shifted and the main 
reason most of the recent members get involved is the cheap rent.” This however does not belie 
the co-operative governance at the heart of managing the group, which I shall explore in more 
depth in Chapter 7.  
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Backdoor Housing Co-operative is one of several short-life housing co-operatives in the area. 
Indeed, it is an area with a rich history of both housing co-operatives and housing associations 
having been founded as response to the housing conditions, especially in the 60s-70s. Other 
housing co-operatives, such as West Eleven and St Marks Housing Co-op are smaller, whereas 
Westminster Housing Co-op is much larger. 
 
Another interesting mutual housing group in the area worth mentioning is Walterton and Elgin 
Community Homes, is a resident-controlled housing association, that forced the transfer of 
ownership from the council to the community group in 1988, using the new Tenants' Choice 
provision in the Housing Act 1988, a precursor to the Right to Manage legislation introduced in 
2013 (DCLG 2013). These examples situate the experience of Backdoor Housing Co-operative in 
a very fervent and active field of community-led housing in an area marked by campaigns and the 
creation of new organisations and niche endeavours in developing affordable cheap housing 
solutions in that area. However, the contact between groups seems to be minimal, and people 
living in different co-operatives might even be next-door neighbours but not know about the 
existence or are involved in the governance of their neighbour’s organisations.  
 
Increasing threats to the short-life form of housing co-operative have been felt by groups across 
London. There has been both a decline in available housing stock, as well as increasing 
competition from private sector property guardianship companies (Ferreri et al. 2016). In 
addition, there has been repossession by local authorities of properties that had been kept in use 
through short-life housing co-operatives, sometimes for over twenty years, such as the experience 
of Lambeth short-life housing co-operatives, the Islington short-life housing co-operative and 
Alamo Housing Co-operative in Brent. This case study however offers some useful insights into 
the governance of precarious and usually transient group self-managing mutual housing in 
London. The next case is a much more recent example of mutual housing, a group that had 
developed a co-housing project specifically for older women, in Barnet, North London. 
 
5.5 Older Women’s Co-housing 
 
The Older Women’s Co-housing (OWCH) is a successful co-housing project set up by a group 
interested in the idea of developing senior co-housing3  in this country. The group emerged from 
discussing the research work of Maria Brenton, who had been researching senior co-housing in 
the Netherlands (Brenton, 1998, 2013). In 1998 she returned from a research study trip paid for 
                                                            
3 In most literature on senior co-housing, it is considered as homes for people that are over between 50 to 
60 years old. Brenton (1999, p.79) notes that, in the West, older women are the largest population group 
living alone. In addition, 43% of women in the UK are over the age of 55 and two-thirds of those in the 
75+ age group live alone. 
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by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) and presented the results to an audience of women in 
London. Among these was a group of around six women who already knew each other and who 
subsequently decided that they would act on the Dutch example and create their own older 
women’s co-housing community in London. 
 
The director of a small housing association and charity called Housing for Women (H4W) was 
also at the workshop, and she offered the association’s help to develop the concept of co-housing 
for older women. As a non-developer housing association, they brought their expertise in housing 
management and helped in the search for an appropriate housing developer. In June 1999, a 
formal partnership agreement was made between Housing for Women (H4W) and the OWCH 
group. The role of H4W helped facilitate relationships with larger housing associations that had 
access to land and development capacity, and this was a way for OWCH to be socially inclusive 
and provide housing for older women who lacked equity.  
 
At the same time, the JRF agreed to fund a part-time worker for the OWCH group. A 
management group was set up with representation from JRF, Housing for Women and the 
OWCH group. In the same year, they organised a visit to senior co-housing communities in 
Holland, which formed the basis of their work. Between 2000 and 2006, the OWCH group 
continued to attract members. From the beginning, the group emphasised working in a flat, non-
hierarchical governance structure and trying to involve everyone, including new members, in the 
task groups which were set up for finance, communications, membership, etc. OWCH members 
agreed on their core values of respect, tolerance and mutual support, as well as a positive approach 
to ageing and care for the environment. They set up a Company Limited by Guarantee and a bank 
account. Residential weekends each year were a feature of these early years, usually focussed on 
building group solidarity and developing policies for when they would live together. 
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Figure 11: Older Women’s Co-housing  
The members began moving in January 2017 [Photo: OWCH] 
 
The group of women brought with them skills honed through years of either feminist networking, 
but also usually following careers in teaching, charity work, business, and academia as well as 
rearing children – showing the wide range of skills needed:  
 
The group has evolved over the years. I think probably around 4,000 women have come and gone … in 18 
years. Lots of women came for a few years and lost patience with it, or their housing need became urgent, or 
their health declined or stuff like that. They’ve had a long time to work out what they want to do and 
(develop) a group culture if you like. The original women …had learned lots of skills in the feminist 
movement, brought those to the group, and that helped it gel. If it had been left to me I couldn’t have done 
it. [C. from OWCH] 
 
Thus, many women have been involved over the years, positively affecting their lives, even though 
they have not stayed. It demonstrates a learning process that has had impacts beyond the current 
members, but also the high demand and interest in the group. Over the years, questions were 
raised, particularly when dealing with local authorities and housing association partners, 
concerning the exclusivity of creating a community just for women. Legal advice was sought and 
found that OWCH rules did conform to equality legislation. 
 
In 2006, the Tudor Trust, a charity supporting community organisations based in West London, 
approached the group to explore how the OWCH experiment might relate to their own interest 
in supporting self-determination amongst communities of older people. That began a period of 
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partnership and they were able to add funding for a worker for OWCH and for the group’s 
running expenses.  
 
In 2009, Hanover Housing Association expressed an interest in co-housing as a model to develop 
for the self-management of their older resident housing schemes. The Association had also visited 
other senior co-housing schemes in Europe, including Holland, and had been involved in the 
study Housing our Ageing Population (Barac & Park 2009).  Hanover Housing Association offered to 
find OWCH a site and in early 2010 identified a suitable one in High Barnet, consisting of an old 
school that was about to be demolished. Some initial opposition from Barnet Council was based 
on concerns regarding having to deal with an influx of older people into the borough, as well as 
a degree of scepticism and wariness expressed, for example, as particularised complaints of equal 
opportunities. As a result, planning constraints were introduced, and blockages kept emerging, 
which in retrospect seemed to be symptomatic of a resistance to, or risk aversion for, new 
innovative ideas: 
 
All the criticism I got when I went to talk to local authorities … who used to say “How can you justify 
using public money to let people choose who they live with – they will choose their friends?” and I said 
“Don’t you have a choice of who you live with and as best you can choose where you live, why shouldn’t 
they?” So, there was very much a prickliness around local authorities in this. I guess all that came from the 
court cases around councillors slipping the council house to their relative, that kind of stuff…corruption… 
[C. from OWCH] 
 
Finally, in early 2013, planning permission was granted and the decisive factor in this decision was 
the support received from the then Director for Adult Social Care, who confirmed that a senior 
co-housing community would reduce the need for health and social care services. Other local 
Barnet organisations, such as the Barnet Society, were also very supportive. OWCH members 
canvassed the immediate neighbourhood, introducing the scheme to neighbours, and organised 
public meetings in the local library. An exhibition was held in the local church. Members also 
organised ‘drop-ins’ in a local café for women to come and find out about OWCH. This outreach 
work established the project in the wider community’s awareness and imagination.  
 
By 2016, work had begun on what was officially known by then as OWCH (Barnet) Ltd – with 
25 flats. The group has now 26 women aged between 50 and 87, with an elected management 
committee that leads on strategy and policy issues, with a representative of H4W co-opted onto 
the committee. Decisions are taken by consensus, as was done during the development of the 
group, and the more day-to-day household management is carried out by smaller task groups. 
There is a proposed car-sharing scheme and a common room, which hopefully will be used for 
group purposes. They moved in late 2016 upon completion of construction.  The case of OWCH 
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offers a very interesting example of current success and run by a group with a very particular 
intention – to house women aged over 55. Their very strong ethos meant that the group came 
together to address their very particular needs and ideals, but they were also able to draw on skills 
within the group.  
 
 
5.6 Co-housing Woodside 
 
Co-housing Woodside was another co-housing group, closely related to OWCH, as it had similar 
inspirations, used the same ideas and group building dynamics, and involved very similar 
partnerships. Co-housing Woodside was going to be a community of households within the wider 
Woodside Square development in Muswell Hill, North London. The new build homes that will 
occupy the site were to be owned on a 250-year leases and had an estimated completion date of 
February 2017. 
 
The group was started in July 2011, when two people living near the site heard about the 
forthcoming sale of the old St Luke’s Hospital in Muswell Hill. They were familiar with co-housing 
as they owned a co-housing property in Stroud and were architects. They formed the North 
London Sustainable Housing Partnership (NLSHP), whose initial aim was to provide a 
community voice on the future of the site and explore the potential for co-housing: 
 
There must have been probably 30 of us or so who started meeting roughly monthly. Typically, we would 
meet Sunday evening from 6-9, bring along some food to share and try and develop a good understanding of 
each other, as some of us had never met the others. [G. from Woodside] 
 
In the autumn of 2011, the group began discussions with Hanover Housing Association, which 
made a successful bid for the site, using its relationship with NLSHP as part of its winning 
proposal. The co-housing element of the scheme therefore became focussed on older people. The 
members of NLSHP who wanted to work with this opportunity created Co-housing Woodside 
as a new group and registered a separate company in April 2012. It was formed as a democratic 
and participatory group working towards the establishment of a co-housing community on the St 
Luke’s site in North London. The planning restrictions limited the ownership of the flats, 
requiring at least one occupant to be aged 55 years or over. Younger family members and partners 
were welcome, but the age restriction was introduced to focus the community on older people. 
People would have their own space and share resources through ‘collaborative consumption’ 
practices – such as car sharing, appliance sharing and shared spaces.  
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The whole process of developing into a group and reconciling the different agendas within the 
group as well as of the external partners – including housing association, the developers and 
commercial partners – has meant that the group has changed over the last six years. For example, 
one relatively small issue which was felt by some members as a compromise was process related 
and concerned the form of decision-making used. A few people in the group were keen to explore 
a more horizontal, consensus-based decision-making process, and the group received training, 
including having a whole-day session at a Quaker Meeting House on the topic. 
 
Eventually over a period of a couple of years [a couple of people] took on more and more of the driving role 
and I think there evolved a bit of a split then. Their approach was more along the lines of the traditional 
work place – not democratic but more hierarchical. Whereas the one we had started with was more the 
consensus decision-making model, very flat, accepting that there might be very long meetings with no clear 
cut decisions being made but that had helped us getting to know each other, whereas the other approach was 
much more decisive and ready to go to a vote – a majority vote – which the consensus crew felt was something 
to be avoided and it was about talking through, and that became increasingly an element of the split between 
different groups and [eventually] probably two-thirds left… [G. from Woodside] 
 
Other difficulties raised during interviews exploring the co-housing project’s history was the lack 
of commitment over the final prices for the flats, the gender imbalance (the interviewee in this 
case was male) and the lack of age diversity.  
 
The group faced some serious problems with the partners – the main one being repeated 
compromises with the developer over costs – and unfortunately the group ceased to operate in 
July 2016, despite planning to occupy houses in February 2017. Although the group ended, the 
case does provide some very interesting insights into the formation and evolution of a mutual 
housing group. The group faced challenges which overwhelmed them, notwithstanding the 
promising access to equity:  
 
We all had an enormous amount of equity in houses and we wanted to downsize but we couldn’t buy the 
land and build the building – it would have taken three years or whatever it was and there was no way we 
could get mortgages because we were too old. [G. from Woodside] 
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Figure 12: Architectural plans for the larger Woodside development  
 
[Plans: Farrer Huxley Associates] 
 
Plans from 2012 included the mixed tenure Co-housing Woodside units circled in Figure 12, with 
common house.  The group eventually ceased during 2016 due to costs for the new homes being 
developed becoming too high, people dropping out and only four people of the original group 
eventually remained. This number was too small for the co-housing with a shared common house 
and intentional community to be viable. This further highlights the challenges of forming mutual 
housing groups, even when equity capital is available, and will be explored further in the chapter 
on finance (Chapter 7). 
 
 
5.7 East London Community Land Trust 
 
The East London Community Land Trust (ELCLT) was established as the first of London’s 
official Community Land Trust. Precursors include Coin Street Community Builders and 
Walterton and Elgin Community Homes (WECH), both of which are forms of CLTs. The idea 
for ELCLT emerged from a campaign by the organisation Citizens UK’s London affiliate London 
Citizens, which is a network of faith and community-based organisations campaigning on social 
issues: 
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London Citizens … does not want to run a kind of reactionary campaign, it wants to run productive 
campaigns. So, chiefly through David Rogers who is from CDS Co-operatives in the UK who resigned last 
month and our experience of community organising in the United States led us to the Community Land 
Trust model. In 2003-2004 London was putting together the bid for the Olympics we’ve just had, and they 
wanted community groups in the East End of London [on board]. LOCOG and London Citizens came 
together and …said it wanted four things …including a genuinely affordable housing legacy through a CLT 
[T. from ELCLT] 
 
The Olympics bid team agreed to the terms but then decided that they would need to see a pilot 
CLT in London first. London Citizens, through its East London local chapter (TELCO), focussed 
its efforts on finding a site and developing a CLT in East London. During the 2009 mayoral 
elections, London Citizens brought together all the mayoral candidates to demand a community-
led scheme in East London, which all candidates pledged to support. The St Clements Hospital 
in Mile End had shut in 2005 and had remained empty. Once the site had been identified, the 
East London CLT (ELCLT) negotiated with a developer, Galliford Try, to take a portion of the 
St Clements scheme for affordable housing for local people. A direct land transfer to the CLT 
was not possible so the CLT adopted an agency model, in which the developer would build the 
properties and sell them back to a community organisation as a so-called ‘turnkey development’. 
 
The project would therefore be funded entirely through the private sale of leasehold homes using 
an income-linked formula. Thus, the homes were planned to be sold at a fixed price of 35% of 
the fixed local median incomes at the time of moving in, which is multiplied by a factor to take 
account of the number of household residents in employment (x1 for a 1-bed house, x1.33 for 2-
bed and x1.66 for 3-bed). The applicants are to be judged by an allocations panel using criteria 
such as local connection and housing need. The same income-linked formula would be used on 
resale to ensure that the homes are still affordable to local people.  
 
The developer, Galliford Try, financed the construction of the homes as part of its planning 
agreement with the local authority and the finished homes were bought by residents through the 
arrangement with the CLT. The Oak Foundation funded a London Citizens community organiser 
to work on the East London CLT and some grant funding was also provided through the Big 
Issue Foundation.  
 
The final number of CLT homes was 23 (5x 1-bed, 12x 2-bed, 6x 3-bed) and the first 13 
households moved in during summer 2016. There were around 300 people who passed the 
eligibility test – which the ELCLT suggested demonstrated the extreme need for affordable 
housing in the area. The guiding principles for eligibility were fairness, transparency, simplicity, 
legality and scalability. The selection criteria used included: connection to the area, involvement 
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in the local community, being priced out of the open housing market, housing need and being 
supportive of the ELCLT.  
 
Once the ELCLT project was fully developed and being built, London Citizens turned its 
attention to expanding and formed the London CLT, pushing for 100 homes with the London 
Legacy Development Corporation on the Olympics site in the Eastwick and Sweetwater 
neighbourhood. The London CLT is now an independent organisation, governed by its members, 
who can buy a share for £1, as was the case with ELCLT during its initial development phase of 
the St Clements site. Successful campaigns for CLT sites have now yielded results across London 
in Croydon, Redbridge, Southwark and Lewisham.  
 
One lesson of ELCLT’s experience concerns the role of campaigning and the change in 
organisational culture at the heart of the ELCLT in its early days. The Board went from being a 
campaigning organisation to one that had to co-opt onto the Board accountants and lawyers: 
 
There’s been a change in mind, a shift… the focus now is on how we grow the organisation, where do we 
want to be in ten years’ time, what do we want to make of St Clements, at what point do we want to use it 
as a springboard for future projects… [T. from ELCLT] 
 
Another lesson to explore further has been the way in which the CLT developed an agency model 
to deliver its first scheme. In this, a proportion of homes were sold on completion to the private 
market, thus releasing the CLT from the risks of longer-term debt obligations which would have 
come with offering only rental properties. The housing model, although it is not purely social or 
affordable, is community-group driven and managed, with an income-linked sales formula but 
binding re-sale covenants to keep prices lower than market levels.  
 
 
5.8 Brixton Green – now Somerleyton Road Trust 
 
The next case is another effort of community-organising and campaigning for the creation of a 
CLT. Brixton Green was set up as a registered community benefit society in 2008 and in 2013 the 
partnership with Lambeth Council on the Somerleyton Road project was agreed. The role of 
Brixton Green became to involve and bring a stronger community voice into the redevelopment 
of a large plot of council-owned land along Somerleyton Road in Brixton. According to a Lambeth 
Council report from November 2013, “Brixton Green is a consultative body affiliated with local 
organisations that provides a wide community base for discussions over the future of Somerleyton 
Road” (Lambeth Council 2013).  
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However, part of the effort of Brixton Green was to develop and promote the possibility of an 
urban CLT and persuade Lambeth Council to support and facilitate the project. At the time, the 
council had begun to present itself as the “co-operative council”, with a manifesto and 
accompanying policy discourse (Lambeth Council, 2010, 2011). While this agenda certainly might 
have received support from local politicians, the council staff’s time was limited and for much of 
the project there was uncertainty as to the direction of the project. By June 2014, Igloo was 
appointed as the developer partner in order to gain planning permission and develop the site. 
Brixton Green’s role became subsidiary to the overall development in a sense and their mandate 
was weakened. Thus, they became involved in the steering group of the whole project as a partner, 
along with Igloo and Lambeth Council. During this period, an analysis of needs was carried out, 
a business case was developed, a series of consultation events and summer activities held, and the 
designs were developed for the site:  
 
[The partnership has a vision of] a mixed development to support and respond to 
community life along Somerleyton Road. Adding to Brixton’s attractions, it could include 
more homes, work spaces, and possibly health and education facilities. It could also include 
a new cultural facility on the corner of Coldharbour Lane that would bring theatre 
performances and activities for all ages, along with training and community spaces 
(Lambeth Council, 2013).  
 
The planning application was submitted in September 2015. Planning officers reported that there 
was an unusual lack of controversy for the project, with only four letters against, possibly because 
of all the preparatory work carried out by Brixton Green, which had included a statement of needs 
and a design team that was really shaped by the community. In total, 305 homes were proposed, 
with 50% at market rent, 40% at council target rents, and 10% intermediate or “affordable”. Of 
these, 75 homes for extra care needs were proposed and 70 for sheltered housing. The entire 
ground floor would be commercial, non-residential spaces. 
 
The housing portion of the Somerleyton Road project involved developing plans for the 
affordable rented housing on council-owned land. Eventually, once the allocations policy has been 
agreed upon, people will be housed off the council housing register, have an application process 
to go through and then will become members of the co-operative. The intention is to use a legal 
body, such as a co-operative, to exempt the property from the Right-to-Buy policy. Around 150 
of the 305 co-operative homes will be for affordable rent, of which 120 will be at council rent 
levels. Through rental returns, £47m is projected to return to the council. In addition to housing, 
the site will have space for the Ovalhouse Theatre, and provide a nursery and children’s space, 
chef’s school, creative workspace, retail space, health facility, play spaces, and a new public square. 
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The group used a community share offer to drive engagement in the project, unlike other 
community groups across the country which have raised money for similar building works. 
Brixton Green, meanwhile, had over 1,200 members during the period that they acted as a 
community development agency. A new body will be set up to handle the housing once the 
development is completed. The council will retain the freehold on the land and develop it with 
various partners using HRA funds, S106 money and Right to Buy receipts. 
 
Figure 13: Preliminary plans of the Somerleyton Road development 
 
[Photo: Brixton Green CLT] 
 
The diagram forms part of the Brixton Green CLT Somerleyton Road concept, made up of six 
blocks of activity, including the Ovalhouse workspace and theatre, chef’s school, care home, new 
homes, children’s centre, and retail spaces.  
 
Brixton Green therefore was the organisation used in theory to ensure that community interests 
were at the forefront of the development of Somerleyton Road site. The current stated ambition 
is for the whole development, apart from the theatre, to be leased by the council to a new 
overarching community body, the Somerleyton Trust. When this is fully operational, Brixton 
Green as an organisation will have completed its role. The task of then making sure the project 
continues to meet the community objectives will be the responsibility of the Somerleyton Trust. 
The constitution of the board of the new body will be like Brixton Green but includes residents, 
wider community, non-residential occupiers (e.g. the chef’s school) and Lambeth Council. The 
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governance structure should ensure that the assets will remain public and benefit the community, 
as well as ensure that its management is publicly accountable. 
 
[The Trust will have] ownership of the land in trust for the community and the people who live there will 
have a major role in how it’s run but so too will the people who have non-residential tenancies and so will 
the wider community... It might be a charity, a charitable incorporated organisation…or it could be a 
community interest company, or it could be, like Brixton Green, an industrial provident society, a 
community benefit society (ComBen). But it can’t be a fully mutual housing co-operative because a fully 
mutual housing co-op the only people who can be members are people who live there [S. from Brixton 
Green] 
 
Some of the governance lessons to be drawn from the project include how this group developed 
a partnership with the local authority that owned the land. Furthermore, the model of ownership 
will have to mitigate the risk that the tenants exercise the Right to Buy in the future. Brixton 
Green, as a community group, led the consultation and development process from the beginning. 
A large amount of volunteer time (or sweat equity) was used as there was little funding for support 
directly offered to Brixton Green. This is clearly another theme that runs through all cases and to 
which we will return in the next chapters.  
 
 
5.9 London Community Housing Co-operative 
 
The London Community Housing Co-operative (LCHC) is one of the more unusual groups 
studied. In the broad mix of models of mutual housing, LCHC was probably the most uncertain, 
as it had not yet found land, secured finance or formed as a wider community group. Originally, 
it was created by a group of women involved in the home education movement, also interested 
in environmental issues, including climate change and urban food production, and subsequently 
became interested in setting up a housing project. An extract from my notes based on our initial 
meeting gives a flavour of the interest in the group: 
 
I met C. on the Southbank on a cold evening in December as one of the first people I had contacted as part 
of Phase 2 of my research interviews. She launched into discussion directly and began to describe what the 
projects of LCNC [London Community Neighbourhood Co-operative] and LCHC were about. We 
explored the ethos of the group and their ideas on home education, eco-build and the environmental projects 
that they were also involved with, along with their food projects. All of which seemed very small scale but 
undertaken with such energy and influence, as they seemed to be involved with many groups across London, 
including forums and conferences. I was a little amazed at the scope of their influence and that I had not 
come across them before, but it just showed me how focussed one can become when researching particular 
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experiences without necessarily connecting with others. This seemed to me both a methodological problem but 
also an interesting empirical finding – the way I had been focussed on particular experiences but also how 
in themselves these experiences did not always have strong connections with other groups, either because of 
the way they had been set up or because of the way they worked, concentrating on the daily running of their 
own group.  What struck me about C. on that first encounter was the passion and zeal with which she had 
been pursuing, with her small group of women of different social backgrounds, their different projects. An 
important side discussion was on home education – how it worked, what they did in terms of activities, how 
the children had grown up and what experiences they had had. The experience of being involved in home 
education had shaped their housing project very deeply, which to them was as the next natural stage of their 
group’s work, a progression from education of children to education of society through self-organisation and 
self-build... [Field notes 15th December 2015] 
 
 
Figure 14: Build day at LCHC pilot site 
 
 [Photo from C. from LCHC] 
 
The intention of the London Community Housing Co-operative (LCHC) is that it will provide 
housing for fair rental levels in London within an intergenerational and inclusive community. 
Originally the group had started as a home education project – The Otherwise Club – which had 
been running for 23 years. The home education project has had various generations of children 
coming through, and at the same time the group’s attention has become focussed on wider 
community issues, including other challenges such as how to tackle climate change and the threat 
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to their community building. Out of these concerns the idea emerged to design, build and manage 
a multi-use housing scheme, which would include residential and commercial units for community 
and co-operative activity. Some people from the group went to a Radical Routes summer 
gathering and during this period two members became mediators for the Radical Routes network.  
 
Between 2010 and 2012 they were in touch with what was at the time the Co-operative 
Development Hub from whom they received 25 hours of business development support. 
However, it became clear that the housing co-operative model could not be fully mutual and, at 
the same time, have a shop. They solved this problem by setting up an umbrella co-operative – 
the London Community Neighbourhood Co-operative (LCNC) – as a multi-stakeholder co-
operative (MSC) with six different projects that they were going to pursue, including housing. 
During this period, a support worker from Somerset Co-operative Services helped develop the 
primary rules for the co-operative, known as multi-stakeholder rules.  
 
Since it was founded in 2012, LCHC has been looking for land and finance. Their idea is to build 
a three-storey, straw-bale apartment block in London, using environmentally sound practices such 
as ecological building materials, renewable energy and design principles for lifelong homes. They 
are currently having training build days (see Fig.14), inspired by the LILAC project in Leeds 
(Chatterton, 2015) who undertook similar activities during their development phase. LCHC has 
also been keen to involve young builders, for example from the Northwest College of London, 
where they used to have cobbing classes and have taught other traditional building techniques.  
 
The housing aspires to be intergenerational, at a rental value of no more than 30% of average 
wage in the area. During 2015 the group had attempted to use the Right to Build legislation but 
was turned down because no land had been identified. Another approach was then used, which 
was to identify plots of potential interest through borough housing strategies. For example, the 
Westminster housing strategy of 2010 indicated three sites of potential interest, including one car 
park. Also, the GLA was developing at the time a register of possible development plots that they 
owned. By April 2016, five plots of land in quite a small area around the south of Brent, north-
west London had been identified – mainly around the Queens Park and Maida Hill 
neighbourhoods. A feasibility document is currently being drafted with detailed proposals for each 
site.   
 
The key interest of this case is following the mechanisms they have used to set up a mutual housing 
group – finding local plots of land and developing architectural feasibility plans for each site, then 
to present for funding and local authority support. Although the group is very small, it has 
developed important connections with other groups across London working on mutual housing 
and related planning issues. Additionally, some of the governance techniques within the group, 
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which have evolved over many years of working together on home education, are now informing 
the housing project.  
 
 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has traced short biographies for eight cases, which were first identified through the 
typology of mutual housing (Fig.2) as examples in London of the different models of mutual 
housing. In summary, there were three older groups and five newer ones; of the older groups, 
they were all housing co-operatives – two fully mutual and one a short-life model. Of the newer 
models, two were co-housing groups, two were Community Land Trusts of a kind, and one was 
a co-operative (LCHC). At the time of interviews, none of the newer groups, had moved into 
their housing and in one case had not yet found land (LCHC). Since the interviews, two groups 
have moved successfully into their new housing (ELCLT and OWCH), one group has since 
ceased (Co-housing Woodside) and the two final groups are still in the throes of developing their 
plans (Brixton Green and LCHC).  
 
The next chapters will explore in more detail the experiences of the cases through the aspects of 
their assets, finance, governance and mutualism. Thus, the questions addressed in the next 
chapters will include what the groups do with their land or assets (Chapter 6); what the role of 
finance is (Chapter 7); the governance practices within groups and experiences of rule creation 
and change (Chapter 8); and what aspects of mutualism are developed within the groups (Chapter 
9).  
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Chapter 6   
 
 
Assets: Land and property 
 
 
If we go back far enough, there was a time when community 
ownership of land was not the exception, but rather the rule. 
 (Wyler, 2007, p.3) 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The basic asset required for the formation of a mutual housing group is land or property. The 
acquisition, development and management of a mutual housing group’s assets can be a lengthy 
and difficult collective endeavour. ‘Assets’ in their abstract form are both the land and its 
appurtenances, or the property used by the mutual group to create its dwellings or homes. 
Therefore, this chapter explores how the groups described in Chapter 5 have accessed land or 
property assets and the subsequent use that has been made by the groups of these assets.  
 
During the process of finding land, groups engage in group formation activities, developing and 
crafting from the start their governance institutions. These include internal governance practices, 
as well as partnerships with necessary external organisations. The chapter also includes evidence 
regarding the choices that mutual housing groups make around their development of housing. 
Finally, the future of assets currently controlled by groups is examined and how new groups are 
affected by current trends in land and planning issues. Therefore, the chapter demonstrates the 
role land, and assets more generally, can play in how groups develop their collective governance 
institutions.  
 
 
6.2 Access to land and property 
 
In most of the accounts analysed, it is evident that there has been an initial struggle by the group 
to access land. In the current context of London, land availability is clearly an issue, but there has 
been a lack of institutional support for mutual groups to access land. It is, therefore, important to 
look at past strategies employed by the groups to access land, including their approaches to 
developing effective partnerships with other organisations. The term ‘partnership’ is used here 
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loosely: it includes working together with or negotiating with other individuals or groups, as well 
as other organisations or institutions.  
 
Often mutual housing groups do not act autonomously but have had to create strategic networks 
(relations) of influence with both individuals and organisations (Hay, 2002; Hay and Lister, 2006; 
Lawson, 2013). These strategic relations can include government, local authorities and housing 
associations, as well as developers and other private sector actors. Strategic relationships are also 
developed with umbrella organisations and other mutual organisations.  
 
One of the main activities of the mutual housing groups during formation consisted of different 
forms of campaigning. The groups develop the necessary partnerships with external organisations, 
albeit with asymmetries in power relations that remain as an underlying tension in the relationship, 
and this can sometimes be a barrier to accessing necessary land or properties. Successful groups 
must move from campaigning to a different mode of management of their group and this requires 
different skills and expertise, effectively enacting a shift in their mode of governance, which is 
accompanied by shifting governance practices.  
 
The starting point in the study is to look at how groups first access land or property. By way of 
illustration of the problems of identifying land, an interviewee from Older Women’s Co-housing 
(OWCH) described how they proceeded based on some grant funding, instead of waiting for a 
local authority to allocate some land to their group, 
 
We came up with our own [strategy]. Through the years we went to dozens and dozens of sites all round 
London, talked to all these housing associations, nothing came of anything. We had about three certain 
sites in the London Borough of Brent. We had one offered to the group in Ealing and the group itself turned 
it down because we felt it was on a site that was too far out from the centre of London and it was above a 
confluence of traffic that was very polluting. If [the group] had taken that they would have been in years 
ago. [C. from OWCH] 
 
After working with an Asian Housing Association in Wembley on a site by a church, the plan fell 
through at the planning stage: 
 
…we were gradually despairing, and I met at a seminar a chap [from Hanover Housing] I’d met before 
[who said] ‘We can find sites but where an earth can we find groups?’ And I said ‘Well, I’ve got one. I’ve 
got a group, but we haven’t got a site’. He found us a site in 12 weeks and it was in High Barnet. [C. 
from OWCH] 
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For most groups, access to land or property was achieved in collaboration with other 
organisations. However, often the relationship appeared to depend on one person within the 
organisation taking a special interest in the ambitions and activities of the group. In the case of 
OWCH, they had a partnership with Hanover Housing, but only because of a chance encounter 
with someone in the organisation that had a keen interest in co-housing as a model of provision 
for elderly people. 
 
Grand Union Housing Co-operative (GUHC) began when squatter groups took over buildings 
to make them liveable in the 1970s and gradually refurbished them over several years. At the time, 
the squatters were not necessarily perceived in a positive light, but it was thanks to the squatters 
that the houses were made liveable and indeed, the infrastructure of the terrace remained viable. 
As a group they reached a point however where they had to engage with external institutions to 
formalise their ownership of the properties, and to obtain grant funding for further refurbishment.  
 
The process of formalisation was usually initiated by the group establishing themselves as a legal 
entity (i.e. the co-operative as an industrial provident society). It was only then that there could 
be formal recognition of their property rights through ownership.  
 
There was a few, key people and the GLC considered us [eligible for funding] … there was a guy called 
George Tremlett 4 and he called us an interesting social experiment … Livingstone and Thatcher, of course, 
liked the idea of co-operatives. The Tories liked it because it was public housing, but you manage yourselves. 
And that’s what we did. We had low rent obviously in those days [P. from GUHC] 
 
Most long-life co-operative housing groups established at the time were able to own the housing 
following a lengthy process of negotiation with local authorities or the GLC. GUHC had been 
negotiating with the GLC to receive grant funding for refurbishment available if they 
incorporated, and with their local authority – the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.  
 
Similarly, Sanford Housing Co-operative’s access to land on which to build their housing involved 
lengthy negotiation with Lewisham Council. The negotiation process was conducted not by the 
residents (because they did not exist as a group) but by the umbrella organisation set up for 
developing housing co-operatives, which became the Society for Co-operative Dwellings (Hands, 
1975).  
 
                                                            
4 George Tremlett was the Conservative member for Twickenham at the GLC and was head of housing 
policy at the GLC from 1977-1981 (Tremlett, 1979).  
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In most cases a lengthy process of negotiation took place during which different strategies were 
employed. At the initial and informal stage, strategies such as squatting and campaigning were 
used; with the subsequent creation of partnerships that then led to the stage of group 
formalisation. During this latter period, the group’s governance procedures were developed, and 
the collaboration partnerships were established with the relevant institutions required for the 
transfer of property, including both financial and legal support. 
 
Campaigning was used by most groups, although in different ways. For example, the East London 
CLT emerged from the work of London Citizens: an alliance of grass-roots, community and faith-
based organisations, with around 280 members at the time, from schools, churches, trade unions, 
and other local community organisations city-wide. Land, being one of the primary issues that 
they campaign around, is referred to as one of their ‘pillars of action’, and for their aims of social 
justice. To develop their separate housing campaign with London Citizens, one of the organisers 
described the changes in their style: 
 
The first thing that I tried to do [in 2008] was to change what was a very good, broad-based campaign…So 
what I tried to do was establish the East London Community Land Trust as an initiative of an arms-
length independent membership organisation, with London Citizens, so that it could transform being a 
campaign that just said ‘Give us land, any land, and we’re not quite sure to whom or what we’re going to 
do with it’, into a viable organisation that had a membership, had a constitution, had a board of trustees, 
had a development partner, had an RSL partner…all the different things that you need. [T. from 
ELCLT] 
 
In this case, the role of campaigning was part of the strategy to create the group and find land. 
However, the group also had to transform from a campaign into a recognised formal entity to 
negotiate with the authorities during their search to find and acquire land.  
 
Although there was little explicit mention of ‘campaigning’ in any other interviews, the work that 
the groups talked about was in effect rooted in the same dynamics – gaining support, forming the 
necessary partnerships, establishing networks of influence and, in this way, finding land – factors 
that were all strongly linked.  
 
Most interviewees, talking about their group’s experience, spoke of their accessing land as being 
a lengthy process of negotiation, usually with a local authority. It was always complex, arduous, 
uncertain, and furthermore, demanded commitment, resources and time, which not all the groups 
had, leading to some giving up: 
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The really big practical problem was finding space in London. A lot of us either gave up on London and 
decided to leave London because it’s so difficult to find a suitable building – a big building to convert – or 
finding empty land that can be built on and all these sorts of problems, it’s so expensive in London, but 
then a lot of us, probably half of us are really committed to staying and it was for really practical reasons. 
[G. from Woodside] 
 
An alternative way of campaigning to find land has consisted of identifying buildings that could 
be used or adapted for use by the mutual housing group. This has proved an important strategy, 
especially in the current planning legislation climate where commercial buildings can be changed 
to residential use under permitted development orders. The strategy of finding suitable properties 
for purchase is being pursued by other recent housing co-operatives set up under the umbrella of 
the Radical Routes network – such as The Drive, Walthamstow and MAJ, Haringey. An 
interviewee traced the outline of their Plan B: 
 
We have our eyes on a couple of streets where some of us either live or there’s a nice geographical connection 
between the houses and we figured if we buy ten houses or so – they might be separated by other houses that 
aren’t part of it, they have all back gardens that link together so you could somehow have them all joining 
up…then over a period of 15 or 20 years, it’s a long term sort of thing we could then buy them up and then 
– in the case of one of our sites there’s a group of garages which all the houses around back onto and so if 
we bought up all the houses we could have the garages and we could turn that into the common house. [G. 
from Woodside] 
 
Clearly, this cannot be a widespread approach in London as it is only available to groups with 
access to equity that can be used to invest in buildings. The idea of reinvesting in existing 
infrastructure to form mutual housing is useful, and can be achieved by providing a developer 
with an existing group with equity ready to move into a development:  
 
One area I’ve been thinking about is to find a developer who is developing an old warehouse into flats – of 
about 30 units – and say to them I can give you a group and the equity – would they be interested – that 
would be one way of doing it in a place like London, to cover the land – because the developer already has 
the land and he’s going to be building for commercial sales. [J.W. from Woodside] 
 
These options rest upon the basic fact that, without partnerships with outside institutions, it 
remains difficult for mutual housing groups to find necessary land or properties.  
 
 
6.2.1 Partnerships 
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Partnerships were usually institutional links that were formed between mutual housing groups and 
external organisations to enable access to land or property. In most cases there were formal and 
informal partnerships formed. One of the most common forms of partnership was between a 
mutual housing group and a housing association (Moore, 2016).  
 
For the short-life housing co-operative, partnership arrangements with a housing association 
provide access to properties – there is therefore no ownership of land or housing, rather 
temporary leasehold under license arrangement, which is the most precarious property relation of 
the case studies. The precariousness of tenure has profound implications for the way a co-
operative is run and how it is defined as a group. When negotiating with a housing association, 
the short-life housing co-operative is at a disadvantage and has to rely on the empty properties 
that the housing association has, either because they are waiting for the whole block to be freed 
up for refurbishment or, as is the case now in North Kensington on the Wornington Green Estate, 
it is carrying out a large-scale regeneration plan in multiple phases. 
 
The short-life housing group works closely with the housing associations they have established 
relationships with; mainly the Catalyst Housing Group and, to a lesser extent, the Notting Hill 
Housing Trust. The relationship has been maintained over the years, and is stronger with them 
than with other mutual housing groups in the area, which they see essentially as competition:  
 
We’ve outlasted some of the other co-ops in the area because we’ve managed to keep the housing associations 
happy and be quite efficient and well managed, relatively speaking. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
The relationship between the housing associations offering the properties and the short-life group 
had been changing in recent months. This was not only because the housing association was 
decanting residents and having empty properties during their phased regeneration project but also, 
they were changing their practices with regards to short-life properties due to wider changes in 
the housing market:  
 
They offer it to us at more like at market rent which we have had to turn down…That’s not market 
standard of letting, so we won’t take it. Apart from anything else, it’s not because of a moral stand, it’s 
because it would upset our finances if we’re subsidising one or two particular properties which are far more 
expensive than the others, so there may be finance issues in the future, but we’ve managed to keep it fairly 
cheap, that’s the only reason for doing it, if it wasn’t cheap, no-one would do it, you might as well go to an 
estate agent. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
The housing association (HA) had been increasingly treating the short-life co-operative as a 
market operator, despite the precariousness and short-term service provided by the housing co-
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operative. There was no need for the HA to acknowledge the group’s precarious role. Secondly, 
the co-operative’s own finances depended on lower-than-market rents being charged in exchange 
for the precarious and short-term tenure. There has also been an increase in competition with 
other short-term property users, such as property guardians (Ferreri, Dawson and Vasudevan, 
2016). 
 
Although most interviewees had not come across these groups or noticed how the property 
guardianship schemes and companies were emerging in competition to the short-life housing co-
operative, some were more aware of the way they have emerged in the last five to ten years. Other 
interviewees (from Sanford Housing Co-operative) who were more involved in housing activism, 
as well as in outreach work for their own housing co-operative, were more aware of the 
competition posed by property guardianship companies and the potential political implications 
over access to short-term properties: 
 
Now they’re getting guardian companies, Camelot, a property guardian, in many places … I think in the 
interim they’ve turned to property guardians rather than co-ops, even though they are expensive or a lot more 
expensive, I think it’s becoming a big problem for short-life co-ops. [N. from Sanford] 
 
Short-life co-operatives were once also a pathway to formalise squatting groups and then become 
a long-life, fully mutual housing co-operative. Squatting was used both as political campaigning 
over rights to housing in general terms, as well as, more specifically, accessing and rehabilitating 
empty properties as a matter of necessity. Both reasons for squatting are vividly present in the 
accounts given by interviewees of the Grand Union Housing Co-operative in terms of their 
informal acquisition of properties in their initial stages of group creation in the 1970s (see Chapter 
5).  
 
The routes to formal recognition included either the creation of a short-life co-operative – with 
short leases to the properties squatted – or the purchase of the properties with grants or financial 
backing from banks by means of loans and mortgages. The establishment of a legal body which 
would take into ownership the properties was the official formal set-up of the co-operative as a 
legal entity. The GUHC was, for a while, both an owner of property as a co-operative and had 
some properties with short-life tenancies from the council. They were thus a hybrid of long-life 
and short-life housing co-operatives, until they accumulated the funds needed to purchase the 
short-life properties.  
 
To establish itself legally as a housing co-operative, GUHC negotiated with a secondary housing 
association, whose role was to underwrite the mortgage and provide assurances of responsibility, 
a common way of formalising a housing co-operative at the time to access finance.  
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We negotiated with our secondary housing association, which was called Solon and we negotiated a mortgage 
to set up a co-op and, in my memory, I think I signed a mortgage for £1.4 million in 1981 in County 
Hall and next to me was the woman signing for London Fields Co-op [P. from GUHC] 
 
A housing association played a key role for the set-up of ELCLT and for the building of houses 
on the site they found: 
 
We’re now working with Galliford Try and Peabody Housing Association and John Thompson and 
Partners architects to redevelop the site. So, the site is partly owned by the GLA. What will happen is that 
it will go to Galliford Try on a two-year development lease and at the end of this it will be transferred to 
ELCLT for a pound or something. The contracts are about to be exchanged between the GLA and 
Galliford this week hopefully. [T. from ELCLT] 
 
Peabody would then have the role of housing manager, but during the development process was 
a key partner. Hanover Housing was another important housing association, involved with both 
Co-housing Woodside and OWCH. The commonality was that both were set up as co-housing 
for older people – ages 55 and over, and Hanover Housing was established in 1963 as the first 
national housing association for older people. The demographic changes linked to ownership of 
capital means that as the older generation seeks to downsize, it becomes an opportunity for the 
housing association. However, this cannot be seen only as a commercial choice but must be linked 
to other changes happening in society:  
 
The real change that is happening in society, and that society needs to deal with, is this thing of parents, the 
middle generation and very young children, wanting to be able to afford to live near one another. We are 
enthusiastic co-housers who have 30-year-old children who are now having grandchildren. [G. from 
Woodside] 
 
Hence, while there are idealistic reasons for starting a co-housing group, there are also wider social 
and economic demands that exist today on how we may choose or be forced to live now and in 
the future, namely in this case the role of intergenerational care-giving being part of the way in 
which the increasing costs of childcare and other caring roles are being assumed in non-monetary 
form by the family. In any case, Hanover as a housing association was willing to experiment with 
developing co-housing models, in part due to the availability of ‘grey equity’ which would make 
commercial sense.  
 
The Co-housing Woodside group’s housing development was a small portion of a much larger 
housing development. The priorities of the housing association became increasingly commercial 
117 
 
and Savills had been brought in as the marketing agent and the co-housing group found itself 
having to deal with the increasing and unclear pricing of the homes with an organisation that had 
a very different set of commercial and institutional imperatives. These imperatives were affected 
by Savills’ lack of awareness of even the meaning of co-housing: 
 
 [Savills had] no sense of what co-housing means. For them it is market housing for the elderly. The only 
constraint they have is that it must be people over 55 because that’s what the planning [permission] was 
for. But otherwise they are just like any other high street estate agent, but extremely upmarket. And they 
are pushing everything to the limit and pushing it as a very upmarket development, which is why they are 
not so keen on some of our ideas, such as allotments. Instead there have to be pristine gardens. [J.W. from 
Woodside] 
 
The interviewees highlighted that not only were Savills pushing the properties to the highest point 
that the market would allow, but that their understanding of the principles of co-housing – as laid 
out by the group in their constitution and rules – had not been considered, including the 
management of the housing, rising service charges, and the inclusion of central heating for the 
whole development. Therefore, to buy into the co-housing development, the group had to comply 
with the conditions laid down by their partners. Here one can see the stark unevenness in the 
relationships, and hence a lack in bargaining power, that the mutual group had with the housing 
association, developers and private sector agents involved in marketing. While this is only one 
example, it does expose the problems for groups seeking to be in partnerships that are relationally 
unbalanced, into which they are forced for strategic reasons (see Lawson 2013). This is applicable 
in similar ways to most of the case studies analysed. The overall result is that it becomes difficult 
to develop the project based on the mutual group’s own terms when access to land is negotiated 
through these partnerships. 
 
Another important partnership was with umbrella organisations and other support organisations. 
For example, the original idea for LCHC when they formed was to buy property that would be 
able to have housing and a shop facility attached for their related enterprises. Some people from 
the group went to a Radical Routes summer gathering and two members also became mediators 
for the Radical Routes Network. After forming the legal and governance structure for the co-
operative, they found some grant funding with which to pay architects for preliminary research 
and design proposals for six plots of publicly owned land in the area, which could be used for 
development once feasibility plans had been developed.  
 
From the LCHC experience, Radical Routes as an umbrella organisation was crucial in supporting 
their set up, exchanging information and experiences, raising funds – but less for directly accessing 
land. However, financial support is important in the developing their proposal. Therefore, part of 
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what groups must do is plan out what their revenue will look like, once for starting their project 
but also for when the land is acquired, or assets developed, which is determinant of their success 
(see Chapter 7). However, one partnership which enables groups to access and acquire land is that 
with the state, including government or local authorities.  
 
 
6.2.2 Role of government 
 
Most groups use local authority and other public bodies as their first port-of-call when looking 
for land. Yet these public bodies appear to give little recognition to the role of mutual housing 
groups who position themselves both as a form of social housing provider, and as a potential 
provider of mutual benefits that go beyond the private housing ownership model.  
 
One of the older housing co-operatives, Grand Union Housing Co-operative (GUHC), bought 
all its properties from GLC (Greater London Council) and Sanford Housing found land from 
Lewisham Council. The GUHC acquisitions happened in the period of a Conservative-led GLC, 
when one of its main housing policy planks was the sell-off of public housing, along with the 
introduction, in 1977, of the first squatters’ amnesty: 
  
To regularise their affairs by becoming official tenants … something like 80 per cent of the 
squatters accepted the offer, which meant that at last we could begin tackling another 
problem that had been bedevilling London’s housing for years – that of finding a beneficial 
use for dwellings that had previously been thought either sub-standard or hard to let. 
(Tremlett, 1979, pp.173–174) 
 
Today, public bodies which have land suitable for housing development include the local 
authorities, the NHS, Network Rail, and the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA). In 2008, 
for instance, ELCLT approached HCA as they owned an old NHS hospital site (St Clements) in 
Mile End. Having been rejected directly by the HCA, they approached the developers on HCA’s 
regional pre-approved development partner list, expressing interest in partnering with them in 
their developments. Finding land for ELCLT was contingent on their developing relationships 
with partners and their strategy was to understand the procurement process of that institution. 
The interviewee pointed out that, in hindsight, HCA had a very lengthy tender process, and this 
was not appreciated at the time: “We just thought we could kind of persuade the Mayor.” [T. from ELCLT] 
Again, this illustrates the campaigning mode they were in. They also realised that negotiating with 
the Council would be more difficult as their property portfolio was smaller, and they would be 
working to a tighter budget: 
 
119 
 
They [the Council] are trying to meet target rents for the borough and so I think you benefit from a kind of 
the economy of scale that makes it slightly more difficult to campaign around [and it’s] another level of 
municipal government that you’ve got to manage and infiltrate... [T. from ELCLT] 
 
The interviews also emphasised the difficulty of accessing public land with significant differences 
between councils regarding their own separate priorities, including the imperative to find buyers 
who were prepared to pay market rates. Negotiations with local authorities are hampered by the 
need to understand and negotiate with the borough’s own financial priorities. We have yet to see 
results from local authorities looking at their own assets and finding strategic ways in which they 
can allocate these for community uses such as housing, owned and managed by mutual housing 
groups, for example.  
 
Both Brixton Green in Lambeth and the LCHC group in Brent spent time determining the best 
strategy to employ with the local authority when they did not have the time or inclination to 
consider the viability of the mutual group proposal. It is unclear whether local authorities are even 
able to, or have the inclination or capacity to, calculate the viability of a mutual group, including 
the potential social benefits from a mutual housing project for example.  
 
There are also wider political realities where managers in local authorities may be interested in 
community-led projects for mutual housing but do not have the necessary understanding or 
institutional instruments to deal with the main actors involved in developing land – the developers. 
In Milton Keynes, for example, a member of the group involved in trying to set up a co-housing 
project noted: 
 
Probably the reality is a political reality – the managers of the development authority are interested in the 
project and are willing to give us a concession on the land, but we’ve taken so long they are probably having 
to fight off other people saying look we want to see something happening here … Developers have got plots 
of land all over Milton Keynes – they are land banking and the council is aware of that, elections are coming 
up, so we don’t really know all the pressures that are on … [J.W. from Woodside] 
 
In large part, there is a risk-averse attitude that local authorities need to have, especially at a 
financial and legal level. However, it remains to be seen whether the argument for allocating and 
selling land to mutual housing groups can potentially be strengthened by having a wider 
understanding of the long-term benefits of moving land off the market, and allocating it to mutual 
housing (i.e. a Community Land Trust) where the benefits will be kept in perpetuity for the direct 
community: 
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I think there’s potential because [local authorities] have got those well-being powers. They are thinking... 
well, they should be thinking about the wider, social economic environmental impacts. Disposal of land and 
at whatever value but, at the same time, they’re under pressure to, in the face of cuts, to get the most from 
that, so there is potential. [I. from CLTN] 
 
It required a deliberate policy decision following the General Disposal Consent 2003 to ensure 
that the “disposal of land for less than best consideration” could include land to community 
groups or for mutual housing. However, a local authority is unlikely to transfer below market 
value, unless the social value of mutual housing can be used to argue for its support, demonstrating 
the added value of mutual housing.  
 
The acquisition of land from the private sector seems even more difficult, as typified by the 
interviewee from the Community Land Trust Network (CLTN), the umbrella for CLTs, who 
asserted that: 
 
In certain areas what we’re finding is that land owners are more likely to release land to CLTs. Then 
there’s the whole thing about holding it in leasehold ownership so it’s not going be lost to the market… 
private landowners in villages for example, farmers, they’re prepared to sell this to the community and not 
to a developer – that’s often how land comes forward for development. CLTs in some areas, basically, are 
the key to unlocking any development. [I. from CLTN] 
 
Again, this is something that none of the other case studies have demonstrated in any definite 
way. There may be other examples from urban areas, in particular in London. Smaller mutual 
housing groups may find land from the private sector, on the open market, when they have access 
to capital – either privately or through some loan stock arrangement. Some recent Radical Routes 
groups, which tend to be smaller in scale and use already existing properties, have been able to 
acquire property from the private sector, such as The Drive in Walthamstow and MAJ in 
Haringey. 
 
 
6.3 Current use and management of assets 
 
In discussing how the groups developed and managed their assets, some issues emerged. One of 
the most important was the role of ‘sweat equity’ in maintenance and management, which is 
examined more in the chapter on finance (Chapter 7). Also raised was the importance of how the 
common spaces were designed and developed, along with other infrastructure projects or 
environmental projects focussing on energy, food production, and reduced car usage.  
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Sweat equity was used throughout the early years of the housing co-operative movement through 
self-help and mutual assistance in the refurbishing of the housing stock. Then, either as part of 
the set-up of the housing co-operative or formalisation of management arrangements, groups 
began to organise repairs and systematising maintenance. In the case of the Grand Union Housing 
Co-operative (GUHC), the maintenance of kitchens and bathrooms was prioritised, along with 
the establishment of a rolling programme over the years, using increasingly better specifications. 
At the same time, a wider range of contractors were identified, a maintenance work manager 
employed, and a works subcommittee created. 
 
In addition to dealing with essential refurbishment and maintenance works, in the interviews it 
was clear that groups have managed to articulate environmental concerns and find their own 
solutions. Sanford Housing Co-operative was keen on environmental retrofitting and, by means 
of grant funding, installed solar panels and wood pellet boilers. The Energy Saving Trust (EST) 
support provided for a survey and a feasibility study. Further funds were received from Lewisham 
Council and Triodos Bank, as well as a contribution from Sanford’s savings. Sanford went on to 
win the 2008 Inside Housing Refurbishment award for their carbon reduction project.  
 
A more recent group, Co-housing Woodside, had the ambition to build to Passivhaus standards, 
since sustainability was a core element in the group’s ethos: 
 
We knew each other through the Muswell Hill Sustainability group. We must have had 5 or 6 Saturday 
meetings with the architects where we went through plans on how we would want the buildings – the co-
housing elements, the common room – to be designed and how we would want each of the individual living 
units to be designed... one of the big elements that we pushed for was Passivhaus design - super energy 
efficiency, recycling, …the real struggle that we had was trying to convince the architects [G. from 
Woodside] 
 
Although the Passivhaus specifications agreed upon eventually proved to be financially non-
viable, the group remained keen to minimise their utility bills as well as to develop more 
environmentally sustainable homes as part of the wider co-housing movement. Other 
sustainability issues included reducing car usage. Other exemplary housing developments were 
looked at by the Woodside group, such as BedZed, LILAC or Still Green in Milton Keynes, and 
they realised that part of the problem was dealing with planners: 
 
Basically, they have their view of what new communities should be like and they are not at all interested in 
actually discussing alternative models. They are not interested in saying we are going to use less private cars 
– we’re going to have a car club. They do say they are interested in trying this, but the rules are two and a 
half car spaces per unit, which is just a huge amount of your land. The idea of a co-housing scheme where 
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you all look in on each other, have a nice garden in the middle and you have the cars away from it, not 
going into, whereas [for planners] the car spaces must be next to the house, because that’s security… They 
are taking away the incentives by taking away the alternatives. [J.W. from Woodside] 
 
Another example of the differences of views between group and planners was how planners were 
promoting their “Attractive Streets” agenda, with fronts of houses placed facing the street. In 
contrast, the group preferred to design with more inward looking, semi-public, shared common 
spaces. That was the way the garden was designed in Sanford and it has now developed into a 
community space that extends along the whole row of houses.  
 
In GUHC, within the main triangle of houses, the gardens adjoining each other originally had no 
fences, creating a wide shared communal space with a path called the Yellow Brick Road that ran 
down the middle to a café. Over the years this changed:  
 
Paths disappeared, and everyone’s claimed their bit of garden. It was a chance for kids to run around 
comfortably, people complained about that, couple of things going missing, and it changed… maybe it is just 
a sign of a co-op that functions. Maybe for people to work together you need a fence for people to have their 
boundaries and meet in comfortable agreement, a controlled manner. [S. from GUHC] 
 
The specific themes that have emerged around the mutual housing group’s use of their land and 
property, including the use of ‘sweat equity’ as part of the management and maintenance, the 
development of environmental infrastructure projects, and the importance of design in creating 
useful common spaces. Following on from the points made around current use and management 
of assets, there are several issues around how groups will manage their assets into the future, 
namely how to build the mutual housing group and potential risks the groups may encounter 
regarding the group’s land and property, which will be explored in the next section.  
 
 
6.4 Future of land and assets 
 
Most of the interviewees articulated their concern regarding the intense pressure there is on land 
and property already owned and used by their mutual housing groups. In the case of short-life 
housing co-operatives, this concern was very immediate, as they have little chance of planning for 
their future. Across London, such short-life housing co-operatives are either being evicted or 
being threatened directly by local authorities (recent cases include the Brixton and Islington short-
life groups). In the case of the Backdoor Housing Co-operative, they are being offered fewer 
properties and at greater distance from their original location. For some: “it feels like the beginning of 
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the end” [T. from Backdoor]. However, there are glimmers of hope in the future from some 
quarters: 
 
I don’t think we’re an anachronism, we’re not some sort of oddity. I think we’re part of a [wider movement] 
… there’s a spectrum of outfits like us out there which, if not thriving, are doing what it says on the tin, 
they’re doing the job they’re set up to do. [P. from GUHC]  
 
Many of the interviewees raised the group’s ideas for their future. One option was to find a way 
of buying more property. Backdoor had explored a proposal to buy a flat and they would 
eventually benefit from future rental income. Another option for some groups has been to build 
more housing, with the group borrowing against their current assets to finance another mortgage. 
However, they recognised that the risk was they would have to increase rents to service the new 
mortgage. When it was suggested that they build above the community centre at GUHC: 
 
Yes, we could go and get a mortgage for a lot of money - to put up what there? We’d still need a meeting 
place, so what are you going put? A couple of single person places over the top? It doesn’t really stack up. 
[B. from GUHC] 
 
Sanford has started having discussions about setting up and building another housing co-operative 
and a working group was formed to look at the necessary steps, including the preparation of an 
options and feasibility study. Among the options considered was to build on the large, underused 
car park at the entrance; set up a sister co-operative on another plot of land in London; or even 
finding land abroad, in a warmer climate. All options are problematic:  
 
The reality is that we wouldn’t be able to make the rent as low in the new place as what we have here, so 
affordability [would be an issue]. It would probably still be cheaper than private renting but not much. It 
would be hard to set up a place like this again. Some people talk about doing it overseas, we’ve got a lot of 
people from all over the place so many different nationalities…. it’s obviously much cheaper abroad to buy 
land but then there’s a lot of people saying we need to be in close proximity in order to help to get it established 
and make it stable, if we are to replicate our model in this country [T. from Sanford] 
 
Another sceptical (or realistic) voice from the same group pointed out that: 
 
The idea of Sanford creating a co-op … isn’t a bad idea but my only experience of that, of doing start-ups, 
is that you really need two or three years to gel and you’ve done your research and you know what you are 
doing. With Sanford there’s these flash concepts… wow, this building is up for sale - yes let’s buy it, let’s 
buy it – and obviously with a project like that it would be a big strain and waste of resources. [N. from 
Sanford] 
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The discussions about expansion vary across the co-operative housing movement. Some groups 
(or those that have survived) set up in the 1970s and 1980s are now paying off their mortgages 
and therefore have now valuable assets:  
 
Our mortgage was paid off. But we also didn’t get a lot more money because the mortgage was quite low but 
we could buy it, we could expand [the co-op] but you got a million quid in the bank what you going to do 
about people who buy a property around here for about 800,000, you use up three quarters of our resources 
and it takes so long to pay off. It’s not worth expanding. [S. from GUHC] 
 
Sanford too has been able to pay off its mortgage and has recently purchased the freehold. Aware 
of how councils, including Lewisham, are selling off their assets, they began negotiations around 
three years ago.  
 
 
The question regarding the use of rent receipts once the mortgage is paid off was also discussed. 
Most co-operatives have kept rents low while others have tried to include a provision in their 
constitution that rents remain at the same level after mortgage repayment and that the 
accumulating surplus is used to support other co-operatives [from LCHG meeting]. However, the 
necessary financial platform to fund collectively more mutual housing has yet to be set up (see 
Lambert, 2012b). 
  
Despite these ambitions, there do remain important internal tensions within the more long-
standing mutual housing groups and efforts still need to be made to ensure high levels of 
participation and prevent the urge amongst some for demutualisation. Any mutual housing group 
has the possibility of deregistering and deregulating itself as initial steps towards demutualisation. 
Around ten years ago, GUHC voted on deregistering and a majority of the membership disagreed, 
so the co-operative remained registered and therefore stayed mutual. The discussion had been 
initiated because of housing reforms discussed in 2010, which some had realised could be an 
incentive to demutualise: 
 
The last attack was about six years ago, and I got involved again then…. We had general meetings and 
we threw out the idea of de-registering the co-op because if the reason to de-register was that people could try 
and buy, it’s pointless because they can’t buy [because of] the Housing Act and you’d have to alter the 
Housing Act. Some people got slightly over-excited and thought, if they became a housing association, they 
could do it. The discussion you’d have now is that somebody will go ‘oh, let’s become an association, we 
might get the Right to Buy.’ [P. from GUHC] 
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At the time of the interviews, the Housing and Planning Bill 2016 was being discussed. Under its 
proposals, Right to Buy (RTB) would be extended to housing associations and there was 
uncertainty both on how this would affect mutual housing groups, including co-operatives, as well 
as the potential of demutualisation and privatisation. The Housing and Planning Bill 2016 
extended the Right to Buy to include housing association properties and again some housing co-
operatives feared that it would also affect them. While the London Housing Co-operative 
Federation and other organisations including the Confederation of Co-operative Housing (CCH), 
organised meetings to push for clarification concerning exemptions for housing co-operatives, 
there remains the risk that, because of government policy, pressures will arise for the 
demutualisation of groups, both from inside and outside, in the future 
 
This threat to housing co-operatives through deregulation and hence demutualisation has existed 
for some time, and some housing co-operatives have disappeared as a result. The Leasehold 
Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 included leasehold enfranchisement, 
allowing leaseholders to acquire their freehold, and this was applied to fully mutual co-operatives. 
More recently, the Right to Acquire under the Housing Act 1996 was enacted but it excluded fully 
mutual co-operatives. Then, in 2010, welfare reform led to the introduction of Pay-to-Stay (as 
known as the ‘Bedroom Tax’), although housing co-operatives again managed to remain exempt.  
 
Historically, therefore, the Right to Buy has only been the most recent instance of a long series of 
attempts to privatise and liberalise social housing, and to support the expansion of private home 
ownership. This has, in turn, undermined and affected mutual housing groups at different levels 
– the personal as well as the group. Most members feel that they are affected by the so-called 
“attack on social housing”:  
 
If I’m paranoid it would be that the next attack … will be a full attack on all social housing, which would 
be co-ops and everything and they’ll just try and wipe them out basically, they’ll just asset strip them, Lord 
knows how they’d do it, but if they come back with another five years, I think they’ll try and think of how 
to do it as a wider, political project. [P. from GUHC] 
 
Again, part of the challenge comes also from within mutual housing groups, with some members 
interested in acquiring their own housing: 
 
We’ve always had people within us who think they can asset strip us. I did the constitution in 1980 – and 
when we were doing the constitution, I made sure it had no Right to Buy and that was part of the things we 
put in as an organisation. We were actually very clear that we were public housing and there was no right 
to buy. We were quite philanthropic, our intention was quite pure, but you will always get people within an 
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organisation, especially when assets have gone up so much, trying to work out how they could asset strip. [P. 
from GUHC] 
 
Another housing policy aimed at increasing private home ownership was the Tenant Incentive 
Scheme, which helped council tenants move to smaller homes:  
 
There was the Tenants Incentive Scheme which gave you £16,000 to leave, which I don’t think still works, 
but it used to. We had a whole bunch of people went, we were allowed two or three a year and people left in 
the 80s and 90s, they got £16,000 but it had to go towards the purchase of a house and you could go …we 
didn’t have the Right to Buy…now, as far as I know, there isn’t a Tenants Incentive Scheme anymore, I 
think that’s gone … [P. from GUHC] 
 
Within the GUHC, some members are aware of the contradictions facing fully mutual housing 
co-operatives:  
 
Right to Buy shouldn’t be allowed because then the community would all go. Would totally ruin it – nothing 
would be the same and the people on social security would be stuck. [#2 from GUHC] 
 
There is an explicit tension between those in the group who are perhaps more involved in 
management decisions and want to see the co-operative remain mutual, and those who see it as 
an opportunity for themselves, even though it would mean the effective demutualisation of the 
co-operative. One clear factor is a change of housing policy at national level, as this then affects 
internal decisions made by the group. For some time, it was unclear whether the Housing and 
Planning Bill 2016, as it was then, would make it possible for tenants of non-charitable housing 
associations, including housing co-operatives, to be eligible for the voluntary Right to Buy. 
Housing co-operatives have, in the meantime, been exempted. Therefore, it became clear that the 
status of the mutual housing groups depended on the form of tenancy as well as organisational 
arrangements within the group to defend their legal status. The charitable status of Community 
Land Trusts can protect their tenancies from Right to Buy, if they had registered with the HCA.  
 
The uncertainty of what was being proposed in the Bill (now Housing and Planning Act 2016) 
prompted many in the mutual housing movement to discuss in more detail the potential 
outcomes. Several meetings were held to raise these concerns, including at the AGM of the 
London Federation of Housing Co-operatives (4th June 2016), and also resulted in the formation 
of the London Co-operative Housing Group.5 Sanford was involved in outreach work, lobbying 
                                                            
5 London Co-operative Housing Group is a grass-roots affiliation of housing co-operatives in London made 
up of members from over 50 co-ops. LCHG formed as a direct response to the Housing and Planning Bill 
2016. They provide a forum for members to share resources and discuss the defence and development of 
127 
 
against the Bill, and joined with different groups and supported protests showing solidarity, even 
though they knew they are not going to be affected directly: 
 
I first got contacted by a co-op in Waterloo – Edward Henry – and they were setting up a group to lobby 
against the bill and then I passed it to Outreach because it needed a bit more focus more than I could give 
it. They managed to get 48 co-ops on board against the Housing Bill… involved in writing letters to the 
lords and they reported back that there were two or three Lords that brought it up in the House of Lords 
[T. from Sanford] 
 
A member from another group showed a very different attitude around campaigning or outreach, 
and considered that the better option would be to lie low:  
 
Imagine a table and there’s loads of pins in it, covered in pins, they’re all the housing association, housing 
co-ops in this country, hundreds of them … the ones that pop up, they’re going to go for them … … [P. 
from GUHC] 
 
There is clearly a significant difference between members in a group such as Sanford, actively 
seeking to link with other mutual housing groups, and members with a more cautious approach 
regarding ‘rocking the boat’. These contradictory positions between mutual housing groups – the 
outward looking group, intent on developing co-operative relationships with other groups to 
survive, and the inward-looking and defensive groups – exist in many ways and are part of the 
shaping of governance institutions.  
Added to the external uncertainties, there are also the personal circumstances of individuals within 
the mutual housing groups. When asked about their group’s future, a member of the Backdoor 
group reflected on their personal uncertainties: 
 
For sure the thing about moving often is not comfortable so probably at a certain point I will like a little 
bit more stability and I don’t know if I’m going to stay in London. I came here for a few years – it looks 
like my life is here. Now, I’m not saying no. I live in London, the work is developing better, so this is 
keeping me in London. I wouldn’t mind moving to have more stability. So, it’s a kind of balance. [S. from 
Backdoor] 
 
As for newer groups who are in the process of formation, their reflections on uncertainty had 
more to do with wanting to set up an organisation that will succeed, despite the wider housing 
policy climate and personal uncertainties: 
                                                            
housing co-ops. They are not the representative organisation, however; that is the London Federation of 
Housing Co-operatives (LFHC).  
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We don’t want to set something up that’s not going to work out in five years’ time and that won’t have 
enough money to do all the things that we’ve proposed to do, that is madness. [S. from Brixton Green] 
 
One way to prevent future demutualisation and dissolving of mutual groups is to identify the 
possibility of locking assets effectively. If asset locks were used, more mutual housing groups 
could be built: 
 
If the government or someone was to say ‘Right, all the land we’ve got now, under any borough’s name, is 
locked’ and on there you could only build co-operative housing, then we might see it. There are some projects 
going on, but they’re rarefied, and the problem is there will be all sorts of clever connections [with other 
organisations], with a bit of grant thrown in and it’ll be so complicated that if it works at all it won’t work 
very well because the people will be constantly under a corporate organisation… [B. from GUHC]  
 
The asset lock is already a constitutional device that prevents the distribution of assets to 
members, and benefits accrued are not distributed privately to members. Charities (including 
charitable community benefit societies – BenComs) and community interest companies (CICs) 
have statutory asset locks. The Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014 permits 
a community benefit society to incorporate an ‘asset lock’ into its rules to ensure that the assets 
of the society (including any profits or other surpluses generated by its activities) are used for the 
benefit of members. If the society is dissolved, the assets must be given to another asset-locked 
organisation, usually with similar objectives (see Appendix E for a summary of legal forms and 
asset locks).  
The Companies Act 2006 introduced a process that permits a company to ‘entrench’ certain 
provisions in its articles. An article may be entrenched at the point of the company’s formation 
or by a subsequent unanimous vote in favour by the company’s members. Similarly, an entrenched 
provision may only be removed by a unanimous vote. Furthermore, those organisations whose 
governing documents include an asset lock may be looked at more favourably by funders or 
potential investors, as they can be sure of the motivation of the organisation and the desire to 
benefit a community other than only the members or shareholders (Co-operatives UK 2016).  
 
It is less clear in the case of co-operative societies, as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) does 
not provide specific guidance on asset locks in such cases. However, the International Co-
operative Alliance (ICA) Statement on Co-operative Identity is important in determining whether 
a society is a bona fide co-operative. Furthermore, the third Principle of Co-operation is about 
members’ economic participation, which refers to co-operatives having common property and 
indivisible reserves (see Fig. 1 in Chapter 2). Thus, most co-operative societies adopt a voluntary 
asset lock in their rules. There is scope to specify that these rules are fundamental to the society 
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by requiring, for example, a higher voting threshold to change these rules. There is, however, no 
legal mechanism to entrench these rules and to prevent them from being changed under any 
circumstance, including changes to government policy. Therefore, an asset lock for mutual 
housing groups would enshrine the principle of common ownership but would depend on the 
legal framework under which they are incorporated (Co-operatives UK, 2016). 
 
Finally, what do members say of the future of mutual housing groups in general? A member of 
the co-housing movement significantly said “slow” [C. from OWCH]. This somewhat pessimistic 
response can be understood when one sees both the huge challenges in finding land for mutual 
housing and the amount of time and effort needed even before building and managing the 
housing. A member of GUHC pointed out the importance of mutual housing within the wider 
social housing sector, but again hinted at the threats to the sector from the ideological basis of 
changing government housing policies:  
 
We represent very good value in terms of social housing …[but] I think if the Conservative Government 
really believes that everyone’s got to own their house and social housing has got to be wiped out, then they’ll 
work everyone out. [P. from GUHC] 
 
Some members do have an idealistic willingness to think long-term into the future: 
 
[In] a thousand years, a couple of thousand years, we’ll still be here, that’s the plan. I made that plan at a 
budget meeting last year. Someone said, ‘that’s ridiculous,’ but everyone else nodded and said, ‘that’s a good 
plan’ and there’s no reason why not. It’s bricks, as I said, it’s bricks. [B. from GUHC] 
 
Mutual housing groups could use Neighbourhood Plans through the Localism Act 2011 to 
propose new sites and access funds from the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), which could 
allow groups access to capital for buying land or property. The first step would be to integrate 
into Neighbourhood Plans designated sites for mutual housing development, and then propose 
that they are developed using a CLT model, for example. In London, some Neighbourhood 
Forums are interested in using CLTs within their plans, including Deptford, Grove Park, 
Dartmouth Park and Kennington Oval Vauxhall. CLT’s can be a delivery vehicle after the plan is 
made or initiated by a different group in the community (Field & Layard 2017). In a recent plan 
outside London, for Woodcote South Oxfordshire, their policy for affordable housing includes: 
 
One approach to ensuring that new affordable housing provided on the allocated sites in the Plan is subject 
to a local connection requirement would be a Community Land Trust (CLT) (Woodcote Parish 
Council 2014). 
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The role of Neighbourhood Plans in allocating land and resources to mutual housing has not 
materialised in London Neighbourhood Plans to any important extent (Field and Layard, 2017). 
Most Neighbourhood Forums are generally at an early stage in the process, but in addition would 
require the coordination between forums interested in developing a local plan and groups 
interested in developing mutual housing.  
 
In wider plans, including Local Plans, there has been some acknowledgment of potential role of 
community-led housing, which could include mutual housing and other models, such as custom 
self-build groups. Lambeth, Southwark and Tower Hamlets have included land trusts in their 
housing strategies and Ealing, Enfield, Hackney, Havering and Lambeth have included self-build 
in their housing strategies. Field (2015) has documented references to ‘community-led housing’ 
within housing and planning strategies in some selected metropolitan areas in England. Again, it 
is yet to be seen if these policies have allowed for much land to be allocated for mutual housing 
groups in general.  
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Historically, mutual housing groups have always started with the identification of suitable land or 
buildings. Some groups incorporate as a legal entity before finding suitable land, while others 
begin as informal squats and evolve into well-organised groups, refurbishing the properties they 
occupied. At the heart of this process – the material basis for the formation of the group – is the 
land they build on or the buildings they live in, which can be viewed as their property or assets.  
 
Groups have had access to land or property based on their ability to create necessary strategic 
relationships or partnerships. Usually, these have been with local authorities (or other public 
landowners) but they have also been with housing associations, developers or even other local 
community groups if more campaigning is involved. In some cases, while mutual housing groups 
have acquired property through the open market, their ability to develop and manage the property 
continues to depend on their relationship with external institutions. Therefore, it is argued that 
the notion of campaigning is important – whether it is lobbying, advocating, negotiating or 
mutually supporting other groups. The use that groups make of their property is defined by the 
intentions, ideals or ethos of the group, which depends on both the internal dynamics of the 
groups, as well as the external changes to welfare and housing policy.  
 
The chapter explores how land and property ownership becomes the vehicle through which 
different models of mutual housing evolve, depending on the form of tenancy and model of 
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ownership. The chapter also begins to explore the importance of relational dynamics that mutual 
housing groups have with external institutions and organisations.  
 
While most people interviewed were proud of what they had achieved and what they had been 
involved in, there was an awareness of each group’s vulnerabilities and an uncertainty regarding 
the future potential for other groups, given the current lack of institutional support. However, 
when discussing the technicalities of financial management – access to finance, creation of 
financial instruments and use of new mutual housing ownership models – there was considerable 
potential in some of the approaches used in these cases. Again, this depends both on how new 
groups form, building on the experiences and knowledge of existing groups and on external 
institutions’ understanding and support. These are aspects will be explored and addressed in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Finance and value of mutual housing 
 
 
When the Stranger says: “What is the meaning of this city? 
Do you huddle close together because you love each other?” 
What will you answer? “We all dwell together 
To make money from each other” or “This is a community” 
 (Eliot, 1934) 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
During the interviews, three main discussion issues emerged related to finance within mutual 
housing groups. First, there was concern regarding how the groups could access the capital needed 
to acquire property in the first place. Secondly, there were the daily financial operations of the 
group, from its foundation, to collecting the rent and accruing enough to support maintenance 
and management, while keeping the group’s capacity to manage any changes in circumstances. 
Finally, there were the more abstract discussions about the nature of housing as a commodity, its 
value and what mutual housing offers in terms of an alternative to the financialisation of housing 
and, what could be labelled, its decommodification.    
 
For new groups, finance is needed to help with such initial development stages as the preparation 
of feasibility reports and the development of a business plan. Some grants are available for these 
stages, for example, both the HCA and CLT Network offer funding for feasibility and technical 
support. Other smaller, non-governmental organisations, such as the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation or Tudor Trust, also offer funding for inception work.  
 
However, the larger issue is that of raising financial equity capital. There are different routes that 
exist, from members’ own private equity, through to traditional mortgages, forms of loan stock, 
crowdfunding, and other investment strategies. ‘Patient capital’ is defined in political economic 
terms as “equity or debt whose providers aim to capture benefits specific to long-term investments 
and who maintain their investment even in the face of adverse short-term conditions for the firm” 
(Deeg and Hardie, 2016, p.627). Therefore, patient capital should have a greater tolerance of risk 
than traditional investment capital, although it has lower returns. One example is that of local 
authorities which use pension funds to develop housing finance. Historically, investment in 
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property for non-profit organisations used to rely on patient capital funding (Deeg, Hardie and 
Maxfield, 2016), but as a result of the financialisation of real estate, property investment has 
become more interwoven with the impatience and unpredictability of global financial markets 
(van Loon & Aalbers 2017). Patient capital as longer-term investment funding can also be 
characterized by an investor wanting to blend social and financial returns. In some cases, such as 
in Belgium (van Loon, 2016), patient capital, especially in the form of multi-generational wealth 
has functioned as a strong barrier to financialisation and has moderated the influence of 
financialised capital. 
 
There is scope to work with mainstream high street banks, but there is a lack of familiarity on the 
banks’ part about the mutual housing sector. Increased lending could result from addressing the 
perceived risk among finance institutions of mutual housing models and how the risk is spread. 
There is evidently a growing need for technical support in this area, which the umbrella 
organisations (CCH, Locality, CLT Network, Radical Routes etc.) are aware of. In some cases, 
partnerships with developers are established on the basis that developers can debt finance their 
projects and spread returns over time. However, this leaves mutual housing groups heavily reliant 
on the conditions placed upon them by developers. Mutual housing groups could, in theory, work 
in a similar way if they had access to the financing. In addition, they can make developments cost 
effective as they do not need to make as such large profit margins as do developers. 
 
Hence, the role of finance shapes the context of all the mutual housing groups’ projects examined, 
but also shapes the role of internal and external institutions. The rules, norms and strategies that 
emerge are also finance related (see first four points in Figure 6 or in point 2 in Figure 5). Thus, 
finance emerges as a theme through the interview material and reflects an important part of the 
role that institutions take within the theoretical framework.  
 
The chapter will look at some of the issues that arose during the interviews concerning finance. 
It addresses how the groups accessed the necessary funds to acquire their assets – land or housing. 
In some cases, the mutual housing group has now become a source of capital funding, in which 
case they are able to help support other groups. This has meant that the potential for the creation 
of a mutual housing economy that can raise investment to support the creation of other mutual 
housing projects has increased in recent years. However, there is still an important role to be 
played by external financial institutions, such as banks, credit unions and building societies. 
Coupled with the role of external institutions, there are also new ways of developing funding 
sources, one example being the phenomenon of crowdfunding which can, in a sense, be linked 
back historically to the origins of co-operativism and the birth of building societies (Hird, 1996). 
Finally, the chapter will explore the ways in which mutual housing is decommodifying housing, 
for example, through removing land from the market through Community Land Trusts. 
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Additionally, other ways in which mutual housing offers some directions for decommodification, 
include the creation of a new social economy around housing or removing some pressure on 
housing as an exchange value good. This is also related to the concept of value of mutual housing.  
 
 
7.2 Finance strategies developed by mutual housing groups 
 
A range of strategies are being used by groups to find the necessary initial capital. Some groups 
have accessed grant funding from banks, and others have used the older building societies, such 
as Nationwide and Unity Trust banks, which are interested in helping support community build 
projects. One of the most recent projects, LCHC, which has not found a site yet and is currently 
developing a business plan, approached a bank for an initial mortgage with the addition of some 
loan stock. The latter would be raised through private donations. Another recent project, OWCH, 
managed to find funding from the Tudor Trust, as their project proposal matched with the Trust’s 
interests: 
 
They’ve got a sort of mission, because we’ve got some really generous funding for these 8 social rental flats 
from a charity – the Tudor Trust …It has given a million so that another million could be borrowed against 
it to build these eight flats and they are very keen on the group trailblazing this as a model for other older 
people – a self-determining, self-governing community and all they ask for in return is that the group share[s] 
the lessons and help[s] educate other older people. [C. from OWCH] 
 
Some grant funding is available from umbrella organisations. The CLT Network, for example, has 
a tranche for feasibility studies and also provides technical assistance grants – a form of seed 
funding. In 2015, the Greater London Assembly funded £3 million for community-led housing 
projects in London, mainly to prepare feasibility studies or business plans. Brixton Green received 
some grant funding, along with £10,000 from Locality in November 2015 to carry out a “pre-
feasibility study” and for workshops carried out by Social Life (Melhuish 2015). Brixton Green 
then approached private lenders during the early days of the project to look at financing for the 
build phase: 
 
They were happy with the idea, as long as the income gave enough loan cover they were not worried, but it 
was not a typical bank loan. It was going to be a loan over 50-60 years. [S. from Brixton Green] 
 
The same interviewee also discussed the potential role that the local authority had in accessing 
funding: 
 
136 
 
It is so much cheaper for the council. The council can go to the Public Works Loan Board and borrow at 
2%, maybe 3%, depending, as it’s changing on a day-to-day basis, and so the formula is based on the time 
and how much… [S. from Brixton Green] 
 
ELCLT demonstrated how they had developed a model where there was no public subsidy 
involved at all: 
 
Galliford Try, the head of the bid, had to pay a lot of money for the site and we had to pay them for our 
houses once they are built and completed and so I think within that cost there’s a contribution towards the 
land value. When Galliford Try are paying effectively market rent to the GLA, then the land comes to the 
trust for free on freehold. So, effectively Galliford Try [together with] Peabody and also us, because we’re 
contributing for our houses, are paying full market rate for the site. The Mayor I don’t think is really losing 
anything and I think what we’ve actually done, is move away from the idea that you need the land free in 
order for it to work. [T. from ELCLT] 
 
During this process of negotiating with partners, a significant factor in determining the financial 
involvement is based on how risks are perceived and then how the uncertainties are distributed. 
The actors’ strategies are based on their perceptions of risk and how they deal with the 
uncertainties, which can be divided into three: risks perceived through science, perceived directly, 
or virtual risk (Adams, 1995). Both risk and uncertainty are affected by the previous experiences 
of actors, as well as the biases inherent in their mental frames that affect their perceptions and 
their actions (Wildavsky, 1988; Beck, 1992; Adams, 1995). Adams (2007, p.10) argues that when 
“the science is inconclusive we are thrown back on judgement. We are in the realm of virtual risk. 
These risks are culturally constructed – when science is inconclusive, people are liberated to argue 
from and act upon pre-established beliefs, convictions, prejudices and superstitions”. However, 
this account of risk focusses on the perception of risk and uncertainty, rather than the distribution 
within the partnership of the uncertainties, particularly in financial terms. For one co-housing 
group, working with an external organisation placed such burden of uncertainty onto the mutual 
housing group, and they were then less in control of financial terms and conditions of the project.  
 
We worked 5 years on this without them [the developers] giving us the prices. We had the prices before – 
twice we had final prices and they have been superseded. Last year January our flat was worth £800,000 
by the prices that they gave us. And we used that as a guide to say “OK, obviously prices are going up, so 
they’ll be higher than that.” But then it came out at £1.1 million and that’s nearly 40% uplift. We couldn’t 
keep the group together. There’s no way you can do a co-housing group like that. And all the people who 
really set the hearts on moving in couldn’t afford it. [M. from Woodside] 
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When the revised prices were presented by developers, uncertainty regarding the project for the 
mutual housing group members increased considerably and many people left the group:  
 
In January Hanover gave us the prices. And they turned out to be 35% higher than the prices they’d given 
us 12 months ago which they gave us as indicative prices, saying they would give us final prices this January. 
Everyone was expecting a 10% increase even though we thought the prices were very high so 35% was sort 
of over the top basically and a whole lot of people walked out. And said we can’t do it, we can’t afford it. 
And therefore, that brings into question whether we can afford to buy the common house which is a key 
element of [the] co-housing scheme. [J.W. from Woodside] 
 
Interviewees in general were more aware of the internal finances of groups, rather than external 
funding. One short-life housing co-operative member, even though not on the management 
committee, was aware of the group’s financial health: 
 
The money that goes to the housing association is the same as what a [housing association] tenant would 
pay. So, I think it is about £200-250 a month. We pay more so the money goes in a positive balance. 
They keep a positive balance to maintain the co-op and to avoid failure. So, we have a positive balance of 
between £50 to £80,000... by keeping the positive balance, they keep the co-op alive. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
GUHC also has a separate savings account for use as a backup resource, as well as monitoring 
procedures for rent payments and arrears, which are followed by the rent and tenancy 
subcommittee. These oversight procedures were generally observed in some form by most 
groups. Most groups had treasurer positions on their boards, finance officers and, in some groups, 
finance or rental subcommittees. These arrangements have emerged as there is a strong awareness 
in groups that one of the past failures of mutual housing groups had been financial management: 
 
There was another co-op, doesn’t exist anymore, it was in the Ladbroke Grove area and they just didn’t 
keep good financial records, or managed their properties very well. They didn’t provide a very efficient service, 
I imagine…they then started to get pursued by what was then the Financial Services Authority, for non-
submission of any finances and of course. That co-op didn’t survive, but others did. [T. from Backdoor] 
 
There is also the group’s awareness of their need for support from external institutions to access 
funding, and usually the support comes in form of partnerships. This however increases the 
dependence the group has on the financial arrangements determined by these external institutions, 
including banks, explored in the next section (7.3). In some cases, the support comes from other 
mutual housing groups examined in the section after (7.4).  
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7.3 Financial support from banks 
 
It is hardly surprising that with the financial collapse of 2008-2009, stagnation in house building 
and an ongoing economic crisis that continues to affect housing prices, interest in mutual housing 
groups has increased. However, these groups need financing and, while public funding for 
charitable and community organisations has fallen, there has been little increase in alternative 
community development finance institutions or other social investors. Lambert (2012) has 
pointed out that there is a number of reasons why lenders are reluctant to lend in small quantities 
to start-up organisations. In general, the loans involved are too small for specialist commercial 
lending teams but too big for the high street branches of banks. Financial institutions do not like 
lending to new organisations that lack business and management track records and have little 
appetite for providing loans unless the borrowers have a high credit quality. The sourcing and 
management of a large portfolio of small loans, and dealing with potential defaults, is both 
resource-intensive and less cost-effective for the financial institution concerned. Finally, financial 
institutions have a preference to lend to regulated entities, which includes most mutual housing 
groups unless they are just starting up (CCH 2012).  
 
The experience of a small potential co-housing group clearly reflects these points: 
 
We spent a lot of time looking at financial models, learnt a lot about Community Land Trusts and all 
sorts of different ways of doing things. We went to the Triodos Bank and some other banks who were 
interested in new models of dealing with the finances and we didn’t have any real success. [G. from 
Woodside] 
 
For ELCLT, funding depended on getting planning permission, which in turn depended on 
whether they already had funding in place. Barclays originally agreed to a loan of £80 million, 
which became a starting point: 
 
We’ve got more people interested now that we’ve won. The tricky thing is that nobody will give us money 
until we’re through planning. So, it is difficult because we’re getting pressure from Galliford Try to show 
where the money’s coming from at the same time until there’s a scheme [it’s difficult to get money]. From 
the point of view of Barclays, it was a good risk for them as long as there was a good return. [T. from 
ELCLT] 
 
Another incipient Community Land Trust, the Brixton Community Land Trust, had struggled 
with finding finance since they had no assets or track record, and needed the support of their local 
authority and other partners to help them take on the risk:  
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…It was an £18 million proposal as opposed to a £3.5 million proposal, and we found that a lot easier 
to get funding for. A conditional offer from Barclays Capital [Barclays Investment Bank] and from Aviva 
for the whole package ...But [it’s difficult for] an organisation with no asset bank, no track record … 
There’s various more things we’re looking at [including] on-lending from other RSLs [registered social 
landlords] long-term finance, bond finance and things like that. [T. from ELCLT] 
 
Older housing co-operatives talked about their relationship with banks in more positive terms:  
 
We took a loan with Midland Bank … who gave us a loan for a piece of land. It was a piece of land after 
all, so no odds to them, over 10 years, £14,000 I think. They gave us a loan … and with the Co-op 
Bank and we just went along to the bank and said, 'can we borrow the money?' and they said 'yes’, and 
everything surprised us quite a lot and that was that, so we bought it. [B. from GUHC] 
 
Overall, an important point raised was the need to familiarise financial institutions with mutual 
housing groups and the possibility of developing new forms of investment in partnership with 
financial institutions: 
 
It would be interesting to actually try and harness [the fact] that … some are quite cash-rich. Because [of] 
the stable nature of co-ops there are lower arrears percentages. Again, you ‘d find it a lot with credit unions 
and that sort of thing ...lower than banks or private landlords or maybe housing associations... probably. 
And then there’s the length of time they’ve been going, you’re bound to build up reserves over time. [N. 
from Sanford] 
 
Again, this touches on the idea of developing specific financial instruments for mutual housing, 
such the proposal by CCH of a “special purpose conduit (SPC)” (Lambert 2012). An SPC could 
allow for the bringing together of funding from different mutual housing organisations to support 
the development of new ones. The scale for this activity would depend on the amount of housing 
that could be built with the capital they could leverage using either existing reserves or assets. 
Therefore, more research would be needed into the roles that financial institutions currently have 
and their willingness to support new and innovatory financial instruments, including the role of 
‘ethical’ funds or bonds, the role of co-operative banks and building societies and other funds.  
 
 
7.4 Financial support between mutual groups 
 
As indicated earlier in the chapter, some of the older mutual housing groups are outward-looking 
in their support for, and interest in, connecting with other mutual housing organisations. They are 
aware of their own solvency but are keen to support other groups as part of their ethos of being 
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a co-operative. For example, Sanford has been helping to set up other housing co-operatives for 
four years and now even has a loan stock officer:  
 
…who keeps track of all of that and keeps track of repayments and how much we’ve given in loan stock… 
It actually started because people approached us. And then we thought actually that’s quite a good idea. 
We were getting a lot of people who kind of knew about Sanford and it’s had quite a long history and it’s 
quite a big co-op, so they approached us first, so we went – actually, yes. [T. from Sanford] 
 
With mortgage repayments reducing in real terms with time and updated maintenance on flats, 
Sanford now find themselves in a sound financial position. After carrying out environmental 
improvement projects and maintenance on their own stock, they realised that they had sufficient 
turnover for some money to be reinvested in other co-operatives:  
 
Rather than ripping out all the kitchens [and] getting new kitchens in… looking more at trying to meet 
those Co-op Principles – engagement, the bigger picture… we’ve been approached by other co-ops and so 
now slowly we’ve been starting to think about how to help out... it seems to be going quite well in the sense 
that we’ve got a couple of co-ops invested in now. [N. from Sanford] 
 
In addition, some people in the group have been connecting with other co-operatives in South 
London, looking at what services and skills can be shared between them and what they can do to 
help new groups become established. For one interviewee, this activity is part of building on the 
Co-operative Principles: 
 
There’s probably a very small handful who are really thinking about the Co-op Principles, trying to be 
beneficial to the co-op movement as a whole, but I suppose we break into two camps. One is the idea of 
Sanford creating a co-op of itself. Find a piece of land or building more like a building and then creating a 
co-op … And then the other idea is to ideally back co-ops from south-east London; however, obviously a 
lot of the co-ops are based up in the north so there’s that to factor in so there’s co-ops not in our vicinity in 
a whole different city etc … but I think the general idea is we’re going to try get stuff going with co-ops in 
south east London. [N. from Sanford] 
 
Some groups have begun to think about what can be achieved with rent from the older mutual 
housing groups once a mortgage is paid off. While Sanford has lowered its rents, other groups 
have written into their constitution that current rent levels should remain and instead some budget 
allocation is made for other mutual housing groups. In some circles, there have been discussions 
about the feasibility of creating a co-operative fund based on the collective assets of co-operatives 
and other mutual housing groups. At the Confederation of Co-operative Housing (CCH), there 
have been discussions on this topic since at least 2010:  
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I was then asked by [the] commissioners to gather together a finance stream and how you could then finance 
those models and that’s what we’re looking to move forward, working with partner organisations through 
the Mutual Housing Group. [M. from CCH] 
 
This topic was repeated at the London Federation of Housing Co-operatives AGM, and had also 
come up several times with interviewees: 
 
If a lot of co-ops are coming to the point where financially they were much more stable and some of them 
would have been able to pay off their mortgages and that they would have some money to then be able to set 
up other co-ops, support each other somehow if they came together with these different pots of money, then 
an instrument to set up other co-ops could be created. [N. from Sanford] 
 
In 2012, the CCH published a report on “Financing Co-operative and Mutual Housing” following 
discussions with key finance institutions lending to mutual housing organisations (Lambert 
2012b). In the report, the idea of a specific financial instrument that could be used to gather such 
“different pots of money” was developed further:  
 
In the long term it may be desirable to create a new special purpose conduit (SPC) or utilise an existing one 
to provide an ongoing financing warehouse that would only lend to developer organisations. It may be possible 
that any public money that is invested goes in as a first loss tranche. The SPC would batch schemes using 
bank debt which would be financed long term by bond issues (possibly with differing time periods) to 
institutional investors and individual member investors. (Lambert, 2012b, p.5) 
 
Another possible source of future financing could come from, what has been referred to earlier 
as “grey equity”: wealthier elderly people wanting to invest in creating a mutual community 
themselves or to support others. One interviewee discussed their own involvement in the Co-
housing Woodside project, which was specifically founded to create a co-housing community 
primarily for over 55-year olds. The interviewee highlighted the problems with buying into a co-
housing group before it had been built while not having the funds because their own property 
had not been sold.  
 
You’ve all got big houses that you’ve raised your families in, you’ve paid off your mortgage and you’ve got a 
lot of equity in it, you want to downsize, you want to move into a co-housing group – but the problem is 
that there is going to be a year before you can finish building the building. And you’ve got to find some 
money to build it beforehand and the only way you can do it in the present model is to use developers. [G. 
from Woodside] 
 
142 
 
The problem is that there is a short-term financial gap which acts as a barrier for people who want 
to downsize and move into a co-housing community because their equity is tied up in their homes. 
The opportunity to support more such co-housing communities for elderly has been recognised 
by Hanover Housing – which is supporting both OWCH and Co-housing Woodside – but the 
short-term financial gap is one of the practicalities that need to be addressed. 
  
A newer form of financing that has become more popular is crowdfunding – the raising of money 
from a large group of people using online platforms. The platforms have become more 
sophisticated, widened in their use and have become both campaigning tools as well as ways to 
involve people who have an interest in supporting either mutual housing groups, or more broadly, 
community-led projects.  Crowdsourcing platforms have been particularly important to CLTs as 
they have an open membership. People can join not only as potential residents, but also if they 
work in the area or have an interest in the group. In such cases, the membership fee then becomes 
a form of crowdfunding. The Rural Urban Synthesis Society (RUSS) took this idea a step further 
and, as a group aspiring to becoming a co-housing self-build CLT based in Lewisham, it had an 
open membership and supporter platform. Another recent group campaign in Tottenham, North 
London, which has been campaigning for the St Anne’s Hospital site, wanted to turn it into a 
CLT and has managed to raise funds to pay for the feasibility and pre-planning drawings based 
on a crowdfunding platform called Spacehive. 
 
The Radical Routes Network has been offering loan stock shares, known as ‘rootstock’, as a form 
of investment for people interested in supporting other housing co-operatives. The investor’s co-
operative, Rootstock, operates with share financing from public and reinvests in Radical Routes 
groups with loans to member co-operatives, including for buying and developing other housing 
co-operatives. This is, in a sense, an updated version of the original “mutual aid network”, such 
as the one the Rochdale Pioneers established more than 150 years ago, as a form of crowd-sourced 
mutual aid. 
 
In summary, there are growing attempts between housing co-operatives to find ways of financially 
assisting each other and helping new groups. In part, this is related to the Co-operative Principles 
of supporting other co-operatives. This is not a trend that is found between other mutual housing 
groups, although there is not the same potential equity because they are much newer. 
Furthermore, there are new forms of investment platforms, making use of open source 
technology, websites and crowdsourcing.  
 
 
7.5 Decommodification by mutual housing groups 
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A further consideration, which is in part financial, is how the groups’ assets – be they land or 
property – are decommodified through the process of establishing mutual housing, and the extent 
to which this decommodification is permanent or just a temporary measure. ‘Decommodification’ 
is the extent to which the mutual group’s housing is removed from the market – not used as an 
investment or for purely private (individual) ownership and speculation. The different groups 
achieve this to varying and sometimes contradictory degrees. For example, the CLT model in 
theory offers a model for the increase of affordable housing as land is held in perpetuity by the 
community group. However, in practice, this is not achieved easily. ELCLT has only a small 
proportion of homes below market rent. Also, in the co-housing model, Co-housing Woodside 
for example does not offer cheaper housing: 
 
When you read the literature of co-housing in other places, other countries, and to a certain extent in 
Springhill [the co-housing group in Stroud] it is a cheaper or at least a cost-effective, supportive environment. 
The reality of Woodside, of Still Green, of Cannock Mill – the three we know about, are that actually it 
turns out to be very expensive. [J.W. from Woodside] 
 
The only examples which are providing cheap housing are the older housing co-operatives and 
amongst the new groups, only LCHC with its multi-stakeholder co-operative model attempts this 
(see Fig.15 and the housing aims of the different groups). The CLTs only achieve partial cheap 
housing through its mixed tenure model. The other way however which these groups attempt 
decommodification is through the land rather than properties on them. However, this depends 
on who owns the land. With the CLT model, the assumption is that the land is held in Trust by 
the group, thus moved off the market, albeit temporarily.  
 
The recently developed mutual home ownership model (MHOS) is an attempt at the partial 
decommodification of housing. The MHOS was developed by the New Economics Foundation 
and CDS Co-operatives and has been used by LILAC in Leeds (Chatterton, 2014) as an equity-
based leaseholder approach to co-operatively owned housing (see also Chatterton 2015). It 
guarantees so-called “intermediate housing”, which is cheaper than market rate, in perpetuity for 
its members (Chatterton 2015, p.133). People only pay a proportion of their income as part of 
their portion of repayment of the overall mortgage, and repayment is pegged to wage inflation, 
not house inflation. For example, in LILAC, each household pays 35% of their net income (plus 
or minus 10%) until the house cost is paid off, and subsequent charges are fixed at 10% of nominal 
net income. If they leave the group, they receive a proportion of the money they have paid towards 
their equity shares, with a deduction based on the long-term maintenance of the property. If they 
have been resident for more than three years, they take a share in any increase or decrease in the 
value of the equity shares (Field 2017, p.110). These are rules-in-use and can be changed or 
adapted depending on the group. This is a form of partial decommodification which is created 
144 
 
through the removal of a direct connection between house value and market value, pegging the 
repayment of house value to income wealth.  
 
One way that decommodification occurs within the mutual housing experience is due to the large 
proportion of voluntary time and resources used for running the groups. Harvey (2014) points 
this out as one of the contradictions of capitalism, highlighting the role of unpaid labour outside 
of the market which creates non-capitalist “value” in his chapter on social reproduction. In some 
cases, management roles are subsidised and the maintenance of the buildings, which constitutes a 
major proportion of the work that mutual housing groups have to deal with, is carried out 
internally by group members. For some groups, such as short-life housing co-operatives, much 
of the maintenance work on the flats is carried out during their licence period: 
 
If it’s the boiler, or if it’s anything to do with drainage, or anything that goes outside the flat, we definitely 
call the housing association first and if, for any reason, they say they don’t want to do the maintenance, then 
the co-op try and step in and I’d get a co-op member to do it, or possibly, pay for a contractor to do it. 
There’s a constant stream of maintenance problems, leaking taps, blocked wastepipes, gas boilers that don’t 
work ... ‘cos they’re old and things do go wrong with them. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
Some groups referred to this management and maintenance work as ‘sweat equity’, particularly in 
the older housing co-operatives that were able, in part, to occupy and refurbish housing using 
members’ own labour input. In cases where houses were originally uninhabitable, the sweat equity 
needed was substantial, in terms of both labour and materials: 
 
They were in a terrible state – I used to go out with my van and I used to go around to the other side of the 
park, the men were working on the houses and I bought some Guinness’s, I took them round and I said, 
‘I need some wood - any doors or windows going?’ And they looked at me … ‘Why do you want it?’ I said 
‘Well, I’ve got the place across the road, it’s falling down round me ears, I can’t give you money, but I’ve 
got some Guinness’s.’ … They put so much stuff in the van… I got it back and used what I wanted and 
gave some to the others who needed it and if anyone heard there was anything, they would tell one another, 
and we’d go over there. [I. from GUHC] 
 
The use of sweat equity and re-use of materials was a part of the way mutual housing groups 
managed and developed their assets. It can be recognised formally when used to describe the 
efforts founder members put into a start-up organisation in exchange for a higher percentage of 
the profits within the first couple of years (Co-operatives UK 2016). Informally, however, it is 
used often in unrecognised ways. Short-life co-operatives use sweat equity as a way to train their 
members in skills that they can use for future employment. For example, near GUHC is the 
Phoenix short-life housing co-operative, seen as a model by other co-operatives in London: 
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They’ve done apprenticeships with people, they worked on their kitchens, they refurbished their flats, they 
had completely started from the shells… but instead of having them for 2–3 years they had them for six 
months, so there were some big questions over that. [N. from Sanford] 
 
The non-remunerated labour can include management, maintenance, and other activities that are 
part of a shared responsibility for running the housing, and which can be thought of as part of a 
decommodification process. The decommodification of housing can also happen as a result of 
the sharing of the responsibility to run the group, as well as spreading the financial burden it 
entails. Decommodification can occur to a greater extent if the land is kept in trust and thus 
moved off the market, kept in perpetuity in the charge or ownership of the group of members. 
Even in the most decommodified conditions, the extent of success will depend on the governance 
structures and institutions for the control of the mutual housing group, examined in Chapter 8.  
 
The governance challenges of decommodification include therefore the possibility of a temporary 
switch in the use of land, the importance of sweat equity and volunteering as un- or under-valued 
labour, the difficulties in mixed tenure situations, the emergence and use of common spaces within 
the housing group, the design process during development and developing the practices to 
overcome the binary distinction between use value and exchange value.  
 
It is clear that the ideology behind this process of decommodification was once stronger. When 
the GUHC was founded, the original idea of rent was through “subscription” or a “window fund”. 
This has risen from 30p a month to its current level of (on average) £130 a week. 
We should be getting some sort of an income because then we can start thinking what we'd do with it… 
We had started from £1 and then slowly eked it up [sic]. Once you can show that things are happening 
people would be willing to pay more. I'm going back to the days when there was not a lot, you didn’t have 
a lot anyway and we didn’t have many expenses, so £1 went quite a long way. We got a mortgage and then 
we had to start talking about real numbers which stacked up. [B. from GUHC] 
 
Decommodification may also just be temporary and a result of particular moments within the 
property market cycle when a mutual housing group can react opportunistically, as the following 
case of short-life housing highlights:  
 
There is a lot of work that’s going on in order to keep it cheaper. People volunteer their time to keep it 
running and also fitting in to a particular moment in the property market …so the example of short-life is 
you are existing in a particular moment in the property market when it is changing, so you are able to go 
in there and occupy it, occupy the space, while it changes the use of the land that is going on. So, it’s a 
temporary measure to keep the price low but it also demonstrates that there is a way of keeping the price 
146 
 
low for more long-term. If people didn’t have to develop it then you’d be able to have more co-ops at lower 
rent and it is just the idea that you have to keep developing things that makes the rent go up. … There are 
shifts in speculation. When changes happen and when it flips to becoming an advantage and my question is 
for who is this advantage for? Who gets this advantage of whatever value goes up? And it tends to be very 
specific persons – landlords or institutions. [T. from Backdoor] 
 
The interviewee here raises some key questions on the nature of speculation and how specific 
potential value from the speculation is captured and by whom. At specific moments in the cycle 
of land-use speculation, short-life co-operatives can use the properties and, in doing so, 
temporarily redefine the value of the land during that interim period. Of course, if these moments 
are extended and the gap in time increased during which they are able to occupy and use the 
properties in a non-speculative way, then new ways could be found of providing cheaper housing 
and the value generated goes beyond the land as commodity. 
 
Another way of providing some cheaper housing and at the same time recognising the need for 
‘affordability’ and having ‘financially robust business models’, was by developing a mixed tenure 
mutual housing scheme. The issue of tenures came up in interviews when exploring different 
models of mutual ownership and the financing of mutual housing groups. ELCLT decided on a 
mixed tenure model with 35% ‘affordable housing’ across the site. The split between tenures was 
negotiated with the developers and they could agree those conditions as part of the transfer of 
land. The ELCLT owns the freehold to the entire site and all the private-owned and social landlord 
units would be leased to the Community Land Trust. ELCLT also owns all the ‘intermediate’ for-
sale homes and the CLT is able to fix, in theory, according to its own wishes, the retail price and 
how much it charges for them. Other tenure splits have been used by other groups, in particular 
co-housing communities, which can be more flexible in the way that they build for different types 
of tenures. Mixed tenure schemes have important financial implications for mutual housing 
groups, but also complex collective governance challenges.  
 
During the planning for the new co-housing scheme in Woodside, the cost of the extra non-
residential building became an issue. A suggestion was made that: 
 
If 30 people sign up, they will divide up the costs of the common house. It was £480,000 for the shell and 
then another amount for services – and then each of the 30 units would then pay proportionately for the 
common house depending on the area of each unit – and a one-bedroom flat would pay less than the three-
bedroom flat. So that’s an additional cost. That was the unique feature of the co-housing. [G. from 
Woodside] 
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The normative idea that a co-housing group must have a common house was challenged because 
of the financial implications. Instead, the option to have a virtual common house was explored: 
 
A lot of things are central to co-housing including shared meals, doing things together, book clubs, film 
clubs, exercise clubs, supporting local causes together. You can still do without a common house. What you 
wouldn’t have is the sort of drop-in facility, you wouldn’t have the guest room and have the opportunity to 
host external things in the same kind of way …We had an emergency meeting to basically look at how you 
would pioneer co-housing without a common house as a way of dealing with the price of housing in a town 
like this and what kinds of things we wanted to do that actually really needed co-housing. [J.W. from 
Woodside] 
 
Here the ideals that the group wanted to pursue contrasted with the realities of their cost 
implications. Similarly, in many of the interviews, it was described how the design process would 
go through an iterative process between normative concepts of what the mutual housing group 
wanted and the practical limitations usually set by financial or planning conditions. For Co-
housing Woodside, the design for the co-housing element, within the larger development, was 
based on a courtyard form: 
 
It is a square – on three sides of a square are the co-housing units with the common house at the centre of 
it and a common garden in the middle … The whole thing has been designed in squares. If we get all the 
30 full so that it is not dotted with all kinds of people who are not remotely interested, it would work very 
well… but it is highly unlikely we are going to get all of it. [J.W. from Woodside] 
 
Another contentious and much discussed aspect of design was the size of the flats allocated, and 
the balance between private and public space. For OWCH, the design was for 25 flats and a large 
common room with communal kitchen:  
 
The flats are all 1, 2, or 3 bedrooms and they are all self-contained. So, the kitchen is a shared kitchen 
and they have their own kitchen. It is up to them how often they have common meals. I have said to them, 
if I drop in and I find that the common room is empty and unused like it is in so many sheltered housing 
blocks, I shall despair. So, there are various ideas, like have the newspapers delivered there, go down for 
morning coffee and that kind of thing. They’ve got to work out the balance between their own private space 
and their personal lives and the group. [C. from OWCH] 
 
For some groups, the way to tackle the issue of sharing spaces was to reduce the personal space 
and encourage more use of communal, shared spaces. The LCHC plans were initially based on 
space requirements of 12-15 square metres per person, but this figure was questioned by the 
architects, based on their estimates for approvable space requirements by local authority planners: 
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This is tiny pocket living but space is an important resource, savoured and to be well-used like water and 
energy. Each unit would have private space and a balcony, and the community centre would be like a living 
room to encourage people to use communal gardens and shared space. [C. from LCHC] 
 
In contrast, the OWCH mutual housing group uses unit sizes which are higher than average and 
start from 58 square metres for a one-bedroom flat. In this case, the inspiration was not derived 
from ideas of encouraging communal living through design, but more to do with changing 
perceptions of older people’s housing:  
 
In this country, in my view, we’ve had housing policy in relation to the elderly that has been mean. “Why 
would you need a spare bedroom? You’re just an old person. 48 square metres is plenty” … so all your 
lifetime accumulation of stuff you treasure you have to jettison or cram in and you can’t move and there’s no 
storage. I think there has been a really, really mean, little box approach to housing older people, which is 
why they won’t move, and which is why there’s a huge problem of under-occupation of big family houses. [C. 
from OWCH] 
 
For OWCH, it was counter-productive to propose smaller space specifications per flat. Their aim 
was to attract people to downsizing, but also to try to address the UK’s own shortcomings in 
having the smallest housing space specifications in Europe. Again, this is also dependent on the 
financing side. Other discussions related to the size of the mutual housing group itself. Co-housing 
Woodside noted that, during its formation: 
 
We felt very strongly that it mustn’t be too small because if it was too small then you’d have inevitably 
disagreements between individuals and there wouldn’t be enough room for people who disagreed to have some 
space and move off with other people and we thought from that point of view the bigger the better. But if it 
got too big then it would become unwieldy and we thought 30 units seemed like a good number because that 
would be around 60 people or 50 people – so we were happy with the number 30 and I think we still think 
that – I doubt it would work with only 15. It seems that would be too small. [G. from Woodside] 
 
LCHC’s discussions have focussed much more on their being able to include multi-use spaces in 
the design. These could, in theory, also involve light-industrial uses, because of pressure on 
London’s workspaces (Ferm and Jones 2016; Ferm 2014). Along with multi-use workspaces, they 
also wanted to integrate urban agriculture, not for self-sufficiency reasons necessarily, but as a 
model for future urban living, with food growing as a group educational activity, coupled with 
having a shop for the produce and use of produce in the community centre.  
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The multi-use spaces being explored by the groups again open up the notion of what can be 
included in the value created by the mutual housing. There is the value of the assets themselves, 
but also, through this decommodification lens, it is clear that the ability to access mutual housing 
has also enabled people to make choices about how to lead their lives, and that also has an intrinsic 
value. As one interviewee noted: 
 
If you’ve got cheap rent, even only relatively cheap, it means you can make decisions about going on a training 
course, which people can’t these days… Tuition fees on a first-degree course, it’s just so high, £10,000 a 
year and people can’t consider it. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
Through exploring the narratives that people have of their lives within mutual housing groups, a 
greater understanding of the value of mutual housing emerges – both in terms of the assets 
themselves, but more broadly, in terms of the process.  Thus, although accounts of value were 
generally focussed on use value, as opposed to exchange value, the tension between the two 
notions of value was explored in some interviews. The contrast between use and exchange value 
in mutual housing narratives when talking about property emerged in very specific moments. For 
example, some people mentioned the potential demutualisation of their co-operative as a way for 
members to be able to buy the property they had been renting cheaply for many years from the 
co-operative and touched on this as a threat to the group. The distinction between use and 
exchange value became explicit when discussing the equity value of the housing, which people 
saw as a potential way of leveraging private funds to set up a co-housing project. In the context 
of this research, it was particularly interesting to note that the notion of value became explicitly 
about exchange value, either in reference to buying land or property on the open market or when 
people living for a long time in the co-operative felt they were entitled to capitalise on their share 
of equity value.  
 
In summary, mutual housing groups offer some mechanisms for the decommodification of 
housing, either through the financing models used, the form of tenures and land ownership, the 
design approaches, or the value created. For example, the MHOS model can peg rents of lease 
and mortgage repayments to the group at a proportion of the individual’s income. Short-life co-
operatives offer models of low rent for low security tenures, but they highlight how they occur in 
the interstitial moments of land speculation. The role of volunteering and of sweat equity is 
another important aspect of mutual housing, which lowers the cost of living and is again a factor 
of decommodifying the housing. Removing land from the market in perpetuity, through the legal 
entity of a Community Land Trust, is another example of decommodifying property. The creation 
and use of common spaces, mixed tenure arrangements, or even mixed-uses, are all forms of 
redefining the value of what the mutual housing groups create. Finally, there are exchange and 
use values embedded in the housing as an asset, but beyond that there is also the subjective value 
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of the experience of living in the mutual housing group, and the value of mutual housing as a 
process, which will be explored more in Chapter 9. These are all elements or possibilities which, 
rather than forming a coherent picture, offer some aspects of a different social economy around 
housing, which mutual housing groups are experimenting with.  
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
In general, mutual housing groups have yet to develop ways of bridging the gap between financial 
efficiency and scale. They are mostly forced into using market-based approaches for the 
acquisition of assets, and they have yet to demonstrate their social impact or rather disseminate 
any demonstrations (i.e. WECH) so that the social impact is more widely recognised and could 
be used as a policy incentive to increase support from external institutions, including local 
authorities.  
 
There are ways of looking at mutual housing assets as long-term investment opportunities and 
these would require technical and business development work to be carried out in partnership 
with the investors – determining repayment plans and using more favourable assessments of risks. 
Furthermore, there is a strong argument to be made that conventional investment vehicles do not 
consider social value, hence the attempt within the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 to 
incorporate into local government procurement processes a better understanding of social value 
contributions. A similar policy instrument could be applied not just to services but to the disposal 
of public assets, especially when what is predominant today is the extraction of financial value 
from the disposal of public assets (Besussi, 2016). More broadly, there is a serious absence of any 
process that allows for the factoring in of social value into house building in general.  
  
There are some community development finance institutions that have been willing to support 
mutual housing, and this may become a growing sector. These include the Charity Bank, Social 
Investment Business, Triodos and the Ecological Building Society, along with other social 
investors, who could advance grant funding for the preparation of an initial business plan and 
feasibility study, with loan financing for more long-term requirements. The relationship with 
banking will also evolve as interest rates can change to reflect the value of support given to mutual 
housing as an emergent sector. 
 
However, when looking at the future, there has to be an awareness of the ways in which the group 
develop their own housing – and financing is only one element: 
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At the end of the day it’s also about providing a guidance on governance, guidance on procedures and policies 
rather than people sitting with a blank sheet of paper and trying to write things from scratch which may in 
the first place take them a long time, and may in the second place make mistakes, and then have to renew 
these things. [M. from CCH] 
 
Throughout this chapter, it is argued that the value of these assets goes beyond the binary 
distinction of use and exchange value. There are obviously material and financial values embedded 
in the property used by a mutual housing group, but through their own work on the building 
fabric, referred to by some as ‘sweat equity’ or volunteering, together with campaigning and the 
acquisition of learnt skills needed to run the mutual housing group, the notion of value is enriched. 
 
A number of useful distinctions emerged from the interviews. Land and housing – as property – 
are assets with different potentials depending on the groups aspirations. For some groups, access 
to land is more important as they will then use it to build on. In other cases, the group is interested 
in acquiring existing buildings. In some instances, the groups may not even own any assets, such 
as in the case of short-life housing co-operatives, but would spend time and resources in 
upgrading, maintaining, and managing them. There were however similarities in the way in which 
the groups access these assets.  
 
The second distinction is that some groups end up owning their property collectively, while others 
have different forms of property ownership arrangements. These can include individual short-
term leases, such as for short-life housing co-operatives, or renting, either from the mutual 
housing group or from an external organisation. In the latter case, the mutual housing group still 
performs an important institutional role in the collective management of the asset.  
 
A third distinction follows on from the previous point. The group and the members within the 
group have different and distinct roles within the property relationship that is established by the 
mutual housing group. Different forms of governance and control are exercised over the asset as 
a whole. As a group, there are collective forms of control (Somerville 2002), but at the same time, 
the individuals exercise important governance roles through their own involvement in this 
collective control. For example, in financial terms, some groups pay rent towards the repayment 
of a mortgage and, in others, they pay individually for their share of equity of the whole property. 
In co-housing groups, while individuals own their property, they pay into a communal pot for 
shared facilities through an overall management fee. In other cases, there is no ownership at all 
for either the group or individuals, but only a form of temporary custodianship of the property 
(short-life co-operatives) and the co-operative element is in the management of the organisation 
that holds the short licences.  
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In summary, the distinctions made above are between forms of assets, which can be land or 
buildings. In addition, there is a diversity of property ownership forms, ranging from full 
ownership through to rental or leasehold arrangements. Finally, there is a distinction between the 
role of the individual and the group, including the individual rights that come with ownership and 
the way in which the groups’ ownership rights are exerted.  
 
The last two chapters have revealed contrasts between the old and newly formed groups, with the 
older groups having more experience to share concerning the management and daily problems of 
living in a mutual housing project, whilst the accounts of the new groups focussed on the 
problems of setting up and finding land. Members in older groups talked a great deal about the 
changing attitudes within their groups to the properties that they own and showed their awareness 
of the value of their assets, which could in theory be leveraged to help build new co-operatives if 
the group were inclined to think outwards. For example, Sanford interviewees seemed more likely 
to think in terms of building other co-operatives or helping other groups, probably because it is 
housing young, mainly single, people. GUHC, on the other hand, has much older residents, many 
living there since its foundation, and their stories focussed on the contrast between different 
generations’ desires and values within the housing co-operative.  Clearly, there are contrasts 
between the old and new groups, but also between older and newer members within groups. This 
may seem obvious, but it does lead to some useful understandings of group dynamics, especially 
when the governance of the groups is considered in the next chapter. While Chapters 6 and 7 
focussed on how groups access land and finance, the next chapter will explore these micro-
practices of governance. This will allow for a more nuanced discussion of the role of mutual 
housing groups and collective ownership, as a space opens between the purely private and public 
realms, where the bundles of rights and practices of relationality overlap and form different 
ownership and management structures.  
 
The difficulties the groups have in accessing land and finance come from the increasing pressures 
there are from the private sector, especially when the priority is maximising financial return. It is 
for this reason that looking at people’s own accounts of the value of their involvement and their 
life in mutual housing (see Chapter 9) adds another layer to understanding mutual housing 
governance and benefits. Searching for narratives of how people live in and manage mutual 
housing through the notions of ‘property’ and ‘assets’ seems too abstract to help understand how 
people use and develop practices of dwelling, co-living and co-operating – all aspects of ‘living 
together’. Therefore, the exploration in these first empirical chapters on land and property has 
offered a useful starting point to move onto what norms and practices mutual housing groups 
have created to govern and manage themselves.  
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Chapter 8  
 
   
Governance in mutual housing groups: Practices, norms and rules 
 
  
Maybe for people to work together you need a fence for people to have their 
boundaries and meet in comfortable agreement, a controlled manner.  
[S. from GUHC] 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters outlined the assets used by the groups to develop mutual housing (Chapter 
6) and the financial implications (Chapter 7). In this chapter, the micro-practices of governance 
are examined as institutions that the mutual groups craft for themselves, including the practices, 
norms and rules they have developed for their collective governance. The chapter will first 
examine some of these micro-practices of governance, which depend on the structure of the 
mutual housing group’s own governance institutions – their management committees, the rogles 
of members as volunteers and workers, and the decision-making structures, as well as norms that 
have evolved since the mutual housing group was formed: for example, around talking and 
listening as practices, and dealing with conflicts and risks within groups. The second part of the 
chapter will look at specifically the experiences of rule creation and rule changing, which is core 
to Ostrom’s framework on understanding governance institutions of collective action within 
groups (see Fig.6). In this way, the chapter forms part of the response to the main research 
question as stated in Chapters 1 and 4 on how mutual housing groups are governed and what 
forms of collective governance result from the experiences of mutual housing groups in London.  
 
 
8.2 Micro-practices of governance 
 
The micro-practices of governance occur in spaces which are both formal and informal. Formal 
meetings – including management committees or general meetings – are important for the 
governance of mutual groups, as these are generally where decisions are approved by the wider 
group. There are also informal, non-explicit spaces of governance, where perhaps some decisions 
are made and then communicated to the group at formal meetings. Furthermore, members of the 
mutual housing group take on individual roles, for example, running committees or working 
groups.  
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The first section of this chapter will give some details of the meeting and governance practices of 
each mutual group. Attention is paid to the roles people have, the processes of joining the group, 
the involvement of members, and other specific practices useful to understand the governance of 
mutual housing groups, which correspond to the internal institutions and rules for governance 
from Ostrom’s framework.  
 
 
8.2.1 Meeting practices 
 
A summary table (see Fig.15 below) compares the different mutual housing groups’ meeting 
practices, including the types of meeting held, the executive or management team, committees or 
working groups, and the professional roles. Newer models of mutual housing are much more 
varied in form than the older ones which are all various forms of housing co-operatives. Generally, 
however, they all have similar governance structures. They all have an executive team, known as 
a Committee of Management (Sanford), Management Committee (GUHC and LCHC), Board of 
Trustees (ELCLT and Brixton Green) or Steering Group (Woodside). The CLT groups generally 
have Boards of Trustees which include members from the community and business leaders, along 
with co-opted professionals who are needed for their specific skills. The model often used is of 
thirds: an equal representation of residents, the community and municipal, government or 
professional sector.  
 
Most groups have (sub-)committees or task groups, but this depends on their size and the level 
of members’ involvement. Backdoor has no task groups apart from a small maintenance team, 
and Sanford has ad hoc task groups, as well as officers pursuing specific projects. Most groups have 
some external professional support – either to deal with the housing on a day-to-day basis (a 
housing officer or manager) or from external partners. For the older groups, this is usually housing 
management support, and, for the newer groups, it is more technical, legal, financial and 
architectural support, as those are the skills needed within groups when they are being set up. The 
rules that groups have are a result of the type of mutual housing organisation they are and what 
their legal status is. Appendix E presents a comprehensive breakdown of the type of legal model 
that can be used by mutual housing groups and includes the type of governing document.  
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Development 
Timeframe 
OLDER: 1970s-1990s  2016- 2017 CEASED ON-GOING 
 Backdoor Housing 
Sanford Housing 
Co-operative 
Grand Union 
Housing Co-
operative 
St Clements, East 
London 
Community Land 
Trust (ELCLT) 
Older Women’s Co-
housing Group 
(OWCH) 
Co-housing 
Woodside 
(ceased) 
Somerleyton Road, 
Brixton Green 
London 
Community 
Housing Co-
operative (LCHC) 
Type of mutual 
housing  
(see Fig. 2) 
Short-life  
co-operative 
Fully mutual  
co-operative 
Fully mutual 
co-operative 
Community Land 
Trust Co-housing Co-housing  
Community Land 
Trust 
Multi-Stakeholder 
Co-operative 
Housing aims 
Provide cheap 
housing - short-term 
Provide cheap 
housing for single 
people 
Provide cheap 
housing 
Provide housing, 
mixed tenure, some 
cheap - with 
community support 
Provide housing for 
older women 
Provide housing for 
older people 
Provide housing, 
mixed tenure, some 
cheap - with 
community support 
Provide cheap 
housing for local 
people - with 
community support 
Meetings 
General meetings: 6-8 
weeks 
CoM monthly; 
Members’ meeting 
monthly  
General meetings 
quarterly; 
Management 
committee monthly 
AGM and monthly 
Board meetings, 
plus community 
workshops 
One day a month: 
business meeting in 
morning plus 2 task 
group sessions, lunch, 
long workshop in 
afternoon 
Once a month on 
Sunday, 6-9pm plus 
food 
AGM and regular 
Board meetings, plus 
community 
workshops 
Every Tuesday 
morning with General 
meeting monthly, 
plus garden and build 
days 
Executive or 
Management Team 
Chair, secretary and 
treasurer 
Committee of 
management (CoM) - 
chair, deputy, finance 
and secretary plus 9 
housing reps. 
Management 
committee: External 
chair, deputy, 
secretary, treasurer, 
plus 15 sitting 
members 
Board of Trustees: 
15 members split 
into thirds - 
resident, community 
and municipal 
representatives 
Management 
committee of 7 with 
elections every 3 years 
Steering Group 
Board of Trustees: 
local community and 
business leaders, with 
co-opted professional 
from regeneration 
and finance 
Management team 
Committees 
Executive Team only 
to discuss tenancies, 
vacancy, and 
maintenance 
Memberships and 
rent arrears with 
other working groups 
for specific issues but 
in general officer 
positions 
Management 
committee, tenancy 
sub-committee, 
works group 
The four sub-
groups are 
allocations policy, 
strategy and finance, 
future projects, and 
interim use and 
design 
Task groups: 
membership, equal 
ops and diversity, 
communications, 
gardening, social, 
carpool, communal 
spaces. Smaller 
finance and legal task 
groups  
 
Task groups and ad 
hoc projects - finance 
and communication 
n/a Four different projects  
Support 
roles 
All done by members 
except more difficult 
maintenance 
Housing officer from 
CDS (professional) 
Housing manager, 
admin assistant, 
maintenance co-
ordinator; external 
chair (professional) 
Co-opted 
professionals onto 
Board for legal and 
financial advice and 
external community 
representatives 
Support from 
Housing for Women 
(HA) 
All members are 
involved in some 
capacity in 
management 
Partnership with 
Council and 
Ovalhouse Theatre 
plus co-opted 
members from 
finance, architecture 
and legal 
Support from co-op 
consultant and 
architects 
Constitution and 
Policies  
(see Appendix E) 
A page of rules - 
Articles of 
Association 
Rules and policies of 
the co-operative - 
detailed but need 
updating 
Rules and policies of 
the co-operative - 
detailed but need 
updating 
Trust rules 
Company Limited by 
Guarantee with 
mutual rules adopted 
recently 
n/a n/a 
Industrial Provident 
Society model with 
multi-stakeholder 
rules 
 
 
 Figure 15: Meeting practices of the mutual housing groups 
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8.2.2 Roles and involvement within mutual housing groups 
 
One of the most important roles in the running of mutual housing groups is the chairperson, both 
as a leader but also in the ways in which accountability is shared through the group’s institutions. 
For most groups, the role of chair and other officer positions are unpaid. In some cases, they may 
receive a rent discount: “We call it in lieu of expenses” [S. from Backdoor] or rent a separate, non-
shared flat (Sanford), for example. Backdoor housing co-operative has had one chairperson, 
known as the secretary, who has fulfilled that role for over 20 years and see themselves as crucial 
to the survival of the co-operative: 
 
For a long time, I felt there was nobody else who could do it. … I was running it by 1992, so next year, 
it will be 25 years ... it's half my life and it means a lot to me. People sometimes say to me, “Without you, 
the co-op wouldn’t exist’ and perhaps they’re right because I have had to be very, very persistent all of that 
time. I've seen other (groups) and some of them have collapsed completely through poor management, so ours 
has just kept going. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
Their main role is to be the single point of contact for the housing associations and to carry out 
the more manageable maintenance work. However, one member of GUHC noted there are risks 
when the chairperson is not open to other members’ ideas. Having had several experiences of 
impeaching chairs in the past, which in itself shows their strength of collective governance, GUHC 
concluded that an external chair was preferable in order to offer an unbiased decision-making 
process and to keep the running of the meetings fair, while also having an input into the 
application of the rules and procedures of the co-operative from a neutral expert. Other members, 
who have been involved in the past, also offer their support from the side-lines in different ways 
or are ready to step in:  
 
I much prefer to be on the outside, knowing what's going on. There are a lot of people here who have been 
on the committee in the past, have been for years and in a way, they’ve backed off… they’ve got experience 
and they'll have knowledge and they may actually join the committee again, or they may be on the side-
lines…but they are there. [B. from GUHC] 
 
In Sanford, issues are addressed by specific officers rather than having committees or sub-groups. 
In this way, people can take on a role and have responsibilities, contributing to the co-operative’s 
governance: 
 
Every year [officers] get elected. We have many different positions, there’s quite a lot. Mediation used to be 
called equal opportunities, but we just decided to change the name. I think mediation is just better reflective 
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of what they actually do. Some have several [officer] positions like rent arrears…They would have regular 
meetings with the housing officer that works here. [T. from Sanford] 
 
In general, the primary roles involve decision-making and forward-thinking on strategic issues; 
secondary roles deal with all jobs which require more long-term development of rules and policies, 
rather than short-term decisions.  
 
GUHC and Sanford both created the role of external, professional support worker. Initially, in 
GUHC, there was a maintenance worker who ended up being over-worked and inefficient. The 
replacement was an external worker, with a background in union organising and human resources, 
who is now a much-appreciated member:  
 
She knows the rights and wrongs, what you can and what you can't do… It's no good us making rules that 
have got no backbone… If we're not sure, she looks into it for us and our works chap, he's on the ball, 
then goes around, “that’s not done right, we’ll have that done again” and everything’s done as it should be 
done, how you want it to be done … we've got good staff, very good staff, we'd be very sorry [to] lose them. 
[I. from GUHC] 
 
A balance is found between the role of an external worker and the co-operative members. For 
some members, it is about finding ways to encourage people to become more involved (see 
Section 8.2.4 on involvement) and not leave everything to the professional staff:  
 
I think that it’s best to involve people and make them aware that, basically, if they’ve got a problem, say 
“we’ll join the committee, do something about it”. [B. from GUHC]  
 
At the same time, there should also be clear and open means through which people can contact 
the professional staff. Sanford has a housing officer employed through CDS (Co-operative 
Dwelling Society), an important secondary co-operative providing management services to 
primary housing co-operatives. 
 
His role is administrative. Every month he will produce a management report which will include things like 
rent arrears, cases, voids in houses that need to be filled. He used to liaise with maintenance. We’ve changed 
it this year as we’ve got a maintenance officer, so a lot of the responsibility went to the maintenance officer. 
We’re now actually thinking we’re going to give it back to the housing officer because it’s a huge job [T. 
from Sanford] 
 
Again, this shows there is a negotiation and discussion within the mutual housing group 
concerning the roles that external professional workers have and the work that is carried out 
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internally by the members of the group. Other groups have developed contracts with managing 
agents and created a list of their own tried and trusted contractors to deal with specific issues. 
OWCH, for example, has been developing a separate management contract with Housing for 
Women, the non-developer housing association. 
 
Other important roles for external people that affect the governance of the group include 
accountants and lawyers, who are familiar with the issues and the support that mutual housing 
groups need. One interviewee noted that there was a burgeoning of housing professionals during 
the 1980s because of the many independent housing organisations that needed experienced 
professional support, including housing co-operatives. Lewis Silkin, a corporate legal firm, became 
known for its support because of its specialised knowledge of housing co-operatives, for example, 
and was important for both Sanford and Grand Union (GUHC).  
 
In most groups, there is an implicit understanding that members of the mutual housing group will 
somehow contribute and be involved in the wider workings of the group. However, levels of 
involvement fluctuate, and it usually remains an unclear, implicit factor in the groups’ governance 
institutions. Some members, from the more established groups, mentioned that there is a need 
for greater participation and different forms of involvement need to be encouraged: 
 
What form of incentives are there to get involved? Well, at the very beginning you can only get membership 
if you participate in three management committees or tenant’s subcommittee and tell us what you are going 
to do with the co-operative. We’re much stricter now… Because we realised participation was an issue and 
that had slacked off. Also, because it wasn’t an issue before. [S. from GUHC] 
 
Participation and involvement in governance by members fluctuates and is influenced by a 
number of factors. There can be a level of uncertainty regarding tenure, which in some cases 
encourages attendance at meetings (see Backdoor). In other groups, the roles of officers are varied 
and plentiful, thus easily distributed around the group according to individual members’ interests 
(see Sanford). There are more difficulties in well-established groups as involvement reduces when 
groups run smoothly, or there is additional external or professional assistance. In GUHC, older 
members who had been heavily involved in management in the past have stepped aside but remain 
“lurking on the side-lines” acting as repositories of institutional memory, ready to jump in if there is 
a crisis. The newer groups, however, must involve people who need to develop specific skills. 
This is an integral part of the formation of the group, as well as the formation of the knowledge 
necessary to run the group (see knowledge and governance within the groups in Chapter 9).  
 
A general point would be that any activities organised by the group can be an incentive to be 
involved. In this respect, a member of the GUHC management committee carried out a survey 
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recently, aimed at finding out what activities would bring people out of their homes to join 
together at the communal Portakabin: 
 
We made a list of things, for example, people giving talks, a gardener comes in a gives a talk on what we 
should be planting this time of year, or you could get someone like Corbyn – if he would like to come and 
do a talk. Could be anyone. Then games nights… Film nights … It was really partly to see what could be 
encouraged. [S. from GUHC] 
 
In other groups, communal activities have included trips to the seaside in summer and to the 
theatre, as well as organising general meetings with a barbecue. However, it was also clear that 
while some people feel more naturally inclined to become involved as they are confident they 
have something to contribute, others may feel they have little to contribute or do not like the form 
that meetings take – the drama, egos, anger, power games – all grist to the group’s governance 
mill:  
 
I’ve never been to [a management meeting]. Don’t like them as a group. When working together [there is 
the] risk of people having secret ways of talking and getting what they [need]. Power games. People who like 
to be on committees – it’s a power thing. It gets a bit obfuscated. People come in at an angle. It gets a bit 
heated. [#8 from GUHC] 
 
Other people have pointed out that the group had been successful precisely because it had been 
undemanding in its requirement for people’s involvement. In addition, many members with useful 
knowledge were not involved in the group until something happened and then they came back. 
The same applies to situations where knowledgeable members of the group leave: 
 
It is amazing how these groups transition quite quickly – [they] are strong enough to survive driving forces 
leaving… It’s really interesting how in Co-housing Woodside other people have stepped up to the plate pretty 
quickly and have seen the vacuum and seen the urgency that if you want to keep this going they have to get 
on with it. [For example] the whole steering committee resigned in January… over the course of six weeks 
and a new strong one has formed. [J.W. from Woodside] 
 
This view pointed to a degree of resilience within the group to changes in roles, especially in 
smaller groups, but which was dependent on having a pool of willing people ready to take on 
more of the management roles. Evidently, Woodside, which included many retired people as the 
group was for over-55s, this was readily achieved. However, in larger groups, it does seem to 
remain up to management to ensure that residents become more involved. Therefore, resilience 
seen as part of governance of the group can be summarised here as depending on external support 
roles such as professional housing managers or workers, lawyers, auditors or finance advisers, a 
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group of older members willing to step in and out, activities for involvement, but also a certain 
flexibility on levels of involvement as not everyone has the same level of participation.  
 
The next section will look at specific aspects of joining the group (see point 1 in Figure 3), again 
a crucial aspect of the formation of the group and of the creation of governance institutions within 
mutual housing groups.  
 
 
8.2.3 Joining mutual housing groups 
 
An important aspect of the formation of institutions within mutual housing groups is how and 
why people join the groups. Most people joined a mutual housing group for its offer of relatively 
cheap housing, and indeed may not see other reasons: 
 
The main thing is – I need cheap accommodation and I don’t see that many people are looking for additional 
things from the co-op. So, while it might be a nice infrastructure for gathering together and doing something 
positive in the neighbourhood, it’s not what people are interested in. They are there because they are an artist 
and they want to save money or set up their own company or they are broke or whatever it might be basically. 
[M. from Backdoor] 
 
However, not all the groups are offering cheap housing, and this is the case with most of the 
newer groups (see Housing Aims in Fig.15 above). The co-housing schemes, for example, are 
neither cheap, nor ‘affordable’, not even at a ‘fair rent’, but instead offer an incentive for joining 
a mutual housing group where the emphasis is on a way of living in which there is some element 
of sharing – either spatially or organisationally – and there is mutual support. Whether the 
incentive is then transformed into some monetary advantage is yet to be confirmed, but the 
assumption is that co-living would offer social advantages that are un-monetised, or part of a 
decommodification of housing. The effort of living together and creating mutual housing reduces 
the cost either through a form of ‘sweat equity’ or through the provision of mutual social benefits, 
as explored in Chapter 7.  
 
How people join varies from group to group though most require some expression of basic 
interest or understanding of the co-operative or mutual housing group ethos. In GUHC, people 
tend to apply by completing a questionnaire and then have an interview: 
 
You have to understand what a co-op is. [We are] looking for someone to say: ‘It’s about getting involved’. 
Sometimes they then don’t turn up. Sometimes the application fails because we haven’t got space, but we’ll 
put your letter on file. It’s also a gut feeling. There are questions and there are criteria. [#9 from GUHC] 
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There are other ways to join; for example, some people joined because of housing swaps between 
the housing co-operative and a local authority property (at GUHC). For Backdoor, the process 
tends to be more closed and has tended to be based on personal contacts or friendship:  
 
Friends present other friends… If for example, I decide for someone to move into my house and then this 
person decides to live there, and we agree, the co-op must know. So, at the next meeting I will bring this 
person and then the way to continue to live in there is to become a member. That is basically the most 
number of times. [T. from Backdoor] 
 
The advantage of this arrangement is that people have already developed a network of friendships 
or at least one point of contact within the group, which can increase the group’s cohesion. 
However, the disadvantage is that, over time, the group may become increasingly homogenous 
and inward-looking. 
 
The difficulties around allocations are reflected at a policy level, where the decisions have to be 
made around the development of an ‘allocations policy’, defining how new housing is allocated. 
Do groups take on people from the local council register, for example, and what criteria should 
be used to determine those joining? Furthermore, a policy must also include for situations where 
families separate, or co-habit, or where children grow up and want to join the group to stay living 
nearby, often an issue in older housing groups. In the case of GUHC: 
 
One of our biggest struggles was allocations – how you allocate property within an organisation and that's 
still probably controversial occasionally. I think we're 50/50 with the council. If something comes up, one 
goes to the council and one goes on our waiting lists. We've been pretty transparent on things like that, we're 
not inward [looking]. [P. from GUHC] 
 
Some housing groups had initially tried to address the needs of people in the area, but 
subsequently the group was filled up with people with many problems and different capability 
levels, thus making the group as a whole more vulnerable to issues of rent arrears and other 
conflicts. Consequently, most groups now tend to consider both the needs of the applicants and 
the maintenance of the group’s ethos, pursuing a judicious balance through their allocations 
policy.   
 
Linked to allocations is the induction process. Most mutual housing groups have tried, with 
varying degrees of success, to use some form of induction process for applicants:  
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There is an application form that potential members fill in. It is quite an in-depth application. Then one 
goes through a vetting process, now merged with the initial membership interview. The applicants are 
interviewed by three members of the co-op and they are asked things like what they understand about co-
operative housing, what it means, what it involves… because we’ve got such a large number of applicants it 
means… we’ve become slightly more selective. [T. from Sanford] 
 
People join primarily because they need housing but the application process, in some groups, has 
changed to encourage participation from the new applicants:  
 
There are structures in place so that people joining have to attend a certain number of meetings, they have 
to say that they are community minded, they have to show what they would do. It wasn’t always implemented 
like that as well previously so …this is where it is important to keep fighting for the co-op because 
participation it’s the only way it can survive, if everyone participates and how do you get people to want to 
participate. This is why it’s such a success and after 35 years it still exists. [S. from GUHC] 
 
Other groups have instituted a formal requirement for each household to give one day’s labour 
every month – a form of sweat equity time in lieu of down-payment. Most groups spoke about 
having so many applicants that the development of a fair allocation policy has been crucial for 
them.  
 
For the newer groups, the process of induction has tended to be lengthy and among most groups 
there tends to be an allowance for different degrees of commitment within the groups. To join 
Woodside, interested people must attend three meetings before they can become a member, or 
they can join as a supporter or friend: 
 
In terms of joining, there are two options: one can be a member or a friend. To be a member one has to 
attend three meetings and then pay the initial £250 membership fee, which is used as seed money to fund 
legal and other expert advice, including facilitators, trainers, and other overheads the group has had. A 
friend can pay an annual £25 and can join meetings and participate but has no vote. The aim is to be able 
to draw people in who might want to support the project and integrate into the group, but not commit. To 
further facilitate new members’ integration the group has also developed a ‘buddy’ system. [J.W. from 
Woodside] 
 
The mutual housing groups offer different types of housing (see Housing Aims in Fig.15). For 
example, Sanford is strictly for single tenancies and therefore is not meant as a family place. 
OWCH targets women over 55 years old. Co-housing Woodside, although more flexible, is aimed 
at primary owners aged over 55, although members can live in a family unit with other younger 
sharers. Prioritising a local lettings policy, for example, was important for Brixton Green, which 
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has been working on the criteria for a local lettings plan to apply across the different tenures 
offered: 
 
We’d like [the criteria] to apply across the board so when a market rent property becomes void we put it 
on Rightmove [for example] that there’s properties available for rent – this is the rent level, and this is 
the income level and if you’re not within this income band don’t bother applying. Then there will be criteria 
about living in a co-operative environment … and it will [apply] to the choice-based lettings as well so 
that people know what they are putting themselves in for. [S. from Brixton Green] 
 
ELCLT has been developing its own local lettings policy to support people who wanted to stay 
in the area and saw its policy as an integral part of what it was trying to do as a community 
organisation.  
 
Therefore, underpinning any allocation or lettings policy is an attempt to regulate the tension 
between those who may need the housing more and those who want to live in mutual housing. 
Groups are explicitly trying to address housing needs at a local level, which is clearly an incentive 
for people willing to join the groups. However, there is also a longer-term strategic need for 
groups to find members who will contribute to the group, either through their willingness to 
engage in the ethos of the group – the explicit and implicit understandings that are shared by 
group members on their level of ‘co-operativism’ or ‘mutualism’ – and the important feature of 
altruistic involvement, as discussed in the previous section.  
 
The next section will cover other practices, some of which were also important in promoting the 
involvement of members in their group, and which have been key to the development of 
governance institutions in mutual housing groups, including talking and listening skills, and also 
dealing with conflicts and risks within groups.  
 
 
8.2.4 Talking and listening as practices within groups 
 
The practices around talking and listening emerged in the interviews as important with regard to 
the governance of mutual housing groups. It would be useful to cover them here before moving 
on to the experiences of creating and changing rules (Sections 8.3 and 8.4).   
 
While talking and listening fulfil an important function in any human group, in the case of mutual 
housing groups, much of the decision-making and social-bonding took place in spaces such as 
meetings, where people would spend more time than usual talking and listening to each other. 
One member highlighted this as one of the reasons for joining the group, and emphasised the 
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important links between talking, listening and the development of a more consensual decision-
making style: 
 
Most of us had experience of working in the ordinary working environment and it’s not the way we want 
to live. We don’t want to live with bosses. Consensus decision-making is very flat, and you are encouraged 
to have a voice and have a contribution from everyone. We recognise the disadvantages to it – it takes much 
longer to come to a decision…but then we thought it was more important that people who were willing to 
have a give and take and reach consensus, rather than end up feeling resentful. [G. from Woodside] 
 
Importantly, this was a group that had regularly met at the Quaker Meeting House. The 
significance of this is more than just symbolic, as Quakers have a spiritual practice very much 
linked to listening and consensual decision-making. The group had also received training sessions 
on consensus decision-making led by two group members with links to the Quakers.  
 
Not everyone interviewed found meetings such a useful place for talking through issues. Some 
people would deliberately avoid meetings, because either they had the impression that there was 
too much talking, or they did not like that people would occasionally become angry, unpleasant 
or loud. Others felt that although meetings were spaces where personal issues might be shared, 
the exercise seemed pointless to them:  
 
Maybe [meetings are useful] for the people who are the subject of the discussion. It definitely feels [for me] 
that a lot of time is wasted – giving people the opportunity to opine on things that really require very little 
introduction or discussion. [M. from Backdoor] 
 
Airing grievances, reaching common understandings and establishing some shared positions are 
also part of learning for one another and creating decision-making spaces. However, it does 
depend on how people learn to listen to one another. As one member pointed out: 
 
[Meetings] seem to be focussing [on] minutiae and what can seem petty… it doesn’t seem to branch out as 
much as it should and maybe a part of that is about co-op education as well and what the principles are. 
Not just about paying your rent on time or having your say, but also about actively promoting co-ops. [N. 
from Sanford] 
 
Much of the talking and listening is instrumental in creating an environment for the group to work 
together in reaching decisions, but also more mundanely, in the act of just “getting on” and 
providing spaces for sociality. This sociality is formed through meetings and other events, both 
formal and informal. In some groups, notably the new ones, a more active approach was taken in 
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providing training in consensus decision-making, mediation and other participatory processes, for 
example.  
 
Consensus decision-making is based on developing a commitment within the group to discussing 
and developing solutions which everyone actively supports (Seeds for Change 2013). Rather than 
simply voting and accepting the majority view, a consensus process seeks to air and listen to all 
opinions, ideas and concerns and by this means, the group can develop proposals that work for 
more people. It is not meant to be a process of compromise or of unanimity – but a process of 
weaving the best ideas and important concerns, usually (if successful) into new solutions:  
 
We got really very deeply involved in [consensus decision-making] …we had a whole day session at a 
Quaker Meeting House and we did various role-playing exercises. And we spent a lot of time thinking 
about how we wanted to make decisions. [G. from Woodside] 
 
It seemed that the newer groups (Co-housing Woodside, OWCH and LCHC) are explicitly 
attempting to develop particular practices along the lines of participatory and specifically 
consensus-based decision-making as governance techniques (Renz, 2006).  
 
Another practice that was created by LCHC is to hold a session dedicated to what they call “anti-
burnout training”. This consists of the whole group going away together for a weekend to ‘check 
in’ with each other regarding what everyone was doing and feeling. A similar ritual was described 
by an OWCH member, where they had developed their own form of social-bonding and learning 
practice, called a ‘recommitment’: 
 
There’s a group building thing every November that happens – the recommitment. I think those sorts of 
processes are highly unusual if you went to any other co-housing group. They are much more easy-going and 
informal. And I think we can take dissonance, as we have got more shock absorbers for someone who is 
more dissonant. [C. from OWCH] 
 
Developing listening and talking practices within the group was also related to developing 
practices to deal with conflicts and manage risks, which are explored in the next section.  
 
 
8.2.5 Dealing with conflicts and risks within groups 
 
Moments of tension arise in all groups, and the interviews provided some rich insights, not 
necessarily on the details of each conflict that arose, but rather how the groups had coped and the 
strategies or policies they had used to resolve conflicts. At GUHC, a complaints procedure was 
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developed as a way of dealing with conflicts. A written complaint is submitted to the management 
committee, which then transmits it to an external complaints person. Part of the reason that 
complaints and disputes have been handled fairly has been that the management committee has 
become a neutral space for complaints to be presented and dealt with.  
 
In the newer groups, such as OWCH, ELCLT, Co-housing Woodside, and LCHC, although there 
may be policies for conflict resolution or mediation, the real tests will only occur when everyone 
moves into their homes. However, there has been important lessons and practices learnt through 
the process of setting-up as a group. OWCH established a process during its inception of internal 
mediation: 
 
You have to get an advocate, each of you, from the group and sit down and talk about things and if that 
doesn’t work then you have to get a group together to mediate. [C. from OWCH] 
 
Co-housing Woodside had prepared a conflict resolution policy even before they had an idea of 
where and how they were going to live. Again, their Quaker roots could explain some of their 
interest in horizontal decision-making and consensual, listening-based meetings. Sanford, an older 
group, now has three mediation officers from within the co-operative who can be requested to 
help resolve a conflict.  
 
The most serious conflicts in the older groups arise over eviction decisions. Usually, all decisions 
concerning evictions must be approved by the main board or management committees. In most 
mutual housing groups, the process takes time and requires many repeated efforts to resolve the 
situation, with discussions at different levels of confidentiality. In the case of Backdoor, such 
discussions are open and public, but the executive team are also in touch personally to discuss 
arrangements before eviction. In GUHC, the confidential discussions are carried out in 
subcommittee, before being raised at the management meeting. However, in general, a sense that 
‘every member is landlord’ is encouraged. Therefore, there is a reliance on informal peer pressure 
which does operate as an incentive for members to conform. 
 
Most members of the mutual housing groups would subscribe to the idea that any group dynamic 
that becomes authoritarian or too hierarchical will inevitably have negative outcomes. The groups 
that can keep a strong sense of democracy, transparency and accountability will survive as mutual 
organisations – successful alternatives to private or public housing:  
 
There’s always a balancing of things to be had. It is always important that co-ops try actively to be as 
democratic as possible but it’s always a balancing act. But I do think it’s a real alternative to private rented 
[housing], and even bureaucracies like council housing and housing associations. [N. from Sanford] 
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While this may be the unspoken ethos in most of the groups, nonetheless, the establishment of a 
mutual housing group requires a lot of commitment in the face of adversity, uncertainties and 
risks. In the older groups, the main risks may be different to newer groups as they are already 
established. In the case of the short-life co-operative Backdoor, the main risk is the lack of any 
guarantee that further houses will be made available by the housing associations they work with: 
 
We're losing 15 flats in the space of a month and only getting, say, three or four replacements because [the 
housing association] hasn't planned for it any more than we have, and the result is that is about as big a 
catastrophe as we can get in our lifetime… so we're always on a bit of a knife edge. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
One of the risks faced by the newer groups early on in their process is that of members 
withdrawing due to changes in the programme, process and costs. This was the stark experience 
of the Co-housing Woodside group (which ceased to exist in July 2016 because of these issues). 
Another challenge, which groups have increasingly faced in recent years, is the rise in land and 
property values. There is mounting difficulty in finding land that is appropriate for new groups, 
and this also threatens existing groups as they might be displaced by more financially lucrative 
developments or land uses. This latter situation is a serious threat, especially if the group does not 
own the land or the housing. For example, Sanford purchased their freehold from Lewisham 
Council as the group had become increasingly worried by increasing prices and the visibility of 
local, private sector housing developments around them. 
 
There are also risks of building cost inflation for groups that have embarked on the process of 
housing development. Co-housing Woodside, for example, was not able to contract a builder 
directly, and was therefore in a joint venture with a housing association and developer. Presented 
with escalating cost estimates for the future houses, many members dropped out because the 
project was perceived by some individuals as too risky to become involved in. There had been no 
financial or institutional opportunity for the group to reduce the risk in the project development 
process. Generally, once building begins, there are also the development risks associated with the 
costs of any large-scale venture which, over a period, are subject to inflation. Finding mechanisms 
for lessening such risks during the build stage, either by bringing together the necessary capital 
for that period or ensuring full project costs are guaranteed up-front, could contribute to the 
provision of more mutual housing.  
 
Most of the newer groups discussed the risks and how they were managed, and how the costs of 
risks, including cost increases, were allocated or distributed within the partnerships established 
for the project. For Brixton Green, the partnership was with Lambeth Council, which had 
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concerns over the financial risks involved, although these seemed, on the surface, to be more 
concerns regarding governance issues:  
 
Some of that is about giving up control, which is a classic public servant-type concern, but if we can get over 
that because there’s a political will to get over it, then we need to get under the skin and see what the real 
risks are to them financially. [S. from Brixton Green] 
 
The discussions also indicated that there were institutional risks associated with having to be 
registered as a housing provider, not necessarily because of a lack of knowledge, but because of a 
general institutional concern that the group lacked the knowledge and capacity to deal with any 
problems that might arise. For example, it was evident from the interviews, especially in the cases 
of GUHC and Brixton Green, that that there is still a strong institutional memory within the 
public sector of similar models having failed in the 1970s and 1980s. There are around 243 
ownership housing co-operatives registered with the HCA currently and most of them were 
developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, during the same period, there were about 
500 ownership co-operatives developed: 
 
Half of them closed pretty quickly and the reason they were closed, as far as I’m concerned, is because a lot 
of people jumped on them and went “Yes, yes, this is flavour of the month, let’s build these things” and then 
they turned around and gave people rule books and said you’re a co-op now and half of them fell on their 
faces. We don’t want to see people developing co-op, community or mutual housing schemes without thinking 
through and learning some of the lessons about what happened the last time round. We spent twenty years 
dealing with the reputational damage to the model. [M. from CCH] 
 
Reducing or mitigating the risks associated with the development and overall governance of the 
group can also be achieved partly through the provision of advice, guidance and good practice 
from groups like CCH, CDS, Radical Routes, Catalyst Collective and other local umbrella 
organisations. For example, CCH sees its role as addressing governance risks: 
 
To address and minimise the risk, through our codes of governance, through things like policy and procedures, 
through our accreditation framework … We provide a checklist and risk analysis model for organisations 
to self-assess their governance, their services and their status as a co-operative. [M. from CCH] 
 
The group interviews confirmed that risks were not necessarily rooted within the mutual housing 
groups themselves, but usually related to external organisations or institutions. Most of the newer 
groups are in situations where they need to develop together with more established partners – i.e. 
the council, a housing association or a developer – and conflicts arise over the use of different 
definitions, understandings and priorities: 
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Savills [have] no sense of what co-housing is. For them it is market housing for the elderly…The whole 
idea is that co-housing is owner managed, and here they’re telling us what we get for service charges because 
they are clearly selling us the whole package. [J.W. from Woodside] 
 
Another source of conflict for mutual housing groups has become the potential implementation 
of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 and the extent to which its provisions would apply to 
housing co-operatives and other mutual housing groups. Similar conflicts arose when the Right 
to Buy was introduced following the Housing Act 1980: 
 
We’ve confronted Right to Buy but pay to stay would have been very divisive and I personally cannot yet 
understand how they're going to put it together… the Housing Bill has not gone through yet. So, pay to 
stay would have had an effect here with a few people, but not lots, I don't think. [P. from GUHC] 
 
Some members of the GUHC co-operative were keen to exercise Right to Buy and, for some 
years there have been discussions in meetings about potential de-mutualisation. In an interview 
recorded around ten years ago, a member of GUHC said:  
 
Without being too political, I truly believe in social housing. Things have changed. There is the possibility 
that we may deregister from Co-op UK. In the end some people want a private house, which is outrageous 
[for the co-op] and it’s a slippery slope. [#11 from GUHC] 
 
GUHC members mentioned the conflict that arose between a potential demutualisation of the 
housing group allowing members to exercise the Right to Buy, and the group remaining a fully 
mutual housing co-operative. The only reason it remained fully mutual was because there was a 
core of members committed to the mutual status of the group. (see Section 6.4)  
 
Audits, usually carried out by external institutions, used to scrutinise the groups’ finances also 
reduce the groups’ risk of failure. Similar external scrutiny by HCA (previously the Housing 
Corporation) is used in some cases to examine policies, procedures, committee minutes and 
accounts. Most groups adhere to the different demands for audits from a range of external 
organisations, depending on the form of mutual housing they have set up and the regulatory 
environment they need to follow (see Appendix E). However, the increasing demands on external 
audits by the mutual housing groups has led to both the increasing levels of professionalism 
needed to run the groups, and the need to adhere to the external demands of monitoring 
institutions, which belies, and arguably undermines the mutual housing groups’ own autonomous 
practices of collective governance but also how they might see themselves. In contrast, LCNC 
has been developing its own form of social audit and will undertake these alongside the financial 
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audits carried out by FCA. Audits are therefore another instance of the interaction between 
external institutions and internal practices common within mutual housing groups and which have 
an important structuring effect on their governance practices.  
 
The process of rule creation and rule changing will be looked at in the following sections, as they 
are two important themes where the structuring effect of external institutions on the inner 
practices can also be observed.  
 
 
8.3 Experiences of creating rules 
  
Following on from the governance practices that the mutual housing groups have developed, the 
next two sections of the chapter look at the specific rules that have been created and how these 
are changed. As explored in the theoretical chapter, institutions are constituted by formal and 
informal rules and norms, which organise social and economic relations (see North 1990). Rules 
are practices-in-action (see Giddens 1984; Cruickshank 2003, p.81) and are virtual or abstract, 
whereas practices are the spatial, social and embodied (physical) manifestations of those rules and 
norms (Cruickshank 2003, p.76). It is not necessary to chronicle the various ways in which 
practices become rules (formal) or norms (informal), or the ways in which rules and norms are 
put into practice. Both processes are important in the general formation of collective governance 
institutions for mutual housing groups. On the one hand, there are structures of collective 
governance (the rules and norms), and on the other there are structural properties (the practices). 
However, the nature of explicit rule creation and change is important to understand as an 
embedded practice that occurs within a mutual housing group. The ability for individuals to be 
involved in rule-creating and rule-changing is a fundamental part of the ‘crafting of institutions’.  
 
These are key in Ostrom’s theoretical framework, as explored in Chapter 3, and cover the specific 
rules and norms for governing the mutualised housing group, the procedures for changing the 
rules and norms, and the monitoring, enforcement, incentives and punishments used to keep rules 
and norms. In turn, these themes also relate directly to some key principles for design (see Figures 
3-5) and thus used here to understand mutual housing governance.  
 
The Backdoor Housing Co-operative has a constitution or what are known as Rules. This is a 
standard form that has not changed since the 1980s, available from the National Housing 
Federation for fully mutual co-operatives. These co-operative Rules are fixed at the inception of 
the group as part of their constitution and include procedures for changing them. Many day-to-
day activities are guided by established decisions and past practices, which have been summarised 
over the years as the ‘Rules to Members’, or sometimes referred to as ‘Standing Orders’. From a 
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member’s perspective, however, they may not see the group operating with many rules, apart from 
a “certain understanding of ethics and obligations” [T. from Backdoor]. One example is the agreement to 
leave within the 28-day notice, which is enforced generally through the “strong internal co-op pressure 
to stick to deadlines” [T. from Backdoor]. For people who do not abide by the rules, the co-operative 
attempts first to deal with the issue based on character and consider their efforts to pay and any 
difficulties in life; secondly, if necessary, it will start legal proceedings. It is also in the collective 
self-interest to maintain good relations with the housing association landlord. Nonetheless, the 
biggest incentive for an individual to stick to the rules in general was, basically, to avoid being 
evicted.  
 
In Grand Union Housing Co-operative (GUHC), most people interviewed did not have a clear 
idea of the rules. One interviewee stated that: “The saving grace with this co-op is that it hasn’t 
had too many rules.” However, they did seem to be keen on policies – which in effect, were the 
same:  
 
[The co-operative] likes to make sure it has a policy; to a very large extent, it has policies because people 
out there [external to the co-op] want to see them and you are required to have some, but internally, there 
are always some people who [say] have we got a policy on that? – Oh well, we can't make a decision until 
we've got a policy. [B. from GUHC] 
 
Other members of the same co-operative thought that there were rules: 
 
You have to keep your own house to a certain standard and that’s part of the tenancy agreement. [There 
are] the rules that are written and the rules that are not: rules that are written are all the policies; rules that 
are not, are things that make everyone participate, it’s a co-op, this is a political project, whereas others 
would say no, it’s not just housing. [S. from GUHC] 
 
Here the member is aware of both written and unwritten rules – what could be defined as rules 
and norms. One particular rule concerned breaches of tenancy, which in some cases could include 
‘not being co-operative’. This was used as a last resort when a conflict between neighbours could 
not be mediated or resolved at GUHC.  
 
In the newer groups, there seemed to be more active discussion and awareness of how rules were 
being created as part of the process of setting up the group. In Co-housing Woodside, there was 
an interesting tension between the approach of consensus decision-making and the more 
traditional top-down approach of working. The rules created for a policy theme would then reflect 
the style of decision-making. One of the reasons why some people left the group was that 
concerns raised about decision-making were not being addressed:  
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There were quite a few other things that came up why people are leaving but probably it was the prices [of 
the homes that kept changing], and the way that the decision-making was going. The difference between the 
core committee [which] would present options ostensibly asking for input but not really take on board the 
suggestions and then have a very quick move towards majority voting, rather than the longer process of 
talking through the things and listening in an open-minded way to the alternatives. [G. from Woodside] 
 
Thus, the process of decision-making influences the rules that are created. However, part of the 
tension between a consensus decision-making process and a majority-voting approach is linked 
to the perceived need for pragmatism, given that there were time, knowledge and resource 
constraints. However, it is evident that both styles of decision-making have been influential in 
creating the rules for the group:  
 
They set out a whole bunch of rules to begin with and they have been modifying those or adapting them or 
discarding them. They certainly still haven’t got it all worked out. [J.W. from Woodside] 
 
In OWCH, the rules and policies around particular issues such as conflict resolution, consensus 
decision-making, and mutual support or communications, came out of the work of task groups: 
 
OWCH evolved its own policies over time through workshops. Sometimes we had somebody come in to lead 
a workshop but more recently they have led their own workshops. So, for instance, their policy on conflict 
resolution has come out of a workshop. Consensus decision-making has had several workshops. Their policy 
on mutual support, what it is and what it isn’t, has come out of at least two workshops, repeated over the 
years because of the turnover. [C. from OWCH] 
 
Social care was a particular policy theme for which both OWCH and Co-housing Woodside had 
to develop rules. Examples from Holland (Brenton, 1998) showed that often health and social 
care authorities would regard older people’s co-housing as providing the extra care needed in lieu 
of statutory care by social services: 
 
I ran that [workshop on mutual support also] with Co-housing Woodside, because one of the things I learnt 
in the Netherlands was that you had to stop health and social services exploiting you, which they do more 
here anyway –they say, oh you’ve got neighbours, you can be discharged from hospital, they’ll look after 
you.... So, we set up protective policies around that in the OWCH group quite early on. Everyone has to 
be self-dependent. They cannot expect more than neighbourly, everyday help and care. It’s up to individuals 
whether they give more than that, but it’s not something that people have a right to expect. [C. from 
OWCH] 
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This was an example of a policy theme that had to have a set of rules suitable for the group of 
over-55s in order not to lose the statutory care and support provided from the external 
institutions.  
 
A positive form of external support was provided by the Confederation of Co-operative Housing, 
which helped Brixton Green with the support needed to learn how to live with one another. In 
their case, which can be generalised, it was not a question of people just being given ‘a set of rules, 
saying – Go away and do it” [S. from Brixton Green]. Other groups used external support to develop 
their codes of governance, their primary rules or policies. 
 
LCHC was supported by Somerset Co-operative Services, which developed with them the multi-
stakeholder co-operative rules. These will be used for the different community and member 
stakeholders involved in the governance of their co-operative. Furthermore, to offer clarity to 
investors in its project, LCHC also developed an ethical investment policy. In the main 
introduction to the governance and management statement, LCHC state:  
 
We view these as living documents to engage with, to inform our work and relationships 
with each other positively. Policies are all too often written, but never engaged with. By 
writing this statement, LCHC hopes to address this. (LCHC 2013) 
 
Rather than offering a set of rules or proscriptions, the statement is more performative – or 
practice-based. It focusses on the group’s intention to promote and build good working 
relationships based on the members’ own commitment:  
 
To taking responsibility for themselves, communicating as clearly and openly as possible with each other. By 
maintaining this focus, we hope to build a culture which does not blame individuals but encourages 
productivity and learning. We do this by committing to transparency, flexibility and change. In order to 
achieve this, it is both necessary and desirable to be open to conflict and its resolution. (LCHC 2013) 
 
Again, the statement emerges from the members’ personal experiences as home educators and 
community organisers – influenced by the self-learning movement as well as a commitment to 
social justice and local activism of different kinds, including within education, the provision of 
community services, environmentalism, anti-racism and the food justice movements.  
 
Thus, the forms of rules created by each group depend on the direction of the mutual housing 
group, and the origin of both the individual members and the organisation itself: i.e. their own 
sense of path, as one interviewee stated [T. from Radical Routes]. It is also their ‘sense of path’ 
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that influences the experiences of how rules have been created, and how they have changed. This 
latter point is explored more in the next section on the experiences of rule changing.  
 
 
8.4 Experiences of rule changing 
 
The final section of this chapter follows on from the experiences of rule creation among mutual 
housing groups and looks at some of the experiences and processes of how members and groups 
have changed their rules. Some groups have not changed their rules much over the many years 
since they were established, whereas other groups have clearly had to adapt and change the rules 
they have used to manage themselves, sometimes quite radically.  
 
Backdoor, for example, has not needed to adapt much, mainly because they have not become very 
large. Proposals to change the rules are presented at meetings or in writing to the executive 
committee. The process is open, and the openness is fostered by the way in which meetings are 
run – people feel free to raise issues and propose changes: 
 
It’s really, really open. The other thing about meetings is that everyone has an opinion and it is about 
listening as well. Things can change because we can be more involved, in order to have something… [For 
example] I propose something that I think is important, then the executive can say that’s interesting – or 
maybe we’re both for it. It is very, very interactive ... [S. from Backdoor] 
 
For example, one rule that was introduced required new members to be friends of existing 
members. This rule change was deemed a way of ensuring that there were stronger ties between 
members and also as a means of ensuring ‘good character’. Other changes were prompted by rent 
arrears which, although relatively minor, went to the root of the co-operative’s relationship with 
the housing association:  
 
If somebody has been in arrears for more than this many months consecutively then we automatically issue 
them notice to quit because for a long-time people were just slowly going into debt, and it became difficult in 
our relationship [and] it became dangerous for the co-op. [It] created problems with the people that we rent 
from and who we are reliant on, and we want to keep getting accommodation. [M. from Backdoor] 
 
Interviewees remembered a phase when discussion concerning internal politics became very 
heated mainly because of particular individuals who were interested in running the co-operative 
to their advantage:  
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Everyone has their interpretation and he tried to monopolise [the] co-op in his favour. [He] built up alliances 
and created distrust in the co-op. Like a communist party – purges were being planned to get rid of some 
members. There was an atmosphere of things going on behind backs. There were open conflicts at meetings 
on irrelevant points. As soon as he left, the nature of the co-op went back to what it had been. Things are 
debated, opinions debated – [it is now] pretty harmonious. [T. from Backdoor] 
 
In this case, the culprits seemed to be individuals trying to run the organisation and change the 
rules, perhaps with good intentions, but this introduced a level of conflict that the rules were 
unable to contain adequately. It is important, as another interviewee noted, not to have rules that 
are accurate in telling you how to run things – but that tell you what to do if things go wrong:  
 
Do not be so concerned about the accuracy of a detail of [the rules]. The important thing to think about is 
what do you do if it goes wrong. It's a good statement, it's a very good statement, so don't try and tie yourself 
in a whole lot of … 'we've got to do that, we've got to do that, we've got a statement about that,' just consider 
what happens if it all goes wrong, then maybe you might put some points in the policy because that's all 
you’re really after. [B. from GUHC] 
 
In the Grand Union Housing Co-operative (GUHC) policies, or rules pertaining to specific policy 
themes, are ideally updated, refined, and streamlined on a regular basis. However, the most 
important rule concerns rental payments:  
 
Let's face it, the only rule that's important is paying your rent and we do enforce that. We haven't actually 
kicked anybody out for a very long time, if ever. Other than that, what rules are there? …Other than 
maybe something about your neighbours. [B. from GUHC] 
 
Acknowledging the role of non-explicit spaces of governance, the same interviewee from GUHC 
noted how practices had changed: 
 
Certainly, in the early days, a lot of discussions about a lot of things would have not necessarily happened 
in the meetings but would have happened outside them semi-formally. We'd all go down the pub and drink 
a few and discuss without it being official…but these days, I wouldn’t say there's really much need for 
[that]. [B. from GUHC] 
 
As for changes to the rules today, the housing officer in this particular group usually informs the 
membership if there are changes due to external factors – for example, changes to national policies 
which may affect the co-operative – and then these are discussed at the management committee 
meetings, as are all rule changes. Similarly, in Sanford they have not had many changes to their 
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rules but, when required, they are discussed in the Committee of Management. Usually matters 
brought to its attention by members are relatively minor things, such as: 
 
We need to spend this much on our house – will you vote on it? We need new carpets there. Usually budget-
type things or the garden, other times it will be [about whether] we are going to hold a party. I haven’t seen 
any procedural stuff while I’ve been there in terms of [rule changes] but there are certain amount of things 
dealt with like sub-letting or other key points that might affect policy [N. from Sanford] 
 
Sanford’s rules have not changed for so long that the current chair pointed out that although 
policies and procedures have been evolving, the documentation needed updating: 
 
We tend to change our policies and procedures as we see fit and we don’t necessarily put that down into 
writing. So, some the practices we do now aren’t actually reflected in what it says in the book, so we need to 
update it to reflect our current practice. [T. from Sanford] 
 
There is therefore a collective learning process which is translated into practices and these, to a 
large extent, are not necessarily formalised in writing. One example is the role of mediation 
officers, a relatively new position for members to take up:  
 
There’s no mention of mediation officers in our current policies and procedures… We’ve decided as a co-op 
this is how we are going to do it, but we haven’t necessarily updated the documents. So, it evolved 
…everything is current and evolutionary. [T. from Sanford] 
 
One specific way in which rules change is to decide to talk about a particular issue that needs 
dealing with. For example,  
 
There’s going to be some meetings just to talk about this issue [membership process to include house guests] 
because it is quite a big topic. So [as Chair] I’m actually in the process at the moment of forming an agenda 
for that and the decisions that need to come out of it [in order to] move forward with this. [T. from 
Sanford] 
 
As other, newer groups recognised, this is a process that is difficult to set up in view of the tension 
between the need for a structure and being flexible enough to evolve and accept change. Many of 
the newer groups are attempting to address this issue of institutional flexibility right from the 
beginning by including, in their training workshops, discussions on diversity and equal 
opportunity, as well as on how to communicate or act with behaviour suitable for the group, 
rather than make everyone conform. One idea that evolved during this initial formation period 
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was the annual recommitment process, mentioned earlier in 8.2.5, which did lead to rule changes, 
but was also used as a form of personal evaluation of the members’ contributions to the group: 
 
The group would spend a whole afternoon in threes. They would all have the same list: What have I 
contributed? And if I haven’t, why haven’t I? What is my understanding of x, y, z? They self-evaluate 
with the other two … it is meant to concentrate everyone’s mind on the values that hold them together. And 
it’s been quite cohesion-building. [C. from OWCH] 
 
This process of group self-evaluation ties in with rule and policy changes as the group is better 
disposed and prepared to understand how and why rules need to change. Some other practical 
pointers on specific practices offered by a different group included circulating information in 
advance of the co-operative or mutual group meeting, providing a forum for ideas to be discussed 
and circulated, and having the chance for changes to embed themselves or be integrated. 
However, the same group acknowledged the risk that the changes had tended to make the group 
increasingly bureaucratic. It was also more defensive of its own institutionalised culture (i.e. “This 
is how we do things here” [T. from Radical Routes]) and new people moving in may find they were 
fighting entrenched group positions.  
 
In summary, these two final sections focussing on governance practices in mutual housing groups 
have looked at examples of the groups’ experiences in rule creation and rule changing, which 
relate to Ostrom’s original principles for design (see Fig.3) and more directly to themes dealing 
with rules in the theoretical framework (see Fig.6).  
 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
The micro-practices of governance within the mutual housing groups include the practices and 
rules that each group develops to manage itself. There are common sets of practices, including 
meetings – both of a formal kind, such as committees and general meetings, as well as informal 
spaces for meeting, created to manage the group’s assets and activities. The meeting practices 
vary, with groups having developed their own practices to manage the size of the group, the forms 
of participation and involvement, all aimed at balancing the members’ skills and resources with 
their availability. There are issues of accountability – developed internally to the group – but also 
imposed from outside. The latter are sometimes the cause of some innovation, as most groups 
have co-opted the role of external individuals or institutions to support them in some way.  There 
are specific arenas of rule-making which were chosen as the focus in this chapter, including the 
practices of joining the group and the ways people have become involved in running the group. 
Some more abstract practices such as forms of listening and talking were also explored, and these 
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are important for contrasting forms of decision-making, such as consensus versus hierarchical. 
Processes of accountability and scrutiny become important as the groups evolve and develop a 
deeper history and knowledge of collective governance.  
 
Finally, the chapter explores the experiences of rule creation and rule change. Older groups have 
very particular experiences and stories around the sorts of rules that have been created and how 
they have changed. These lessons have been incorporated in the newer groups’ experiences in 
forms of institutional flexibility, where groups can critically self-assess themselves as part of an 
ongoing process of institutional evolution, integral to the group’s collective governance process.  
 
Most accounts are individual and subjective, and there were often contradictory accounts of the 
same processes. However, of particular interest is the reflexive nature of how people relate to 
their organisations as much as their own accounts of their groups’ governance structures. These 
accounts are all useful to understand not only the specific rules, norms and practices which mutual 
housing groups have evolved and are currently using, but also the wider implications of what 
forms of community are being created by these groups. It seems that a group’s process of 
developing rules and practices is also an activity that creates knowledge within the group – 
knowledge of how to live in a mutual way, through institutions of co-operation and practices of 
‘commoning’. The next chapter will explore these topics more thoroughly, through the narratives 
and experiences of the interviewees. 
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Chapter 9 
 
 
Aspects of mutualism: Community, knowledge and living together 
 
 
We want to imagine, instead, community as a process of coming into 
the world, a process in which people work out both the value of face-
to-face relations and the limits on those relations.  
(Sennett, 2012, p.273) 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The last of the empirical chapters brings together some of the overarching, more abstract themes 
that emerged from the case study interviews. It explores the impact and outcomes of mutual 
housing collective governance by considering the themes of community, knowledge and 
mutualism. These points correspond to the last point in the theoretical framework derived from 
Ostrom (Fig.6) regarding the ways in which knowledge is shared and trust is developed within the 
group. I explore community creation and the shaping of groups at a collective level, which are 
aspects of community-making. Using the more personal and subjective accounts, I reflect on some 
aspects of mutualism and of living together, which include reflections of personal change and 
diversity within the groups.  
  
The previous chapter focussed on the micro-practices of collective governance. These micro-
practices have in turn shaped (and been shaped by) the group’s own sense of community: how 
people consider that their groups’ identities are formed, their trajectory and evolution, and how 
they might see their futures. Furthermore, the main factors for the crafting of micro-practices are 
the groups’ knowledge and trust-forming activities that develop different forms of knowledge 
regarding self-management, as well as increase the levels of internal trust within the groups. These 
factors are the basis of finding mutual ways of living, including how groups deal with conflicts 
and risks, as explored in the previous chapter.  
 
  
9.2 Mutual housing as community-making 
 
The first section of this chapter looks at some of the narratives of community that emerged from 
the interviews. When I use the word ‘community’, I refer to the mutual housing group itself and 
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how the people in the groups see themselves in relationship to the wider urban social and political 
landscape. The interviews show what people within the mutual housing group think of the group 
and its trajectory, through their accounts of living together and creating a community. Exploring 
how members of the group conceive and talk about their community adds to the understanding 
of what Amin (2005, p.624) describes as “an alternative and less instrumentalist understanding of 
the local-social, which, in turn implies a very different approach to local regeneration based on a 
wider conceptualization of the society of commitments and connections”. Here the accounts 
move away from using community as a normative descriptor, either related to community 
cohesion, social capital, community participation, or spatially circumscribed society of 
commitments (Amin, 2005). The emphasis is shifted to how “the activities within communities 
[can play] a vital role in the construction of the larger political economy and also makes them 
inherently interconnected with other realms not normally talked about as community per se” 
(DeFilippis, Fisher and Shragge, 2006, p.685). In addition, this echoes how the “meanings, roles 
and political implications of community are not predetermined by the larger structures of 
contemporary capitalism or even by the language and invocation of community itself” (DeFilippis, 
Fisher and Shragge, 2006, p.685), thus adding to the problematisation of ‘community’ and the 
potential ‘tyranny of community’ (see Joseph 2002). In going beyond both the neo-communitarian 
romancers and the limitations of regulationists, it was clear that groups felt the pressures of 
contemporary economic and social forces and how these affect the mutual housing groups and 
the individuals involved within them. As DeFilippis et al. (2006, p. 685) write, it is within this 
context that these groups create strategies to build effective and progressive practices.   
 
 
9.2.1 Community created 
 
The narratives around the creation of community related to how the members of mutual groups 
conceived and talked about the creation and development of their groups. In most cases, there 
were initial pressures to become a group from both internal and external sources. In GUHC, for 
example, the original group developed a strong sense of community through its squatting 
activities, and subsequent external pressures such as threatened eviction and demolition 
encouraged them to organise themselves as a formal group. An additional external incentive was 
the availability of grant funding (see Chapter 6). At the same time, the setting-up process fostered 
a sense of cohesion within the group, stimulated by internal factors and processes such as 
discussions, meetings and mutual support: 
 
In those days, things were simpler … [we] got a few policies, filled in a form, went for it. The main thing 
is if you can show you've got meetings going, they are minuted, you were 99 per cent of the way there. We 
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certainly had a lot of very good meetings and it was very cohesive … Everyone was involved very much – it 
became a community at that point because of the meetings. [B. from GUHC] 
 
Other people also mentioned meetings as a way of forming community, as places where they 
would meet other people and feel part of what was happening. Thus, in the case of Backdoor 
Housing Co-operative: 
 
The executive makes the point that you must go [to monthly meetings]. And if you don’t go, you must 
apologise because they want to keep everything going. So, it’s a good practice to go and the point is that if 
you don’t go there must be a very valid reason. There are many people that don’t attend that much and if 
they are old tenants that pay regularly their rent, I don’t think they get punished. But I usually go. Because 
I think it’s nice. And you meet people as well. [T. from Backdoor] 
 
The danger of community is exemplified by the generalised risk of simultaneously excluding 
external non-group members and demonstrating authoritarianism towards those within the group 
by imposing a degree of conformity and the denial of diversity (Iveson, 1998, p.25), which some 
have called the ‘communitarian conundrum’ (DeFilippis, Fisher and Shragge, 2006, p.685). Young 
(2011) argues that “if community is a positive norm, (…) if existing together with others in 
relations of mutual understanding and reciprocity is the goal, then it is understandable that we 
exclude and avoid those with whom we do not or cannot identify” (2011, p.235). Sennett (1970) 
and Joseph (2002) articulated similar critiques of community. When the emphasis is placed on 
what is shared in common, because of the inherent sameness, the group ignores difference, 
hierarchy and hence can help foster forms of oppression.  
 
In the case of mutual housing groups, it seems that underpinning the formation of community – 
or the sense of community – is not so much conformity to some shared values, but rather to 
shared needs. In some groups, it is clearly the cheapness of the accommodation or housing on 
offer. The shared need has fostered what someone called “a sense of loyalty to the group” [S. from 
Backdoor], also expressed as friendship, as a result also of meeting others in the group to work 
through problems together, supporting each other and even organising parties or other shared 
activities. Naturally, not all the people in the group are friends, but there is an assumption that if 
the mutual housing is to work, somehow people will establish good relationships and negotiate 
their differences: 
 
We didn’t all see eye to eye, it wouldn't be natural if you did, but we all got on, in our own way. I said, 
'you don't act like you look,' that type of thing, you got to know one another, and it was really, really good. 
[I. from GUHC] 
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For newer groups that are in the process of formation, this aspect of friendship and support is 
also translated into forms of self-selection during the development stages. As there is always much 
to do together during common work activities when the members get to know each other, this 
also becomes part of a group selection process:  
 
It was the whole process of doing things together and developing it together – that is part of the selection 
process or de-selection process. Most co-housing people don’t go into co-housing, they deselect themselves from 
the group because they realise this isn’t how they want to live. [G. from Woodside] 
 
The process of setting up as a group is so intensive, lengthy and laborious that it also becomes a 
space to look more carefully at how members want to live together and manage themselves: 
 
[The] softer side of things, which knits people together. They got to know each other well. They wanted to 
live together before they’ve [finished] the actual building, [including] planning permissions, building prices, 
and all the rest of it and how you finance the whole thing. [J.W. from Woodside] 
 
These projects have been building up for years, which allows for a longer period for the “softer side 
of things” [J.W. from Woodside] to develop: 
 
This is about community wealth-building, this is not just about homes. Homes give people the security to 
then sort their lives out. [S. from Brixton Green] 
 
OWCH members, who moved into their new homes in January 2017, had evolved their 
membership procedures over the previous five years, developing a process to choose future 
members of the community: 
 
[There have been] disastrous women in the group over the years... [who] have self-selected themselves out on 
the whole or had a bit of a nudge. [OWCH] set up the selection procedure, which is that you have to come 
to three meetings, three gatherings, you have to show an interest in learning about co-housing and in the 
group, and you are assigned a buddy who is your contact point and who explains stuff to you and then if 
you are interested in becoming a member then you fill in an application form and then you are interviewed 
by two women from the group. [C. from OWCH] 
 
The process has allowed OWCH to create a more stable membership by allowing new members 
to integrate into the group, while also allowing older members to feel rooted. The intention is 
ultimately to be able to create a community where the “micro-tensions of living together” [S. from 
Brixton Green] can be negotiated. The process of creating such a community was difficult, as 
acknowledged by most interviewees, and required a lot of work “pulling it together – all the elements 
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are not new but as a whole it is” [C. from LCHC]. Much of the work in achieving this depends on the 
expertise to be found within the group. For example, LCHC was formed from a group of home 
educators and community activists who had been working together for over 20 years, with useful 
shared skills. In most groups, there are also particular individuals who tend to be the drivers, 
especially initially. In the newer groups (i.e. Woodside, OWCH, LCHC, Brixton Green), these 
individuals were clearly identifiable, and some of the stories of the groups’ origins reflected this. 
Co-housing Woodside:  
 
Started [with] two people … their back garden backs on to the site, so they were aware of it. [They] had 
already been very much involved in co-housing and already owned property in a co-housing in Stroud so they 
were very knowledgeable about co-housing... and then there was a group of local people who knew them … 
and there must have been probably 30 of us or so who started meeting roughly monthly. [G. from 
Woodside] 
 
The discussions underlined the importance of the role of leaders in the start-up of communities 
as well as the role of meetings. For example, OWCH resulted from a workshop presenting 
research into co-housing: 
 
So out of that initial workshop with women of different groups, about 6 or 8 women emerged and we went 
off to a pub and said let’s stop talking about doing this and let’s do it. [C. from OWCH] 
 
Another example is Brixton Green, whose sense of direction as a group developed by drawing on 
ideas from the wider community through a series of deliberative workshops (Melhuish, 2015). 
These so-called action planning workshops occurred in a series of meetings (twelve in total) that 
took place at the Lambeth Volunteer Centre in Brixton covering four themes – housing and 
communal spaces; health, education and culture; employment and training; and long-term 
management. In November 2013, a second programme of public workshops was launched by the 
Brixton Green Trust to discuss in more detail procurement models, legal structures for managing 
community assets, housing tenures, finance structures, and developing the brief and criteria for 
the selection of a design and development team (Melhuish, 2015).  
 
Workshops were also used by ELCLT to engage and develop a sense of a community on a longer-
term basis: 
 
We want to open up the front building and have a planning café where people can come in one weekend and 
contribute to the design and to what’s going on… The front building, which is actually quite perfect to 
isolate and at the back – get as much use as we can in there. The CLT needs to have some sort of public 
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presence on the site and then there’s one other hall which is quite big which we’ll use for on-site events or 
shows ...and try and get as much use out of it. [T. from ELCLT] 
 
The aim of using the format of engagement workshops in the initial stages of building a project 
is not only a way of bringing people together but also a way to overcome the physical distances 
that typify a dispersed community. The same applies to group meetings and parties. The 
importance of spatial location for the formation of community was highlighted by the example of 
GUHC, which is territorially spatially concentrated: 
 
I can see if someone’s roof has fallen in and neighbours are neighbours. A co-op that is more fractured, they 
would have more difficulty. Basically, if we can't run a co-op in this little area like that, it's not able to be 
done. I can see how some might have difficulties being a very fractured set of properties … you can just stand 
up here and survey your estate. [B. from GUHC] 
 
More dispersed mutual housing groups (e.g. Backdoor and other short-life housing groups) have 
to find innovative ways of functioning as a community as well as dealing with the challenge of 
dispersal.  
 
Another interesting aspect of community formation is the relation that groups have with the 
surrounding community. In particular, the CLT projects are based on a model of community 
organising and they need to involve people from the surrounding community. Hence, the building 
of a CLT is based on community organising. In the case of ELCLT, for example, this has meant 
developing strong alliances of institutions using the London Citizens forum in the area and 
including schools, churches, and mosques, as well as tenants’ and residents’ associations and park 
users. Brixton Green, in contrast, has focussed on cultural institutions and business alliances as 
well as residents’ organisations. Such links give the groups a strong support, and in addition a 
form of accountability as the project develops and the community changes. As a result, a sense of 
community emerges based on the strategic and evolving relations within the group and in relation 
to their context - spatially as well as institutionally rather than on conformity and hence exclusion.  
 
 
9.2.2 Community change 
 
The mutual housing groups’ members were aware of the changes both among the members and 
to the wider area:  
 
Well, basically we’re not hippies anymore. We’ve grown up, and some people grow up gracefully and some 
people grow up disgracefully. [B. from GUHC] 
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When discussing how their community had changed, reference was often made by interviewees 
to external changes in the wider, surrounding area, where the mutual housing group was located. 
North Kensington, where Backdoor is located, used to be very different. When the co-operative 
was set up: 
 
It was much rougher ... and Caribbean immigrants had their own kind of sub-culture - Notting Hill 
Carnival and everything. […] This was really a vibrant place in the 80s and 90s and it's gradually got 
less so ... not entirely, but if you go down the pubs in Portobello Road, it's not so much the locals now as 
tourists… it's not as arty as it was… It was very much more bohemian, it's been squeezed out …. Our 
co-op – and other smaller co-ops – have really contributed to that local diversity and they've really helped 
people. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
Most people spoke about the changes in their area and how it had impacted on their own 
community. For both Sanford, near Deptford in Lewisham, and Grand Union, in Bethnal Green, 
Tower Hamlets, there was an awareness of the privilege that the housing co-operatives could 
represent to local neighbours since, over the last fifteen years, house prices as reflected in the 
rental values nearby have increased out of all proportion to those of the housing co-operative. 
One interviewee from Sanford, who had returned to the co-operative after a five-year absence, 
noticed the changes to the surrounding area: 
 
It has definitely changed. It is different and there are different dynamics. It could be something to do with 
gentrification of New Cross. It’s become more trendy and expensive even though contrasted with seven or 
eight years ago when people didn’t know where New Cross was... It has killed a lot of the actual real 
character of the area, a lot of the music scene has died out, just gone even further under. There used to be 
many venues and local bars… and now it’s gastropubs, student bars, certainly a lot of the places are more 
expensive now. [N. from Sanford] 
 
Having said that, they did point out that more people in the co-op pay rent now as more people 
work, and there is a different ethos within the co-op. The older mutual housing groups 
commented on the way most groups have become more democratic. Past key figureheads or 
leaders have stepped back and allowed new people to be involved, while an increasing need for 
transparency, including audits of accounts, has resulted in governance procedures becoming both 
more formalised and professionalised. Some members even referred to themselves as having 
become more middle-class and materialistic, with the result that individuals in the group have 
become more self-interested:  
 
186 
 
Now it’s ‘You’ve got that, did you know she’s got …etc.’ which they all say doesn’t happen, but it does and 
it's not nice. There's a lot of jealousy and it's not the same … it was lovely. [R. from GUHC] 
 
Therefore, mutual groups’ changes reflect the changes in the surrounding community as well as 
more structural social changes in society. All the older mutual housing groups clearly had a sense 
of shared history and of a trajectory that the community had gone through, which of course the 
newer groups do not necessarily have. The newer groups, on the other hand, talked about changes 
within their groups during setting up. This included, for example, how particular policies were 
introduced or changed, or how the introduction of new forms of decision-making affected the 
group as it grew larger, as time was prioritised over the need to foster trust between members:  
 
There evolved a bit of a split then, where I think their approach was more along the lines of traditional 
work place – not democratic but more of a hierarchical approach. Whereas the approach we had started 
with most of us were happy with as it was more the consensus decision-making model, very flat, accepting 
that there might be very long meetings with no clear-cut decisions being made but that helped us getting to 
know each other, whereas the other approach was much more decisive and ready to go to a vote – a majority 
vote – which the consensus crew felt was something to be avoided and it was about talking through, and 
that became increasingly an element of the split between different groups and I think that led to and was 
one of the main reasons why most of the group left. [G. from Woodside] 
 
Thus, for Co-housing Woodside, there were distinct waves of people leaving and arriving because 
of internal disagreements on decision-making models. At the same time, there was also a shifting 
relationship with the housing association and developer, and price uncertainties for the proposed 
housing. In other groups, such as ELCLT, there was an important change in the composition of 
the Board between the campaigning phases and development with new members co-opted onto 
the Board to reflect the changing set of challenges and the group needing accountants and lawyers.  
 
Brixton Green had a very small group running the project initially and engagement with the wider 
community in its formative stages was important to build the group and to engage more widely 
with people in the area, particularly when it was working together with the council to reach the 
planning stages for the project. Looking back on this process, the interviewee realised that: 
 
Maybe a lesson from that [process] was that we weren’t having a wider conversation enough about [the 
future] but it was difficult to do that when the council weren’t really… thinking about it and were just so 
concentrated on getting the planning application. That’s another big lesson for other projects in future… to 
make sure that there is a long-term strategic work stream [with] resources, energy and thought, as [well as] 
getting something through planning. [S. from Brixton Green] 
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The point made here is the strategic importance of how the community plans for its future.  
  
 
9.2.3 Community future 
 
The future was touched on briefly during interviews. For the newer groups, the future was 
uncertain as they had, in general, not yet moved into their housing or found land for their project 
(LCHC) and were aware of the multiple challenges and uncertainties that still lay along the way. 
For older groups, the issue of the future was laden with a different set of uncertainties, mainly 
related to national-level housing policy decisions that could affect them, but also at the same time 
their own sense of agency (or lack of) in shaping future directions of housing policy. Backdoor, 
as a short-life housing co-operative, for example, relies on new flats to replace its old ones. 
However, it has now realised that it will inevitably have to shrink in the future because most of its 
properties are now concentrated on one particular estate, which is being redeveloped.  
 
Both older and newer groups had concerns regarding future outreach with the wider community. 
Sanford near Deptford in Lewisham appointed an outreach officer to establish links with local 
schools and with a nearby housing estate, as local perceptions of the housing co-operative had 
not been very positive in the past. It has also hosted local film festivals in the communal building 
and helped fund a local music festival. The outreach team has also been involved in London-wide 
campaigns for better housing, campaigning both locally against gentrification and the Housing 
and Planning Bill 2016. These were all concerns that were raised often by most groups in the 
discussions and also at their meetings.  
 
The effort to connect the activities of mutual housing groups with wider housing campaigns has 
resulted in some London-wide umbrella groups organising specifically around these issues. The 
London Co-operative Housing Group has prepared a report from the perspective of housing co- 
operatives on the future of London housing (LCHG, 2017). The London Federation of Housing 
Co-operatives has also organised a series workshops during 2016 on issues related to the Housing 
and Planning Act 2016. 
 
Some groups have been interested in seeing how they could support other groups in the future, 
either by providing financial assistance (see Section 7.4) or other types of support: 
 
What I want to do with the works committee is explore what we can do to help set up a new co-op. Not 
physically, [but] in terms of recruiting and the process … For example, presenting the business and social 
case for co-ops over other housing [to the council]. Quite a tough task. [S. from GUHC] 
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The outward-looking perspective expressed here is notable for the generosity shown towards 
sharing their experience in concrete, practical ways. While this is not a typical occurrence within 
the housing co-operative movement it is noticeably more evident within the newer co-housing 
and Community Land Trust groups. Many interviews, as well as events such as the meetings of 
the London Federation of Housing Co-operatives commented on the widespread tendency 
amongst older groups to be inward-looking. This was one of the primary motivations leading to 
the formation of the London Co-operative Housing Group (LCHG, 2017).  
 
Finally, a general issue to consider for the future will be the demographic changes in society 
leading to differences in both socio-economic conditions and lifestyles. For example, two mutual 
housing projects examined in this thesis have focussed on housing for older people (OWCH and 
Woodside) while another group provides communal housing only to single people (Sanford). An 
indication of the importance which demographic considerations will have in the future is to 
consider the growing importance of the so-called ‘baby-boomer generation’. In some cases, this 
generation is fulfilling caring roles for their “cash-strapped younger generation and their children” [G. from 
Woodside], but they will increasingly need more care themselves as they grow older. This does 
offer an opportunity, which some scholars have reflected on (Brenton, 2013; Labit, 2015; Brenton, 
1998; Glass, 2009), but also mirrors a widening of inter-generational inequality within some 
demographic strata: 
 
The future includes … this older generation of baby boomers downsizing… [That is] what is happening 
in [Co-housing] Woodside in terms of having the flats designed for older people. [Housing associations] see 
there is a certain amount of capital and that’s an opportunity [for them] …The developers Savills also see 
that and I think what we are worried about is that it’s going to exacerbate this division between the 
generations because at the same time that there are all these wonderful, luxurious flats… for the downsizing 
equity-rich owners, those of us who have children, we are looking for flats in the same neighbourhood. Savills 
and others could use the downsizing money to build flats for us as 60 years olds to move into as a co-housing 
unit near where our children live. [G. from Woodside] 
 
The point being made here (by a privileged ‘baby boomer’) is that, by not considering inter-
generational needs at a neighbourhood level, future opportunities to create more integrated inter-
generational communities using ‘grey equity’, could be missed. The same could apply to pension 
funds or other investment sources for future housing (see Chapter 7 for further discussion on 
‘grey equity’).  
 
Other important socio-economic demands, in addition to inter-generational factors, include the 
increasing need for cheap (or affordable) housing, the inclusion of work spaces within more 
flexible domestic spaces, and increasing the environmental considerations within house building. 
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These are all factors that most of the mutual housing group cases have been designing into their 
schemes and have been developing knowledge around. The following section will focus on these 
forms of knowledge that have developed in mutual housing groups, and that are part of their 
governance: they can also be called skills for living together. 
 
 
9.3 Mutual housing as collective knowledge 
 
The knowledge needed for living together develops over time through members’ involvement in 
the collective governance process. In planning terms, the practice of knowing implies an 
interrelationship between the theoretical forms of knowledge needed, the technical knowledge, 
the moral choices involved and the practical doing, through “a dynamic process that is situated 
and provisional, collective and distributed, pragmatic and purposive, and mediated and contested” 
(Davoudi, 2015, p.318).  
For mutual housing, the knowledge needed includes technical skills, such as book-keeping, 
accounting, dealing with legal issues, fixing boilers or repairing roofs, as well as much softer skills 
such as group decision-making, mediation and facilitation. The group also has a collective form 
of knowledge – an institutional knowledge – which is dependent on forms of trust between 
members and is developed through shared activities such as governance activities, as well as 
campaigning, dealing with internal group conflicts and coping with risks (see Section 8.2.6). This 
section will explore the aspects of knowledge raised during the interviews and the ways in which 
people in mutual housing groups have developed their specific skills, including through training 
and other activities.  
 
 
9.3.1 Knowledge and skills for collective governance 
 
Clearly, the knowledge needed to run a mutual housing group involves both technical as well as 
social elements. Each group must work out for themselves what they want to do and how they 
want to do it: “You can’t force people to co-operate…you can’t force blueprints onto people” [M. from CCH]. 
However, it was evident during the interviews that training in management, committee skills and 
finance had been useful for the members.  
 
For some groups, however, even such basic steps as knowing what the Co-operative Principles 
are could be a useful starting point in developing the knowledge for self-management within 
groups. Principles 7 and 8 concern co-operative education and supporting other co-operatives 
(see Fig. 1 in Chapter 2). While some mutual housing groups are not explicitly co-operatives, the 
Principles are useful to help strengthen the ethos of the group and to demonstrate that there is a 
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wider impact on the group beyond simply paying the rent. Therefore, some mutual housing 
groups have adopted these Principles more than others: 
 
With a lot of co-ops, it just becomes ‘Me and my house. Me and my space’ and that’s it…In Sanford there 
are a handful [of people] that are trying to make co-ops a bit more part of New Cross and actually promoting 
[them] through grants to community groups could be useful in New Cross... The good thing about Sanford 
is that people care about where they live and what happens to their resources. [N. from Sanford] 
 
One simple way for people to gain necessary skills is through involvement in management – 
including volunteering or attending committee meetings. Members pointed out that even a basic 
understanding of meeting protocols is helpful as they know how to behave and debate issues. It 
was noted that a divide can emerge between those involved and those who are not – a gap of 
knowledge: 
 
You have to bridge this gap of being involved to know what it’s like to be involved. You can have those that 
don’t want to participate and those that don’t know. It is a very big learning curve. I think many people 
benefit from going through that whole process. [N. from Sanford] 
 
Some groups have organised specific training tailored for the management committee members 
– a form of introductory course into their new roles once they start. Newer groups, such as Co-
housing Woodside, have developed a weekend-long introductory course for people interested in 
joining the group, and have had visits to other schemes as part of the learning process. One of 
the newer mutual groups has had away-weekends once a year at a rural housing co-operative. 
Workshops at the last away-weekend explored the theme of ‘privilege’ and participants discussed 
some of the social and economic barriers that existed, how they applied to their group, and how 
issues of class and race intertwined.  
  
Some mutual housing groups (GUHC and Sanford) have allocated a training budget to send 
people on courses which interest them and could also benefit the group. Sanford, in addition to 
its training budget, has a training officer who coordinates requests from individuals and organises 
training sessions for the whole group. The group has had fire training, mediation, permaculture, 
and boiler and bicycle maintenance: 
 
We sent one of our members on a bike maintenance training course and then he came back and [now] every 
weekend the bike workshop is open and people will bring their bikes along because there’s a lot of people 
that cycle in this road and we opened it to the community, as well, so sometimes we get kids from the estate 
coming over with their bikes to get them fixed, which is pretty nice. [T. from Sanford] 
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Newer groups, such as Co-housing Woodside, felt that they had had a form of training because 
of their involvement with the architectural design process: 
 
Because what we would do was get down to the nitty-gritty of the layout and we learned a lot about Lifetime 
Architecture – that you have to have doorways which are wide enough for wheelchairs so that even although 
you are not a wheelchair user it is already ready for a wheelchair – to make it liveable for the future. That 
was really an eye opener and great training for us, because you realise these things are important … thinking 
about a place [where] you want to live for potentially a long time. [G. from Woodside] 
LCHC has a build day twice a month, where volunteers come and meet current members. The 
group is currently building a straw-bale prototype house in the back garden of one of the 
members, experimenting with the materials and using the opportunity to get to know one another. 
The idea of training-in-building has also been used by LILAC in Leeds. Future tenants were 
involved in the building process, which increased a sense of ownership (Chatterton 2014), an 
important feature in the self-build movement (Hamiduddin and Gallent, 2016; Brown et al., 2013).  
 
Groups had training sessions on understanding financial models and legal issues, using knowledge 
within the group and from outside. OWCH, Co-housing Woodside and LCHC used knowledge 
within the group from individuals with relevant professional experience – for example, teachers 
of social planning or development, home educators and housing policy advisers. Other members 
spoke about their experiences within activism as having been a form of training. In one case, a 
member’s attention had been focussed on external political activism without realising that, on 
their own doorstep, there was the chance to be involved in a social experiment on a much more 
local scale [S. from GUHC]. In a similar way, members of OWCH who had been involved in the 
feminist movement brought those skills to the group and group building exercises, motivational 
techniques and counselling were shared with other members. 
 
It is also important to recognise that much of the knowledge that arises from these experiences is 
transmitted beyond the individual group. For example, during the establishment of OWCH, it 
was estimated that over 4,000 women came through, became involved, but did not necessarily 
stay. Some of them will have acquired useful skills and awareness that will be applied elsewhere. 
The volunteering during the set-up phases has also increased awareness among people other than 
those directly involved in what the mutual groups are trying to achieve. The external support for 
the group projects has been important, especially in more community-orientated projects such as 
ELCLT, Brixton Green and LCHC, where other forms of knowledge, such as food growing, 
alternative education, environmental and community projects are brought in. 
 
However, what strikes some of the people interviewed is the lack of awareness, outside the mutual 
housing groups, of these housing models, including housing co-operatives. One member pointed 
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out that, considering how many MPs are either property owners or are landlords, there is an 
understandable lack of awareness among politicians regarding housing alternatives (Foster, 2016). 
This, in spite of how the mutual housing model ought to appeal to both sides of the political 
debate: 
 
Co-ops … are something that should be able to appeal not just to socialist, Labour types, but to the 
Conservative Party’s thought because they are not reliant on the State. It’s actually people doing it for 
themselves…So I think it’s something that if education is there, if people are educated and especially now 
that we are in another crisis and loads of housing needs to be built and co-ops are not even in the mindset. 
[S. from GUHC] 
 
This quote highlights how mutual housing is seen as ‘people doing it themselves’ – and therefore 
should appeal to different parts of the political spectrum.6 At the same time, this trope raises the 
question of why should such housing need political support if people are doing it themselves? As 
has been shown in previous chapters, especially those dealing with land and finance, external 
institutional support and facilitation from government, local authorities, banks and other housing 
organisations are important. However, another more basic form of support includes developing 
knowledge and a culture around mutual housing outside the niche it currently inhabits. That is 
one of the main roles of the umbrella organisations for mutual housing – for example, Co-ops 
UK., CCH, CDS Co-ops, the National CLT Network, UK Co-housing, Radical Routes – which 
all carry out knowledge sharing, dissemination, advocacy and research.  
 
CCH provides support and advisory services to organisations on governance difficulties and 
policy development. For example, they produced a Code of Governance in 2001, jointly with the 
National Housing Federation, and revised it in 2012 (Lambert, 2012a). In parallel, their work on 
accreditation for housing co-operatives and management service agencies supporting housing co-
operatives includes a checklist and self-assessment risk analysis model. The umbrella organisations 
have also come together in different ways over the past five years, to promote knowledge of 
mutual housing and find ways of supporting new initiatives. CCH has worked directly with local 
authorities, seeking to develop mutual housing schemes in their own way. They have also worked 
closely with the Welsh Assembly to develop specific policies around new co-operative and mutual 
homes. In 2009, the Commission on Co-operative and Mutual Housing was set up and included 
the National Housing Federation, the Chartered Institute of Housing, CCH, Co-operatives UK, 
a representative from the International Co-operative Alliance and others. A study was carried out 
which had the remit of producing research into the models of mutual housing (Bliss 2009). In 
                                                            
6 Co-operatives are appreciated across the political spectrum: “There is nothing fundamentally radical or 
progressive about co-operatives: their supporters include, after all, Norman Tebbit” (Fox, 2012). Whether 
this is a factor that makes them a more supported solution for housing remains uncertain.  
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December 2016, CDS Co-operatives, the CLT Network and the UK Co-housing Network agreed 
on a formal collaboration supporting community-led housing groups across the UK, following 
the announcement in the 2016 Spring Budget of an annual fund of £60 million, as well as special 
provision for the sector in the Mayor of London's latest affordable housing prospectus (Lawrence, 
2016). 
 
Another umbrella organisation that supports housing co-operatives, and with which both LCHC 
and Sanford are affiliated, is the Radical Routes network. This is a network of housing and other 
co-operatives which are committed to ‘radical social change’ in some form. What constitutes the 
‘radical social change’ commitment required of individual members is a source of regular debate 
and discussion at gatherings (Fox, 2012, p.18). Radical Routes member co-operatives hold 
quarterly ‘gatherings’ – essentially democratic management meetings, where Radical Routes 
member co-operatives decide on the policies, practices and principles of their own organisation. 
Their gatherings are also important forums to share knowledge and provide support among the 
affiliated housing and other co-operatives. In addition, they have been providing financial support 
in the form of loan stock funding (see Chapter 7).  
 
Groups have also been organising at a more local level. A South London housing co-operative 
meet-up was held in Deptford, and sharing our impressions afterwards, one co-operative member 
said: 
 
I felt quite rejuvenated. We were able to share problems, share knowledge and ideas, and find support as 
well. And maybe even work out some of the solutions ourselves in that meeting. [N. from Sanford]  
 
Similarly, LCHC organised, together with the Building and Social Housing Foundation (BSHF), 
a series of events around the country that brought together planners, financiers, politicians and 
housing experts. During the period between 2014 and 2016, they held a series of workshops on 
different topics, including formulating rules for community housing developers and necessary 
changes in the law to support community-led projects in housing. Similarly, OWCH was very 
keen to emphasise how they see themselves as trailblazing their model of older persons’ co-
housing as a “self-determining, self-governing community” and that, integral to their experience, 
they see themselves as sharing their experiences and lessons to help educate other older people.  
 
Brixton Green has been collaborating with the BSHF, UK CLT Network and the Confederation 
of Co-operative Housing (CCH). They perceive themselves as the local testing ground of ideas 
developed with these external organisations. East London CLT has certainly been pioneering in 
their use of local-level campaign methods and close working with local community groups, 
through the London Citizens network, especially faith-based groups. There was also the 
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involvement of key individuals (Paterson and Dayson, 2011). In a way, they view themselves as a 
form of social movement, and gather individuals and organisations, who in some cases are not 
necessarily ideologically driven but are local activists with their own motivations and can apply 
the CLT idea to their context (see Alinsky, 1971; Hill, 2015). The launch last year of London CLT 
as an umbrella organisation signals their intention to scale up their activity, building new local 
organisations for the development of CLTs (Mullins and Moore, 2013). 
 
One aspect which was touched on in a few interviews concerned learning from the groups that 
failed or had not done so well. There was an awareness of how some groups had become too big 
or dispersed when expanding, and had failed to keep their accounts, or had de-mutualised, taking 
advantage of changes in housing policy to exercise their Right to Buy. Sanford members recalled 
the years when they had had a number of tenants in arrears, putting the whole housing co-
operative at risk. GUHC also had had a number of years when they had governance issues and 
they twice had to impeach their chairpersons (see Section 8.2.2).  
 
Finally, the accounts gathered in this work were from groups that, because of their very existence, 
have had some degree of success. The sort of knowledge that can be found is of relative success, 
even though there is also a degree of uniqueness to each case study: 
 
I think that if you went and met with people who were in the co-operatives that ended up folding up and 
closing down, you probably get a completely different perspective and they may not have ever embarked on a 
co-operative model or would ever again, because they might think that would work out badly. [M. from 
CCH]  
 
One factor at the heart of successful mutual housing projects was trust within the group. The 
following section includes some observations on trust as a form of knowledge that runs as a 
common theme throughout all the groups as a way of reinforcing both the group and its collective 
identity.  
 
 
9.3.2 Building trust as a form of collective knowledge 
 
Another key to understanding the formation of the group, its identity and its ability to manage 
itself is linked to trust. While all the groups have shown that there were some important elements 
of trust that helped in running the group, there had also been moments in most groups when 
levels of trust had fallen as a result of some form of governance failure: mismanagement, increase 
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in rates of rent arrears, misbehaviour of individuals, or differing views on some aspect of running 
the group.  
 
For example, members of Backdoor recalled a period, some years ago, when the climate within 
the group had become ‘mistrustful’. There had been complaints about a lack of transparency and 
how this had been exaggerated through, what an interviewee called, a ‘strategy of paranoia’. The 
issues had eventually been resolved, but the incident is now recalled within the group as a clash 
of leaders’ egos and was rooted in group mismanagement. For that group, trust was also linked to 
loyalty, as both underpinned the collective decisions made by a mutual housing group. Loyalty by 
the group towards management was also needed. Evicting people at short notice (a minimum 
one-month notice) when the housing association demanded it needed a level of loyalty or trust 
towards management:  
 
We depend on a lot of loyalty and if people leave when we ask them to, even if we can't re-house them 
immediately, they know we'll keep them in mind and we will re-house them again, so they may have to go 
sofa-surfing for a while. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
This implies a level of trust that the short-life co-operative can continue to function with and not 
risk losing the group’s reputation with the housing association, despite the precariousness of 
individual tenure arrangements. Thus, trust and loyalty overlap – the loyalty from the management 
towards its members, and the trust of members towards the management. In the case of Backdoor, 
a clear contribution to building such bonds of trust and ensuring the group’s survival are the 
friendships linking members:  
 
Apparently, according to what people say, one of the reasons that this co-op lasted for so long was because 
friends presented other friends. In a way this is true, since you never know who is going to join. But if I 
guarantee for another friend, then they trust me. [M. from Backdoor] 
 
The concept of loyalty is closely linked to a feeling of pride in the group, which was evident in 
other interviews. Members reminding each other how proud they were of the achievements of 
the group and therefore how lucky they were. This also promotes a sense of loyalty and trust in 
one another. In the more difficult situations that have to be negotiated, such as dealing with rent 
arrears, a more understanding, trusting relationship has helped in most cases between whoever is 
in arrears and the mutual housing group. If there is a team dealing with the problem they can 
discuss issues in a more personal and directed way. For example, in GUHC, the tenancy sub-
committee discusses such cases, while in Sanford the cases are reviewed and discussed at the CoM, 
which is very different to the processes in Housing Associations or with council housing.  
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[It] helps because it’s not just a council who says you are out or sends official letters. [S. from GUHC] 
 
The fact that the group manages rent arrears and decisions on sanctions rather than the Council 
can help foster greater trust between members and management. Being able to interact with the 
people responsible for dealing with a problem is also trust-forming, for example, at Backdoor it 
is a question of ringing up the officer in charge of dealing with repairs or other issues. In GUHC, 
the office, located at the heart of the ‘Triangle’ (see fig.9), is open and people are able to visit and 
discuss their issues without needing an appointment. The interviews indicated that members were 
generally satisfied with the housing officers: 
 
It is just a matter of trying to keep all those things done without any favouritism …I think that's about as 
best as you can do to involve people and make them aware that if they’ve got a problem, say 'Well, join the 
committee, do something about it’. [B. from GUHC] 
 
Therefore, trust becomes the mechanism through which both a sense of ownership is established, 
and the group can develop their collective governance. The final section of this chapter will reflect 
on some of the narratives of living together in a mutual way and present somewhat more 
subjective considerations of the implications and effects on individuals of the collective action 
involved in the governance of mutual housing.  
 
 
9.4 Mutual housing as personal experience 
 
The final section of this chapter focusses on two specific themes raised during the interviews, 
which were related to more personal experiences of living together. They were themes that may 
be ignored in more functional or structuralist accounts of housing and include the individual’s 
own reflections on their own personal self, their changes and reflections on diversity within 
mutual housing groups. These are aspects of living together integral to the experience of collective 
governance of mutual housing and are part of the answer to the main research question of how 
mutual housing groups in London have overcome the problem of collective through self-
governance. Furthermore, they help answer, in a qualitative and descriptive way, why there is such 
a range of different mutual housing groups. Finally, these were themes that were not originally in 
the theoretical framework used derived from Ostrom’s work, as they emerged through the 
empirical work and analysis. 
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9.4.1 Reflections on personal change 
 
One striking element which emerged through the interviews was the more subjective and reflexive 
accounts of how members were affected by living in mutual housing or by being involved in a 
mutual housing project.7 Most people interviewed expressed in some way how the experience had 
changed them because of the life choices living there had allowed them to make:  
 
The co-op has given me the space to live – it’s all right for me to be me. This is quite deep at an emotional 
and psychological level. That might still be there. You can be friendly or unconventional or just be yourself. 
It’s slightly anarchistic – but we have somehow managed to go down the middle road. [#8 from GUHC] 
 
The interviewee recognised that there was some intrinsic quality inherent within the co-operative 
that allowed her to be herself: a place where people could be very energetic and become involved 
or feel they could live quietly. When asked about the impact of living in the short-life co-operative, 
Backdoor, one interviewee said: 
 
It is difficult to attribute your personality traits or state of mind to one thing in your life – it’s a massive 
mélange – but I’m sure it has helped me gain an insight into myself. It has put me in a group of people I 
wouldn’t have had a reason to hang out with, share stories with. I don’t invest hugely in it, apart from the 
Christmas and summer parties. [M. from Backdoor] 
 
Generally, older members spoke of how living in mutual housing had helped them because of the 
cheap rents, which had allowed them to have jobs or do training courses they would otherwise 
not have done. The quote below gives a sense of the social demography of the housing co-
operative and is also a comment on the changing access to housing more generally in the area:  
 
 [There was a] teacher, nurse, teacher, teacher, actor… and it was very interesting how many teachers were 
here, I was quite surprised actually. David does some teaching now, but he's a cameraman; I teach a bit 
now, he’s a teacher, next door's an antiques business, next door is a teacher and a drug/alcohol counsellor, 
Danny's a builder … it's quite interesting and I think if you look at teachers' wages at the moment and if 
you went and asked some of these people ‘Could you afford to live in the house?’, they couldn't. So, you 
would push even more of the key workers [out]. [P. from GUHC] 
 
                                                            
7 See Adams (2007), Self and social change, and Sennett (1999) The corrosion of character, as both are useful 
explorations of the notions of self in times of social change.  
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Another interesting reflection related to personal change with regards to learning. Everyone 
interviewed spoke about having learnt through their involvement and by living in mutual housing. 
Some members are now considered experts in the field of mutual housing: 
 
I’ve learnt a lot – and I’m the one that everybody comes to on senior co-housing. But we’ve just got one 
senior co-housing community [in the UK]. And the demand for it is enormous. This country is crying out 
for this model [and needs] the people with the vision and the finance, money and the policy clout… [C. 
from OWCH] 
 
Apart from members of the newer co-housing projects targeting over-55s, there were some 
poignant reflections on ageing within the group, especially from members of GUHC. The first 
members started living there in the 1970s and those still present, are now in their late 60s to late 
70s. They are being replaced by younger co-operators, either new or some second-generation 
members. This has resulted in an increase in age diversity within the mutual housing group. In the 
case of such older mutual housing groups, it is a sign of community continuity; other groups, such 
as Sanford and Backdoor have younger members only because of either their policy or because 
of the precarity of tenure in such a short-life co-operative. The diversity in age within mutual 
housing groups is also linked to other aspects of diversity, explored in the next section.  
 
A final point which emerges from the interviews was that the mutual housing groups offered 
spaces of refuge and shelter for people who felt they did not fit into mainstream society. The older 
housing co-operative members, whilst recounting their experiences of arriving and finding their 
group, would highlight the eccentricity of the people who lived there, especially in the early days. 
There was a sense that the co-operative was a space for diversity, and a way of ‘queering’ space. 
The newer groups were less inclined to talk about this diversity as most of the newer groups were 
more focussed in their appeal i.e. OWCH for older women and Woodside for older people. But 
nonetheless the issues of gender and diversity are worth exploring further.  
 
 
9.4.2 Issues of gender and diversity 
 
A range of issues, which could be classified as aspects of diversity, emerged in members’ accounts. 
This included diversity of age, gender, class and race. The issue of age, which has been briefly 
touched on in the previous section, arose in two ways: the first in relation to the older mutual 
housing groups and their changing demography, and the second because of the two examples of 
mutual housing groups that specifically target older people – OWCH and Co-housing Woodside. 
For OWCH (Older Women Co-housing), their target was in housing for women aged over 55 
and demand during the project’s development increased in part because of considerable media 
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coverage. OWCH found that it had to develop a selection procedure to have an equitable 
distribution with women of different ages and an equal age profile as well as levels of potential 
involvement: 
 
We have to have agreed processes for involving these women, because already they are coming in at 79 or 80 
and the reaction is they are too old…And we didn’t think we would have to face that until the group moved 
in and did an assessment of the age profile and took a view. But actually, with the whole load of women 
flooding the group, we have to have some equitable procedures [for selection]. [C. from OWCH] 
 
An advantage for OWCH of having so many applications was that it became possible to create a 
supporters’ network or club for non-resident members. Also, for Co-housing Woodside, the age 
limitations became a problem during the early stages of the project development: 
 
A few of us were happy and positive about excluding people below the age of 55 but most of us thought it 
was a complete no goer and were willing to compromise on that, (but) it was a really big compromise … 
and one of the main reasons we left was because there was this age gap, this age-lack of diversity and I 
particularly don’t want to be in co-housing situation where we are restricting it to mainly older people as I 
want to have my next generation and the generation below that. [G. from Woodside] 
 
As the interviewee explained, some people were in favour of more inter-generational co-housing 
and wanted to welcome younger people, particularly if they had children and grandchildren of 
their own. Others from the same group were more interested in finding and developing purely 
senior co-housing, as opposed to developing a more inter-generational model. However, the 
partnership with Hanover Housing, an older people’s housing association, and the subsequent 
planning application that specified older people’s housing, eventually defined the group as 
providing housing only for people aged over 55.  
 
OWCH, on the other hand, from the outset was clear that it was for older and single women. The 
group was more interdependent than other co-housing groups as they needed each other more 
because they were not applying as family units or as couples. Interestingly, the interdependency 
was also stronger in Sanford as it has remained a co-operative for single, young people, but in 
shared houses of eight or nine members.  
 
Another theme of diversity briefly touched on during discussions was class. The co-housing 
projects were attractive to people with professional backgrounds, who generally had equity capital 
to invest, who had professional skills they could use and saw the option of living closely with 
others as a positive, even idealistic, proposition. The older co-operatives had also tended to attract 
middle-class people, although in GUHC there was a strong presence of working-class members 
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born in the Bethnal Green area. Commenting on the changes in the co-operative over the last 
twenty years, one interviewee claimed that they had become more middle-class, affluent, 
materialistic and even more individualistic, which had affected how the group was run now. As 
members became wealthier, they also tended to demand more from the co-operative in terms of 
standards of service, kitchen and bathroom amenities, and were less likely to provide the sort of 
reciprocal mutuality that had originally characterised the housing group. A similar view was 
echoed by a member of Sanford: 
 
When I first moved here, it was quite a different demographic of people. It has definitely changed in the time 
I’ve lived here. It’s got slightly less diversified in terms of the background and the ideologies people have… 
which is not necessarily a bad thing. It means that if you’ve got more people that share more similarities 
then it’s easier to function together. From my personal perspective, it did make it more interesting to move 
into a place with more people I might never know in any other situation. Social background, ideology, 
people’s politics, and world view… I think now, maybe this is all my perception, but it’s definitely more left 
wing and people are perhaps slightly more middle class. [T. from Sanford]  
 
Another theme of diversity, which mirrors class, was ethnic representation in the mutual housing 
groups. It is worth noting that only two interviews were conducted with people who would self-
identify as Black, Asian, Minority Ethnic (BAME), while the other interviewees were white – 
usually Anglo-European: 
 
People-wise, to begin with, they were white, middle class, teachers and people who needed a place to live, the 
sort of people that would squat… [At one meeting the Chair] said ‘Look, we really should be more diverse 
and reflect [the surrounding community]. We’ve got to do this, it looks bad, it is bad, it's wrong, it looks 
bad on us, we need to do it’ and we did, and we went out with an absolute [purpose], took a lot of 
nominations and we have a pretty good cross-section now. [B. from GUHC] 
 
It was noticeable that in most groups there was a predominance of white members. However, it 
is important to emphasise that, in terms of most themes of diversity, including gender, age, class 
and ethnicity or race, each mutual housing group had its own unique representation as well as its 
contextual composition. In the case of Backdoor, located in a very ethnically diverse 
neighbourhood, its members tended to be younger and international, reflecting more the 
friendship networks and the type of housing available, rather than the local community: 
 
It's the type of housing that is available as well ... we do short term and short let, so it is better for students…. 
we’re certainly incredibly diverse, and we're still quite cheap. [S. from Backdoor] 
 
201 
 
As an older group, GUHC had been founded by a group of young and predominantly white 
people and has been changing over the last ten years. Sanford, mainly composed of young people, 
is more mixed. In both cases, the ethos of the group and the networks formed by the housing co-
operative members reflect the demographic of the area. One group that was particularly aware of 
the challenges of working with a multi-ethnic membership was East London CLT:  
 
As a genuinely representative local effort… it’s very difficult. We’ve got people who speak Sylheti translating 
some of our stuff and there’s consideration if we have a party to celebrate stuff that there’s no alcohol. So, 
we can try as much as we can to encourage it. Last when we had a big party to celebrate putting in the bid, 
about 200 people were there and we started it with Iftar, basically breaking the fast to encourage people to 
come. [T. from ELCLT] 
 
The intentional efforts carried out by this CLT’s organisers are similar to the experiences of 
community engagement at Brixton Green, now Somerleyton Trust. The structure of each mutual 
housing group would ideally be influenced by the wider community in that particular area, as well 
as by the internal group ethos and the ways in which people gain access to housing within the 
group – the latter either through friendship networks, local housing lists or an application process, 
which are all opportunities for the values of the group to be reinforced. 
 
The theme of gender was explored through interviews in both evaluative and reflexive ways. Some 
interviewees mentioned that, within their group, “[gender] inequality was a bit taboo” and “it was 
something people were scared of mentioning” [#8 from GUHC]. Wanting to dispel some of the 
preconceived ideas of the egalitarianism inherent in co-operatives, the same interviewee said that, 
in the beginning, “it wasn’t egalitarian at all and it still isn’t, which I don’t understand” [#8 from GUHC]. 
The same interviewee felt that the most important issues for her were having a voice and being 
able to articulate views. When asked about the gender issue within the same group, a male group 
member said: 
 
We've got males and females, [and in terms of involvement] definitely there's never been a problem there. 
From the beginning, this was a squat, so you’ve got none of that [sic]… and let there not be because the 
male would never chance me; if he tried to become an alpha male around here, there's plenty of alpha male 
around here. Not that there’s no problems at all, no. But there’s respect, diversity, definitely. [B. from 
GUHC] 
 
The co-operative’s own awareness and ability of individuals to evaluate or reflect on the gender 
issue clearly varied between genders. For example, in Backdoor, a female member commented on 
the gender split and differences between them on a policy towards partner membership of the co-
operative: 
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There is a fifty-fifty balance, although perhaps more men than women. There are debates, and that comes 
out in issues where one member wants to bring a partner, and they are made half-member – this has applied 
usually to women. But when women have wanted to bring a partner then it’s a different story… [with much 
more discussions] [T. from Backdoor] 
 
One story of interest from a gender perspective concerned the reverse problem – with a male 
interviewee raising issue with the overwhelming involvement of women in the co-housing group: 
 
There was a big imbalance between genders, so there were predominantly women, particularly in terms of 
the driving force and then some of the men that did get more deeply involved felt this predominance and I 
know a couple of them who got involved in a committee and in the decision-making process and began to 
feel they were not being listened to, their views were being dismissed… [And now] the imbalance is even 
bigger – there were sixteen women to three men [at the last meeting]. I think that the overwhelming 
predominance of [women] – the gender imbalances – is something I wouldn’t want to live with. [G. from 
Woodside] 
 
This perspective might not have considered how there may well be structural reasons and issues 
faced by women, especially among the older generations, which lead them to seek mutual housing 
solutions more than men. This was particularly reflected in the Local Authority position regarding 
the Older Women Co-housing project, when objections were raised (indirectly) on similar 
grounds.  
 
It is important to consider a gender perspective within mutual housing, both for how ‘everyday 
life’ is conducted in these spaces as political sites where belonging and rights are explored 
(Beebeejaun, 2017), and also how these can be spaces that are created where women need not be 
subordinate or equal, but can fully express their difference, as in the case of OWCH. These are 
considerations that have not necessarily been made explicit by all groups but are sometimes 
reflected upon through the interviews and in governance statements (LCHC for example).  
 
The issue of inclusion, recognition of difference and the subsequent relation between policy and 
reality, relates back to the formation of practices of governance (Chapter 8), where micro-practices 
and rules evolve as practices of relationality. Thus, although groups might espouse equality and 
diversity, their reality is different. However, the knowledge and capacity to change their 
governance practices can also be a way in which to improve diversity issues.  
 
Finally, it is important to distinguish between internal diversity issues and ones that exist at a wider 
level in society. Whether mutual housing groups represent a fairer way of organising the 
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distribution of housing is a problematic question, but what is attempted in this section is to explore 
how both gender and diversity issues could influence the way groups manage and evolve their 
governance, but also how these are issues that also underpin co-operation with mutual housing 
groups. 
 
 
9.5 Conclusion 
 
Some of the overarching themes that emerged from the empirical work were presented in this 
final chapter of analysis. The first section explored the idea of community from the perspective 
of mutual housing members, including their own sense of how community within the mutual 
housing group is created, is changed, and their perceptions of its future. The theoretical aside here 
involved an exploration of how to move beyond the communitarian conundrum – or the ‘tyranny 
of community’ (Joseph 2002) – since any sense of community is bounded by both an inclusionary 
and an exclusionary movement. This echoes Field (2017, p.111), who makes a distinction between 
‘community’ as outward-looking, and providing open access to resources, and ‘communal’ as 
inward-looking and with limits on the access to resources controlled by the group. This can be 
applied to mutual housing groups too and community becomes the means to exclude as well as 
include. Mutual housing groups have a range of ownership models that display this range of 
exclusion. Co-housing is probably the most exclusionary, since most examples examined rely on 
private capital (see Chapter 7 on Finance). In contrast, the Community Land Trust model is, at a 
governance level, the most inclusionary or outward looking. Furthermore, ‘community’ is not a 
static notion, but a changing and relational one:  
 
[The] community thing is so important. Because I don’t have much of a family, my friends are my family. 
There are people here who aren’t friends, but I’ll stay. On occasions I left… obviously now I came back 
and now can’t imagine leaving. Here I have a sense of history – my grandparents – we’re all from here. I 
wouldn’t invite everyone to a party (but) there’s still [a] strong sense of community. [#11 from GUHC] 
 
This changing and relational sense of community is also related to particular aspects of knowledge 
needed within the mutual housing groups. Both technical and social knowledge are needed, and 
this also includes forms of trust that are cultivated within the group. The changing sense of 
community is also connected to the changing sense of self that emerged in some interviews, both 
as a reflection of the individual’s sense of themselves within the mutual housing group community 
and also as a form of self-knowledge. These were some qualitative and personal aspects that were 
explored as they affected the crafting of governance institutions for mutual housing. The sense of 
self was usually mentioned in relation to living and being involved in the mutual housing group 
and its daily routines of management, as well as the longer-term effects on people living there. 
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And a final qualitative aspect touched upon was related to diversity issues, including age, class, 
ethnicity or race and finally gender. These were all qualitative issues worth unpacking, as they were 
elements with which to understand better how co-operation works within the context of 
governance institutions for mutual housing, but also how individuals themselves understand their 
experiences of living in mutual housing.  
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Chapter 10 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
[Urban society] is an ongoing social practice, an urban practice in the 
process of formation... this practice is currently veiled and disjointed... 
it possesses only fragments of a reality and a science that are still in the 
future. It is our job to demonstrate that such an approach has an 
outcome, that there are solutions to the current problematic. 
 (Lefebvre, 2003, p.17) 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
The central concern of the research was to explore the internal governance of mutual housing 
groups and the forms of governance practices that evolved within them. The research questions 
developed during the research process as a result of using both an inductive and reflexive process 
(see Chapter 4) and included a pilot phase of interviews with mutual housing group members, 
archival research and attendance at mutual housing group meetings. The interview material not 
only captured some important themes in relation to the set-up, management and future of mutual 
housing groups, but also some of the subjective elements of peoples’ experiences in the set up 
and running of mutual housing groups. The empirical material revealed how groups have dealt 
with the main problems they faced, which primarily centred around the groups’ relationship with 
land, of financing their projects, the daily practical governance of the groups and finally, how these 
experiences have in turn shaped the people involved, their subjectivities and identities. 
 
The interviews confirmed the extent to which members of these groups are aware of the historical 
and even utopian traditions that weave through the contemporary experiences of mutual housing 
in London (see Coates, 2001; Miles, 2007). As detailed in Chapter 2, the traditions which are 
explicitly echoed in the experiences of contemporary mutual housing groups included the co-
operative tradition of more than 170 years ago, influenced by the Co-operative Principles from 
the Rochdale Pioneers; the subsequent rise of philanthropic or charitable housing, and then 
municipal housing; the Garden City movement, with a financing model based on the capture and 
share of the uplift in land value. During the post-war period a second wave of housing co-
operatives emerged in the 1970s, rooted in an awareness of land scarcity, unequal distribution of 
housing and of rising housing values relative to incomes. There were also the changing socio-
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cultural norms regarding, for example, communal living arrangements and property ownership. 
In parallel with these trends there have been the housing rights movements, including the 
squatting campaigns, important in the early development of the second wave of housing co-
operatives, as revealed in the cases examined (see GUHC in Chapter 5). Straddling utopian desires 
and practical needs people’s own experiences, have evolved from the myriad of everyday micro-
practices. The narratives of these everyday practices provided the important empirical 
contribution to understanding the history and contemporary experiences of mutual housing, and 
their governance.  
 
Most people interviewed had initially joined mutual housing groups for very practical reasons, 
rather than having been motivated by a deeper historical awareness or ideological zeal. For most, 
such housing presented an opportunity for cheap rent, while others were more concerned with 
their age and creating a suitable, supportive environment for their future. Many people were 
simply coping with living in an expensive and difficult city, in terms of accessing housing. Personal 
and subjective motivations shaped the groups’ governance practices, which, in turn, also shaped 
the individuals’ lives: many were able to pursue their own projects and be musicians, educators, 
activists and researchers, as well as become nurses, teachers, actors and writers.  
 
Although mutual housing groups operate in a small institutional niche within the wider provision 
of housing in London, each experience of the mutual housing groups was important in revealing 
something about the nature of co-operation and mutualism. The cases were examples from across 
a spectrum of models that evolved during the twentieth century and, as was shown in Chapter 2, 
these encompassed short-life and fully mutual housing co-operatives, co-housing schemes, and 
Community Land Trusts. The groups were analysed from the perspective of individuals involved 
in the governance and management of such housing models, and as such interviews were able to 
capture particular and subjective narratives. These were explored through looking at the members’ 
perceptions of the way in which their group’s governance institutions had been crafted, and the 
analysis revealed common themes. These themes included a group’s access to land or assets and 
to finance, the development of their own governance practices and institutions, and some 
important other aspects of mutualism considered to be more subjective, singular and unique to 
the experiences of individuals in mutual housing governance.  
 
The final discussion that follows summarises the empirical findings on the governance institutions 
of mutual housing, considering the theory of governance as collective action as developed by 
Ostrom et al. first explored in Chapter 3. The empirical and theoretical contributions made to the 
understanding of governance institutions as applied to the provision of mutual housing, lead onto 
a discussion of collective action in the context of mutual housing governance as a form of 
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commoning. The chapter concludes by outlining some possible policy implications, and avenues 
for further research. 
 
 
10.2 Summary of research approach and key findings 
 
To understand the governance institutions for mutual housing, a theoretical framework was 
developed and then applied to case studies selected from a typology of mutual housing groups. 
The typology was based on understanding the process through which mutual housing is created 
through the moments of provision, including accessing land and finance, design and construction, 
ownership and use, and management. The framing of the mutual housing groups through this 
structure of provision allowed for a typology to be built for a range of models of mutual housing: 
from housing co-operatives through to Community Land Trusts (see Fig.2 in Chapter 2).  
 
The structure of provision (Ball et al.) was therefore used instrumentally as a way of structuring 
the process for the different mutual housing types – housing co-operative, co-housing and CLT 
– and as a way of typologising only for the instrumental task of establishing the structural 
differences between the mutual housing models, and from there coming up with possible case 
studies for the comparative analysis. Therefore, the Structure of Provision approach remained 
very subsidiary in importance and relevance for the main theoretical and empirical contribution 
of the thesis, which is principally and primarily centred on developing the work of Ostrom et al. 
in order to understand the particular institutions for governance within the mutual housing 
groups, and look at the groups’ particular responses to the problem of collective action when 
considering mutual housing as a form of commons – a shared resource for a  bounded group 
which establishes its own rules and practices for the removal and allocation of resource benefits.   
 
The theoretical framework developed to look at the experiences of mutual housing groups in 
crafting their own governance institutions was based on Elinor Ostrom’s work on governance 
institutions for managing natural resource commons (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). Her work evolved in 
response to two theoretical sources – Hardin’s work on the Tragedy of the Commons (1968) and 
Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action (1971) – both of which emphasised the view that “unless the 
number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special 
device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will 
not act to achieve their common or group interests” (Olson, 1971, p.2). Ostrom saw that there 
were also widespread experiences of groups managing a commons successfully. The genealogy of 
the governance of ‘commons’ is traced in Chapter 3, beginning in the pre-capitalist, feudal 
practices of commoning with shared rights to common land (Linebaugh, 2008; Thompson, 1991; 
Neeson, 1996). During the latter part of the twentieth century scholars began looking at the 
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environmental management of common pool resources. This new institutionalist school, 
associated in part with Ostrom and her followers, saw the management of commons through the 
lens of economic institutions, based on empirical work on groups’ experiences based on mainly 
natural resource commons. Ostrom derived eight principles for managing a commons successfully 
(see Fig.3 in Chapter 3), which was elaborated on to create a theoretical framework used in the 
research (see Fig.6 in Chapter 3).  
 
The different scholarship around the commons, that draws on the writings of Marxist historians 
of pre-industrial period, industrialisation and capitalism (Linebaugh, 2008; Thompson, 1991; 
Neeson, 1996), highlight the dialectical process of enclosure and commons (Blomley, 2008; De 
Angelis, 2007; Jeffrey, McFarlane, & Vasudevan, 2011). These Marxist scholars also developed 
the concept of ‘immaterial commons’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009; Roggero, 2010; Caffentzis and 
Federici, 2014), which did find a parallel in Ostrom’s work when she studied knowledge as a form 
of commons (Hess and Ostrom, 2011).  
 
It is acknowledged that viewing mutual housing as a commons is problematic but viewing it as 
such has theoretical and empirical advantages. Housing is intuitively perceived either as a private 
resource for dwellers or residents, or as a public resource if provided by the State. It certainly does 
not lend itself to being shared in the specific way that a community centre, a park or other forms 
of urban commons might be (see Stavrides, 2016). Field and Layard point out that “housing, even 
communal housing, is not a public good as classically understood” (2017, p.111). Hodkinson 
(2011, 2012) discusses public housing as a commons in order to frame the impact of social housing 
restructuring, emphasising the emergence of a new form of enclosure of public goods. In this 
thesis, the governance framework used by Ostrom in situations of collective action to manage 
commons is considered applicable because mutual housing depends on collective action for its 
governance institutions.  
 
The research sought to understand how mutual housing governance institutions were crafted by 
the people involved. Although the actual homes – the bricks and mortar – might be individually 
lived in or shared – as in a shared house – the decision-making and governance is a collective 
action problem. Interviews with group members involved in the governance of mutual housing 
groups demonstrated that there were, indeed, practices of commoning taking place which were 
qualitatively like the crafting of institutions of collective governance. People who were not 
particularly active participants in daily governance, such as those not involved in committee 
meetings or with specific roles (free-riders, in economic terms), still demonstrated an awareness 
of the mutual aspects of living together and the necessary reliance on one another – a crucial 
element in mutualism. 
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The governance institutions rooted in everyday micro-practices are also a result of broader 
institutions of land, finance, and planning policy. Thus, the theoretical framework used as the 
basis for interviews (see Chapter 4) was modified to develop the analytical framework. This 
included the broader categories of assets (including land or property), finance, governance and 
aspects of mutualism, which became the basis for the discussion in the empirical chapters 
(Chapters 5-9).  
 
The case studies were introduced in short descriptive passages (see Chapter 5) before the main 
body of empirical work, which considered the housing group’s property, land or assets, exploring 
the three aspects of how groups accessed their assets, what they did with them, and what they 
conceived to be the future (see Chapter 6). In terms of accessing land or property, most groups 
had first to identify their site. The access was usually then based on the group’s ability to create 
the necessary strategic relationships, including through campaigning, and the establishment of 
partnerships with housing associations, developers and/or other local community groups. 
Campaigning pervaded most experiences. In some cases, the campaigns address specific local 
demands: for example, the defence of local housing that occurred through squatting during the 
early days of the housing co-operative movement (Vasudevan, 2017). GUHC, for example, used 
squatting as a way of tackling planning blight in East London, which was also linked to the anti-
road protests in the early 1970s. In other cases, they were addressing pan-London issues by linking 
up with broad citizen-based campaign groups across the capital (i.e. ELCLT and their strategic 
links with London Citizens organisers). This stage of finding land, of campaigning and developing 
strategic relationships, was found to be part of the building of a group and its governance 
institutions.  
 
Once established, the groups were then able to choose what to do with their assets, and the 
ownership of their properties not only allowed them to refurbish and build their homes, but also 
meant they could innovate, especially in terms of develop and implement environmental and 
sustainability measures – such as, eco-boilers, car-sharing, and energy efficiency. The case studies, 
divided as they were between older and contemporary examples, provided valuable insights into 
recent challenges and how current groups were tackling them, especially regarding members’ 
concerns about environmental efficiency, affordability, workspace flexibility, and allowing for 
mixed-tenure schemes. The distinctions between old and new emphasised the diverging forms 
and plurality of models of mutual housing groups that have emerged in the last forty years, 
possibly as a process of hybridisation (see Fig.7 in Chapter 8).  
 
Regarding the future of the groups, some are hopeful and can look beyond their own groups’ 
plans and indeed, for example, have proposals to support other groups setting up. However, there 
are generalised concerns about the changes to housing and social policy, and the likely pressures 
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that will arise from the use of Right to Buy and the cutting back of public subsidies, grants as well 
as housing benefits that had, in the past, been important in supporting the establishment and 
maintenance of groups. Unfortunately, the mutual housing groups are not autonomous or 
insulated from the pressures on housing and welfare in society. Such pressures are mostly financial 
but there is also a strong awareness of the changes that happen within the groups. This point 
echoes the work of Satsangi (2014) who notes, in relation to the experiences of CLTs in Scotland, 
how their particular challenges change according to the age and status of the group (McIntosh, 
2004; Satsangi, 2009; Skerratt, 2013). The long pre-purchase and build phases requires confidence 
and perseverance on the part of the group during its formation. During the five years (or more) 
following purchase and/or build, the groups’ skills in financial, legal, organisational management 
and governance develop. Their success thereafter depends on an ability to innovate, maintain the 
community buy-in and pursue external networking (Satsangi, 2014, p.125). In summary, the 
research found that access to land formed a crucial part of how the mutual housing groups were 
governed. The difficulty of accessing land, especially in the heavily speculative land market 
environment, that exists in London and the south east of England, has been an important barrier 
for the establishment of mutual housing groups.  
 
The chapter on finance (see Chapter 7) grew out of the research analysis. All groups needed to 
access funds during their early foundational stages, sometimes before they had even found land 
or property. Some older groups (i.e. Sanford Housing Co-operative) who are now coming to the 
end of their mortgage repayments, are finding ways of supporting the establishment of newer 
groups. However, relationships with financial institutions, such as banks, are still difficult, partly 
because of the banks’ limited institutional understanding of mutual housing and partly because, 
more generally, such lenders do not like supporting organisations such as new mutual housing 
groups which lack business and management track records.  
 
The discussion on finance and its impact on governance within groups also included description 
of new models for raising capital (for example, rootstock and loan stock mortgage support) and 
new forms of tenure (such as MHOS – the mutual home ownership schemes, for example). This 
confirms existing literature on community-based financial tools. For example, the MHOS 
developed by LILAC (Low Impact Living and Community) the co-housing project based in 
Leeds, was based on a rent linked to salary or ability to pay (Chatterton, 2013). Other examples 
of alternative financial models include index-linked mortgages (used in Canadian co-operative 
housing), or the formation of secondary co-ops to deliver shared services. Participating in 
meetings of South London housing co-operatives during the pilot phase of the research work 
highlighted the efforts housing co-operatives were making in finding models for sharing skills and 
services. They were subsequently able to form the South East London Co-operative Forum to 
negotiate and contract collective services, and eventually form a local management co-operative, 
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similar to the one formed in Liverpool by a group of housing co-operatives (NW Housing 
Services, 2016).  
 
New forms of tenure also serve to change the understanding or perception of the ownership ideal. 
This is being experimented in the form of co-operative mutual retirement homes (Brenton, 2013) 
or in student co-operative housing in Sheffield, Birmingham and Edinburgh (SSHC, 2013). A shift 
in the ideal of home ownership is also related in the research to the way in which mutual housing 
enables a range of housing decommodification, which may be temporary or more long-term. 
Partial forms of decommodification can depend on the ownership structure of the assets: the rent 
can be pegged to income (such as within a MHOS); the length of tenure (short-life co-operatives, 
which are low rent but generally have low security tenures); can include the role of volunteering 
and sweat equity; or the removal of land from the market through legal instruments such as a trust 
(i.e. a CLT).  
  
The core issue of governance within mutual housing groups was explored, beginning with the 
groups’ micro-practices of governance (see Chapter 8). The micro-practices include the meetings 
used to run the mutual housing groups (summarised in Fig.15 in Chapter 8); the roles that 
individuals have within the mutual housing groups; the criteria for membership; the ways that 
people become involved; and, the more performative aspects of governance, particular to 
individual groups, such as talking and listening practices, consensus-based decision making, and 
dealing with conflicts and risks.  
 
The second half of Chapter 8 examined a key aspect within Ostrom’s framework of understanding 
institutions for collective action: Understanding how rules are created and changed within the 
groups. Despite similarities between the groups, the interviews revealed that the uniqueness of 
each group’s rules directly reflected the group’s experience. The process of developing their rules 
and their own practices is part of the group’s own knowledge of how to live in a mutual way, 
through their own institutions of co-operation and their practices of ‘commoning’.  
 
The final empirical chapter (see Chapter 9) explored the aspects of mutualism that emerged that 
were considered important for the understanding of governance institutions: namely the 
formation and change in community, the knowledge and skills needed, and issues of diversity and 
gender. The concept of community is explored from the perspective of people within the housing 
groups, regarding the creation of their community, how it had evolved and their ideas for its 
future. Echoing some of the narratives that were explored around land (Chapter 6), the chapter 
goes on to look at particular forms of knowledge within groups, including skills and trust. The 
chapter concludes with some consideration of aspects of living together, which are useful 
additions to Ostrom’s institutional framework because they concern the more subjective aspects 
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of understanding institutions within mutual housing. The accounts reveal how members perceive 
changes in themselves as a result of mutual housing; how identity issues of gender, age, class and 
ethnicity are addressed in mutual housing groups; and which all offer key reflections on the 
broader concept of mutualism, and hence on the practices involved in commoning.  
 
 
10.3 Significance and application 
 
A new institutionalist lens was used to look at mutual housing and current mutual housing 
practices that form part of the attempts to find alternative housing solutions to those offered by 
the private or public sectors. Not all cases were radical from an ideological perspective, nor were 
they all deeply democratic projects (see Chapter 5). The research does reveal, for example, that 
mutual housing, despite the more hagiographic chronicles, can be beset by issues of democratic 
control and accountability. For example, distinctions were observed between the mutual housing 
groups with regards to their degrees of ‘community’ (outward-looking, providing open access to 
resources) versus their ‘communality’ (inward-looking, with limitations on access to resources) 
(see Field & Layard 2017, p.111). The following sections will explore further the empirical and 
the theoretical contributions of the research.  
 
 
10.3.1 Empirical contribution 
 
The main empirical contributions were around understanding the context and details of the 
internal governance of mutual housing. The context was explored through the narratives of 
people’s own experiences in London include those of identifying available land, developing 
necessary partnerships and their attempts to find ways of decommodifying property through 
mutual housing. These insights from the London cases add to literature from other parts of the 
UK, i.e. Liverpool (Thompson, 2015), the Midlands (Lang and Mullins, 2014), and Scotland 
(Satsangi, 2009), as well as country studies such as on Germany (Hamiduddin and Gallent, 2016) 
and Austria (Lang and Novy, 2014), or more comparative international studies (Moore and 
McKee, 2012), all of which offer particular spatialised accounts that are rooted in diverse historical 
and institutional settings.  The focus on London sheds light on the particular constraints and 
challenges faced by mutual housing in accessing land and finance, and also contributes to the 
broader literature on housing in the context of this city (for example, see Bowie, 2010; Edwards, 
2016). Furthermore, the London-based fieldwork, along with the wider literature review lead to 
broadly generalised and justified conclusions about the state of mutual housing governance.  
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The importance of developing partnerships with external organisations, such as housing 
associations, has been noted by other scholars, especially for CLTs (Moore, 2016). However, there 
has been rather less work on the contribution of housing association partnerships to the 
development of co-housing and other mutual housing models. For example, the study of the 
experience of Backdoor in this thesis illustrates how members of a short-life housing co-operative 
are highly dependent on short-term leases from housing association property. In fact, these co-
housing models needed support from other external organisations, including developers and local 
authorities. Thus, the accounts provided in this work add to the broader understanding of the 
dynamics of the innovative partnerships that are needed, as well as the risks that groups face when 
partnering with larger institutions where their control over governance and decision-making is 
reduced. Indeed, in such situations, they may well lose all control, especially in matters concerning 
land use and development proposals (such as the experiences of OWCH, Brixton Green and 
Woodside in particular).  
 
The financial aspect of mutual housing has been explored by others in theoretical and practical 
ways (Conaty et al., 2003; Chatterton, 2013, 2014; Lambert, 2012b). Empirically, the actual 
experiences of mutual housing groups in managing their own finances – collecting rent, accruing 
enough for their subsistence and survival – and accessing initial capital in setting up their group 
and acquiring property have been less studied. The difficulties of groups in relation to financial 
institutions and banks, was noted in most cases. In addition, due to the nature of the cases (with 
two cases focussed on older people’s housing), the research shows considerable evidence of the 
importance and potential of so-called ‘grey equity’, when coupled with downsizing. In the cases 
of both OWCH and Co-housing Woodside, the grey equity available served as an important 
source for their primary capital. This finding confirms other research on the potential of senior 
co-housing (Glass, 2012, 2009; Brenton, 2013; Scanlon and Arrigoitia, 2015; Labit, 2015), where 
“older people in the UK have an estimated £1000+ billion in un-mortgaged equity and 60 per 
cent of older households live in family-sized accommodation” (Brenton, 2013, p.17).  
 
Other important aspects of finance include the potential for different forms of crowdfunding. 
This can apply at the initial stages of a project, as the mutual housing group begins its site surveys, 
group building workshops, and plan and partnership development. It can also apply to finding 
ways in which accrued funds from long established groups can be gathered together in a financial 
vehicle which supports new mutual housing groups. There is evidence that groups formed some 
time ago (see the older cases in Chapter 5) are now finding themselves occupying valuable assets. 
Mortgages have either been paid off or running costs are low, and two of the groups interviewed 
have been actively supporting other groups in an ad hoc way. At some of the meetings attended 
during the fieldwork, discussions were being held at the wider mutual housing movement level – 
for example, at the AGMs of the London Federation of Housing Co-operatives and the 
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Confederation of Co-operative Housing. In these cases, the groups have been exploring the 
possibility of formalising the potential of this equity to leverage and support new mutual housing 
groups. This demonstrates that new financial tools are being imagined and discussed. Lastly, the 
unpaid work of volunteers throughout the mutual housing experiences was evident in most 
interviews. This sweat equity is difficult to quantify in financial terms but as a process reveals the 
voluntary nature of the governance institutions within mutual housing, and thus, how they are 
part of the decommodification of housing.  
 
In terms of governance, it was found that the success of the group is fundamentally based on 
forms of learning through involvement. Interviewees either tended to be heavily involved in the 
governance processes within their group or had at some point been involved and had decided to 
step back. Their narratives provide an important empirical contribution to the field of governance 
studies and to the understanding of micro-practices within groups. It was clear that time was 
required to develop group dynamics and shared, collective knowledge, not only to develop the 
group’s rules, to explore feedback loops of behaviours and find effective ways of negotiating 
conflicts and reaching decisions, but also to develop trust within the group, in this context 
considered as a form of group knowledge (see Section 9.3.2). 
 
The empirical contributions of the final chapter included some specific aspects of mutualism 
worth highlighting. The interviewees’ understanding of their community emphasised the phases 
of growth during set-up, the changes to the idea of community and their perceptions regarding 
the future of the group. While the accounts of individual members tended to express the ethos of 
the group, they also provided reflections on the group’s relationship with the surrounding area 
and the broader community. Some important empirical contributions were provided on the issue 
of diversity and, in particular, gender. The active promotion by women (in OWCH for example) 
and the preponderance of women in organising the groups, which created some forms of 
resistance from individual male members of the groups as well as local authorities, showed a lack 
of understanding of the particular demands and creative impetus which went into forming these 
particular groups. The next section explores the theoretical contributions of the research.  
 
 
10.3.2 Theoretical contribution 
 
The thesis sets out to understand the governance institutions of mutual housing and, through this, 
to understand better the nature of property that is not necessarily public or private (see Section 
3.4.3). Blomley (2004) explores this in his work on the politics of urban land, where he elaborates 
a critique of property. The ownership model fails to make sense of the multiple meanings and 
moralities of urban property. As Blomley argues, “private, individualised property is not the only 
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form of estate. Rather than the setting for social life, property emerges as a site for moral and 
political ambiguity, contest and struggle” (Blomley, 2004, p. 152). Although the dominant 
ownership model seems determinate, contained and bounded, there is a diversity of tenurial 
arrangements where the basic ‘bundle of rights’ can be unpacked and contested. For instance, the 
‘bundle of rights’ approach to property can include the right to exclude others, the right to sell or 
alienate the property when the owners choose, the right to profit, and the right to enjoy the 
property. 
 
Mutual housing, as a form of collective ownership of property, attempts to “disaggregate 
alienation from the bundle of rights associated with ownership, while retaining most of the 
traditional benefits” (Blomley, 2004, p. 16). Therefore, the forms of mutual housing explored in 
the empirical work (especially in Chapter 6, on land) are of collective groups making claims over 
property that are different to private claims. Mutual housing is not an open-access commons.  
Building on the work of the critical property theorists, it can be seen as a form of limited common 
property: “Property held as a commons among the members of a group, but exclusively vis-à-vis 
the outside world” (Rose, 1998, p.132). The mutual housing models described (see Chapter 5) 
further complicate this definition as they occur within a range of property rights. In addition, there 
is the unpaid labour involved in creating the value of the property. Therefore, the cases 
demonstrate how a range of the possible ‘bundle of rights’ over use, development, control and 
sharing of asset-value can exist within the different models of formal ownership and legal 
structures. Mutual housing groups have developed as a hybrid of individual and collective 
arrangements for ownership, management, control – and in the creation of value.   
 
Framing mutual housing in this way helps us understand how land and property can be 
decommodified, for instance, limited equity restrictions can be put in place by housing co-
operatives because of their fully mutual status, or CLTs can separate land lease value and 
individual house values. There is also the value contributed through sweat equity and volunteering 
that remains within the mutual housing as a collective and is not necessarily allocated to 
individuals. These are all forms of partial decommodification. Another way in which (partial) 
decommodification occurs can be through linking rental values to income, as in the MHOS model, 
where “linking housing value to national earnings rather than house prices erodes housing as a 
speculative commodity that can be bought and sold according to the vagaries of market 
conditions” (Chatterton, 2016, p.408). Thus, the decommodification is another way in which 
mutual housing fosters a sense of common, rather than private ownership and points towards “a 
housing commons that can increase stability in housing markets and reduce volatile local 
economies” (2016, p.408).  
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There is also the challenge to address affordability in housing can use models such as Community 
Land Trusts, housing co-operatives, and co-housing – through a collective property model. Such 
models can, in theory, be used to lower individuals’ costs for housing based on the disconnection 
of property or land value from the tenure and ownership arrangements involved. One example is 
short-life housing co-operatives, where occupants who do not own the flats or have any rights, 
apart from short-term leases, but still derive value from the collective use of the properties (see 
Backdoor, Chapter 5).  
 
The ‘bundle of rights’ metaphor for property, or ‘bundle of entitlements’ (Singer 2000) can also 
be repackaged as a ‘bundle of values’. Similar to the other discrete attributes of property, value 
can be divided and reallocated to some degree, independently of the more formal attributes of 
ownership and usership in property. There are echoes of this within commercial real estate 
practices (e.g. percentage leases in the US or turnover lease in UK). In the case of collective 
property, the capture of increased value is managed for the benefit of the community, which 
members spoke about during interviews. Therefore, the thesis has contributed to producing 
evidence for a new theorisation of property and value (see Geisler and Daneker, 2000) that 
understands the governance of mutual housing as a distinct form of collective, common property, 
enabling the sharing of a certain ‘bundle of values’ provided through mutual housing.  
 
The thesis explores, mainly in Chapter 7, the micro-practices of governance within the mutual 
housing cases. Starting from the institutional perspective of Ostrom, understanding institutions 
of governance through the experiences of people involved in the management of mutual housing 
served to break down and understand key characteristics of governance for each of the models of 
mutual housing groups. The thesis developed a theory of institutions of governance of mutual 
housing, focussing on their micro-practices. These included meetings, the roles of members of 
the groups, how people join and become involved in the group, the more qualitative aspects of 
the micro-practices, such as talking and listening techniques, consensual decision-making, ‘anti-
burnout’ training or ‘feelings’ meetings. The thesis then explores specific rule-making activities – 
the experiences of rule creation and rule changing.  
 
Much of Ostrom’s work focusses on breaking down the concept of rules and their attributes 
within the arena of action, including rules relating to position, boundary, choice, aggregation, 
information, payoff, and scope – all of which are the regulatory rules that define the “attributes 
of participants who are obliged, forbidden, or permitted to act (or affect an outcome) under 
specified conditions” (Ostrom, 2005, p.187). The thesis adds a descriptive thickness to this system 
of institutional analysis used to classify group rules using subjective experiences to add a qualitative 
element to the theory of institutional governance used in Ostrom’s and other new institutionalists’ 
work on managing common resources. Thus, position rules are explored in Section 8.2.2 on roles 
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within groups; boundary rules are explored in Section 8.2.3 with reference to joining the groups; 
and choice rules correspond to involvement, as discussed in Section 8.2.4. Therefore, a first broad 
theoretical contribution of this thesis has been to apply Ostrom’s theory to the study of mutual 
housing.  
 
The second contribution has been to add a qualitative element to the structural and mechanistic 
approach for which Ostrom’s work has been criticised (Fine, 2010). In experimental laboratory 
conditions, solutions to collective-action dilemmas can include face-to-face talking to develop 
joint strategies and increase trust and reciprocity (Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2010, p.219). 
However, when this is translated to field-based studies, with the large number of contextual 
variables that influence collective action, including micro-situational conditions, the group size 
and heterogeneity, as well as contextual and macro-conditions, such as market pressures, property 
rights and government policies etc., it can seem that “few if any variables influence collective 
action in a uniform manner” (ibid. 2010, p.219). The challenge to theory is how to allow for this 
complexity and contingency without losing sight of patterns that apply to multiple cases. The 
approach in this research has been to draw out patterns of governance at the micro-situational 
level and carry out an analysis of micro-practices through the qualitative and subjective realities 
of the mutual housing group members’ narratives.  
 
A distinction emerges in all the cases between formal and informal rules. All groups have formal 
rules – as defined by their constitutions, rules for members, policies and other official documents 
– which they developed and adapted over the years. Institutional formality is subsumed within a 
larger set of rules, which are informal, evolving as they do through practice. In some cases, these 
are in the process of being officially documented, a process which occurs every few years (see 
GUHC or Sanford). Other, newer, groups have either not yet elaborated official policy documents 
or, if they have, they will need to be revised as their practices evolve. The informal rules which 
groups operate under are known by members and acquired through practice and usage – the daily 
heuristics of living together. As Poteete et al. point out when considering the assumptions of using 
a behavioural theory of human decision-making in dilemma settings, “actors use a variety of 
heuristics in making daily decisions that may approximate maximisation of net benefits (for self 
and others)” (2010, p.223). How these heuristics translate into field situations is one of the 
theoretical contributions in this work (see Chapter 9, in particular Sections 9.3 and 9.4). 
 
There is a range of roles within groups. There are the roles that require a higher level of knowledge 
and responsibility for everyday decision-making, with such members regularly involved in 
management decisions, to those roles for members who are less involved. Thus, the problem in 
groups is not so much one of the ‘free-rider’ dilemma but more related to degrees of knowledge 
and skills, including abilities in the heuristics of everyday decision-making and governance. Key 
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to the process of governance is also the role of trust, which can be seen as a form of knowledge 
(see Section 9.3.2). The centrality of trust was not noted by conventional theorists of collective 
action. However, more recent studies have begun to explore the importance of trust, observing 
quite predictably, that co-operation in micro-situations and with broader contextual variables 
being stable, depends on the levels of trust that, in turn, affect levels of co-operation. “At the core 
of an evolving theoretical explanation of successful or unsuccessful collective action is the internal 
link between the trust among participants… and the increased probability that all participants will 
use reciprocity norms” (Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2010, pp.226–227). Trust is seen here as 
necessary for knowledge, developed alongside particular group skills needed for holding meetings, 
listening, negotiating, addressing risks, and the other aspects of living together (see Section 9.4).  
 
Another broader theoretical contribution of this thesis has been an attempt to bridge the literature 
on institutional approaches to managing commons and the neo-Marxist school around 
commoning. The latter is based upon an understanding of the commons that is in dialectic tension 
with the process of enclosure, and that sees mutual housing as a political activity developing 
progressive, everyday social practices and crafting institutions that can promote more co-operative 
forms of social life, including spaces of communal belonging and commoning. However, the tools 
to materialise these commons include understanding the institutions at the micro-situational and 
macro-contextual levels – tools which can be derived from an institutional approach to 
understanding and managing commons.  
 
It is worth reiterating at this point that the structure of provision approach was used only to define 
the provision of the different models of mutual housing and derive from this the spread of case 
studies (see Chapter 2). Case studies were found to be grouped in two distinct timeframes: those 
that have existed since the 1970-80s and were well-established groups; and those cases that are 
more contemporary examples, and which have evolved during the time frame of the fieldwork, 
or essentially over the last five years. This posed a number of challenges at a methodological level, 
primarily with regards to the continuity of cases, but also in terms of creating a typology which 
allowed for the mutual housing cases to be examined together (see Section 4.7 on Methodological 
challenges). The more recent cases were of groups in the process of being created, as most of 
them had begun to form at the time that the research began. This resulted in the interviews being 
conducted with group members who were significantly uncertain about their own future. 
However, they were able to provide useful reflections as the projects progressed. The cases chosen 
therefore represented groups that were all quite distinctive, and which spanned more than forty 
years of mutual housing experiences in London, yet they all had significant commonalities for 
governance, as I have shown above. 
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10.4 Policy implications 
 
There are a number of useful policy implications that arise from the work in the thesis and which 
largely correspond to the empirical chapters on land, finance, governance and the organisational 
aspects of mutualism. Regarding the search for land for mutual housing, there are increased 
pressures on land supply and prices. The potential for land reform in England, as in Scotland 
(Satsangi, 2009, 2011; Wightman, 2000; Bryden and Geisler, 2007), although unlikely politically, 
can offer new ways in which community-led organisations can own and manage their own assets. 
Particular pressures on land occur in cities, especially London, where the challenges for change, 
or indeed resistance to change, is high. Financial incentives or instruments, such as forms of land 
value taxation, could be adapted to create funds to support community-led and mutual housing 
projects or decouple land values from land use to promote some forms of decommodification of 
land.  
 
The implementation of various recent planning laws, such as the Localism Act 2011, Self-build 
and Custom Housebuilding Act 2015, and Housing and Planning Act 2016, could help support 
more mutual housing, but this would need to be made more explicit in policy formulations at local 
authority levels and at a London-wide level. Current support seems to be tokenistic and hard-
pressed local authorities are risk averse and generally unwilling to dispose of assets through an 
alternative model of management or indeed, control. They also have limited institutional capacity 
or knowledge to promote community-led mutual housing. In summary, more government 
support is needed, and could focus on making more land or properties available for mutual 
housing schemes.  
 
Regarding finance, as revealed during the research interviews, there is clear potential for new 
financial instruments could be developed to support mutual housing. These could also be based 
on crowdfunding models or the collective strength of building societies as they used to be, for 
example. In policy terms, decommodifying housing through mutualism can influence the 
separation of equity in real estate from rent, through both the CLT and MHOS models. The latter 
can influence a more important decoupling between rent and property values by pegging rent to 
incomes rather than fictitious land values. As the anarchist planner, Colin Ward (1990, p.34) 
writes, “It should be possible to operate some kind of usufruct, some kind of leasehold with 
safeguards against purely cynical exploitations, which would enable people to house themselves 
and provide themselves with a means of livelihood, while not draining immense sums from central 
or local government”. Of course, this would have an impact on mortgages and rents, as well as 
new developments and housing investment, in general.  
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Grey equity funds could be used more to develop mutual housing for older people who, in some 
cases, might wish to live in mixed, intergenerational communities. With the right policy 
framework, grey equity could be used to finance downsizing and pay for social care needs. The 
interviews with older people involved in setting up new mutual housing groups raised this as a 
possibility but noted the lack of financial instruments to enable them to use their equity within 
the long time-frames of the mutual housing development process. Banks and other financial 
institutions could offer long term ‘patient capital’ or temporary, short-term collateral for the 
development phase of projects.  
 
An important policy implication that emerges from the governance chapter concerns the need for 
training and support. This could include training in group dynamics, consensual decision-making, 
and the development of other governance tools for mutual housing groups, including co-
operatives (Lambert, 2012a). Policies aimed at making such tools more available would also be an 
important contribution to the sector, particularly in the case of people outside the mutual housing 
groups in the broader organisations that provide support and on which new mutual housing 
groups will depend in the future. However, it would be unjust on the groups studied if I were to 
end with the conclusion that an external authority needs to allow more of these groups to happen. 
Ultimately, it is these groups of people, through acts of commoning and developing practices of 
crafting their own governance institutions, that will enable more mutual housing groups to emerge 
successfully in the future; through their example, their survival and success, they can demonstrate 
the possibility and potential for these and other models of dweller-controlled mutual housing to 
flourish.  
 
 
10.5 Further research 
 
Further research topics that could be conducted on the basis of the work carried out in this thesis 
include building on the main themes explored, such as land, finance and governance, as well as 
possible co-research to be conducted with groups seeking mutualisation of housing or other 
services. While this research focussed on the micro-situational and contextual modes of 
governance, comparative studies of micro-practices of housing management in different contexts 
– different cases, in other cities, regions, or indeed in other countries – using similar methods of 
in-depth interviews and workshop settings would offer some insights into the different roles of 
land, finance and governance in mutual housing where the external contexts are very different. 
The methodology can be used to understand the external context, as well as to explore the more 
qualitative and subjective nature of governance for better understandings of the micro-practices 
of everyday governance, the roles and involvement of people, and in particular, their knowledge 
and skill formation.  
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The full impact of such planning policy instruments, such as the Localism Act 2011 and the 
Housing and Planning Act 2016, on mutual housing provision and building has yet to be seen. 
Already as part of the Self-build and Custom Housebuilding Act 2015 local authorities are required 
to help find land for those who have an interest in building their own homes (Wilson, 2015). 
Through a Right to Build Register, local authorities now have a statutory mandate to keep a list 
of people or groups who would like to join a co-housing project or community-led housing. Local 
authorities in England are supposed to ensure there are enough serviced plots available to meet 
demand, to be assessed by the number registering for the Right to Build. Of course, London’s 
relatively high costs and low land availability will make these developments problematic. However, 
the Mayor of London has recently announced the inclusion of a Community-led housing Hub to 
support amongst other housing models, more mutual models too.  
 
Another important topic of research would be to could look at estate-wide regeneration schemes 
and how mutualisation can be used as a way of contesting regeneration proposals and proposing 
alternatives led by residents, as used by Walterton and Elgin Community Homes (WECH) or 
through the Right to Transfer, as West Ken Gibbs Green and other community groups are doing 
as part of a community-led social housing regeneration programme (Lees et al., 2014). Further 
research could focus on the sociological aspects of changes in living arrangements. The cases of 
older people’s involvement in mutual housing development could stimulate research into older 
people’s housing compared to inter-generational mutual housing. Gender and other diversity 
aspects, which were touched on only briefly in the research, should be explored further.  
 
The structure of provision approach which was used in Chapter 2 only as a tool with which to 
develop a typology of mutual housing, can be returned to and developed further to understand 
the ways in which the provision of mutual housing can be improved, sustained or encouraged in 
a more systematic way. In particular, focussing on the relational aspects that are needed to build 
up successful mutual housing support institutions. The main body of the thesis has focussed on 
internal governance within the different mutual housing groups, but attention can be paid to the 
more structural demands made on both the production and consumption of mutual housing 
through the different models (see Fig.2 in Chapter 2). Further  research can also draw from 
research into the financialisation of housing, its commodification, and the attempts to move away 
from supply-side solutions: “The reasonable expectation of families to benefit from the 
investment potential of housing has to be acknowledged but then balanced with an appreciation 
of its central role in providing shelter, stability to individuals, families and communities, and long-
term social opportunity” (Gallent, Durrant and May, 2017). The greater inclusion of mutual 
housing options could lead to a shift in the form that demands are made, for example.  
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The housing crisis, touched on in the opening words of the thesis, clearly cannot be solved 
through mutual housing, but it can be a significant part of the mix. The research furthermore 
highlighted how the housing crisis, or the challenges of housing is not necessarily just a supply 
side issue. The two opening empirical chapters – on land and finance – demonstrate clearly how 
the current conditions of housing provision are social, political and economic constructs. Indeed, 
the deeper question of how these constructs are shaped can touch on the issue of power and how 
that is shaped by the practices and institutions that establish both the mainstream responses and 
the alternatives, including mutual housing. Recalling the exploration of governmentality in section 
3.4.1, further research could be carried within the vein of uncovering the counter-
governmentalities within mutual housing and how these can indeed shape the wider housing 
models used, especially in the cities of the UK and beyond.  
 
In Foucault’s work on governmentality, he explores the way in which power relations are not just 
repressive or constraining, but they are generative. They change both the material forms of 
existence but also social identities. This productive dimension, which in section 3.4.1 is referred 
to as the counter-governmentalities of power, allows and enables the individual and collective 
experiences, promoting new forms of knowledge and practice. (Lemke 2011) As Foucault stated: 
“Power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.” 
(Foucault 1977: 194) Thus, using this productive aspect we can see how new models of mutual 
housing can effectively begin to redefine the relationships people have to property for example, 
and incorporating forms of sharing and of communality into the everyday. As Lemke (2011) 
points out, Foucault argued (2008: 91-95) that a (real) socialism has not been able to invent an 
“autonomous governmentality” and this would be a worthwhile trajectory to take the research in, 
extending the notion of governmentality into our understanding of the dynamics and institutions 
of co-operation.        
 
There is also scope for critical legal research to frame the provision of other resources beyond 
housing, such as energy, food production or distribution, and other forms of infrastructure, 
including social infrastructure. Promoting the research of collective production and consumption 
(Castells, 1985; Mayer, 2006), seems all the more urgent now, in a time characterised by the 
deepening hegemony of neo-liberalism, accompanied by austerity, a paucity of public finances and 
the fragmentation of State-market provision of basic services. New avenues for community-led 
research and solutions are now needed more than ever. Scholars have been looking at these 
prefigurative practices of post-capitalist transitions (Chatterton and Pickerill, 2010; Gibson-
Graham, Cameron and Healy, 2013; Chatterton, 2016). Research is needed in this autonomous 
and counter-normative vein, and the use of the institutionalist approach developed in this thesis 
can help understand what governance transitions are happening or can be supported, at different 
scales, through different actors and in different timeframes. With this research based on mutual 
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housing framed as a form of commons and its interest in the way people craft governance 
institutions for self-management, more research can be conducted into the materialisation of new 
urban commons, their collectivities, and their governance (see Stavrides 2016; Borch and 
Kornberger 2015).  
 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this research was to understand how mutual housing groups have crafted their 
institutions to respond to the challenge of collective governance. In order to do this, the different 
models of mutual housing were described through a typology of groups (Fig.2) focussed on 
London (Fig.7). The creation of the mutual housing groups and the challenges for their set-up 
and survival were examined, along with the forms of collective governance that resulted from 
their experiences.  
 
To understand the institutions of governance within mutual housing groups, a theoretical 
framework was constructed, beginning from Ostrom’s work on governance of commons and 
more broadly on the practices of ‘commoning’ from other commons researchers (Figures 3-5 in 
Chapter 3). This allowed for the framing of a series of questions and analysis of the responses of 
the narratives from mutual housing members involved in the management and governance 
processes within groups (Fig. 6 and Appendix A). Their responses were explored in four empirical 
chapters, which offered a more detailed analysis of the differences between mutual housing 
groups’ experiences and offered a series of qualitative answers to the main research question. 
 
The research therefore offers a fourfold explanation of how mutual housing groups use formal 
and informal institutions to overcome the problem of collective through self-governance. First, it 
is argued that mutual housing groups need access to land to be created and become established. 
However, the difficulties of finding land are manifold. Groups have usually, but not exclusively, 
accessed public land following a period of research, alliance building, the establishment of 
partnerships and campaigning, all of which can be seen in terms of a group’s strategic relational 
action. This period of activity forms an integral part of their formation as a group, the 
development of their governance structures and the development of internal practices, 
importantly seen to be a form of knowledge-building. The forms of tenure that the groups have 
on the land or property influence their governance arrangements, mainly due to the decisions they 
make as a group concerning the allocation, management and use of their housing. The forms of 
tenure also influence the individuals’ roles in the groups, although no direct correlation was found 
between tenure uncertainty and the members’ participation in governance.  
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Secondly, the mutual housing groups need access to finance, to be able to build or buy the land 
or property for their mutual housing. The models for financing vary depending on the equity the 
group can access, either as individuals or collectively. Access to ‘grey capital’ for example, was 
crucial for the older people’s co-housing projects. In addition, the amount of capital needed was 
also related to the amount of ‘sweat equity’ or volunteering which the groups carry out to build, 
maintain and manage the property. The relationship a group has with finance is again dependent 
on its strategic relationships, and the access they have to necessary knowledge and skills. Finance 
was also found to be a way for mutual housing groups to support other groups, although there 
are very few formal structures in place for that to happen in a more systematic way, which is 
something umbrella groups are beginning to experiment with. 
 
Thirdly, while the governance institutions developed internally by the groups were specifically 
tailored and crafted in unique ways, some commonalities emerged in terms of the forms of rule-
making and rule-changing to ensure collective governance. The role of leaders was understood by 
members as important and necessary. Although experiments in decision-making took place, many 
groups needed to face pragmatic governance decisions, which meant that the groups distributed 
leadership activity through specific roles and committees. Social-bonding, however, was integral 
to the governance institutions in various forms – from shared activities, shared spaces, shared 
values and norms – which made up a conjunctural set of micro-practices to ensure group 
cohesion. Particular knowledge was highlighted that was needed for collective governance, which 
includes listening and talking skills; additionally, specific informal institutions for conflict 
negotiation were observed in most groups, both old and newer ones.  
 
Finally, knowledge was an important aspect of mutualism, highlighted by the specialisation needed 
that emerges out of participation and involvement in management activities. Trust as a form of 
group knowledge was also considered important, as well as a knowledge of community, which 
was not linked by shared values or a shared ethos necessarily, but shared needs. These defining 
features of the institutions for the governance of mutual housing allowed for a better 
understanding of how groups are formed, the variety of groups, and the forms of collective 
governance. These can support not only the practical-realistic need for planning and policy making 
for better housing, but also support the more utopian-idealist project of finding ways for self-
management to permeate into new spaces in the city and the crafting of mutual institutions for 
the creation of new forms of commons.   
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Appendix A: Interview schedule 
 
The role of historical, social and cultural contexts:  
How did the mutual housing group emerge?  
Who owns the land and how has the access to land affected the group? 
Who were the people or actors involved in the set-up of the mutual housing group? 
What have been the major changes through its time? 
What important social and cultural elements are there to the group? 
Awareness within the group of history of the group 
 
Understand the role of internal institutions: 
What is the size of the mutualised housing?  
How many people are members?  
How is membership defined? 
How often are meetings held? 
How many sub-groups are there and what’s their role i.e. committees, sub-committees, working 
groups, meetings? 
 
Understand the role of external institutions: 
What are the external conditions, requirements, relationships? 
What are the relationships with other mutual housing groups? 
What are the links to local authority, and to other organisations? 
Are there any particular links to secondary organisations or umbrella organisations? 
What are the modes of financing the mutual housing project? 
How have the finances affected the group? 
 
Understand the specific rules and norms for governing the mutualised housing group: 
What are the general rules? And what are the rules per sub-group? 
What are the rules around the practical running of the housing on a day-to-day basis?  
What rules are written, and which rules are not?  
What involvement do members have in defining the rules? 
What shared activities take place? 
What other examples of forms of sharing take place? 
Are there different levels of involvement, and what are they? 
Do people change when living there and what does this depend on? 
What are the sorts of conflicts that arise? 
What are the ways to resolve conflicts – i.e. methods of arbitration, negotiation, conflict 
resolution? 
What data is there about finance, housing allocations, other internal matters? 
How are housing maintenance priorities negotiated? 
How are decisions made about revenue? 
What decisions are made about the future? 
How do you see the future of the group? 
 
Understand what the procedures are for changing the rules and norms: 
How are rules changed? 
How is membership of the housing organised?  
How is participation and involvement ensured? 
Are diversity considerations made? 
What are the sources of innovation within the group or where do new ideas come from? 
What different skills are there in the group? 
What is the role of leaders and roles of different people in the group? 
What different groups have there been? 
What works and what doesn’t work in terms of decision-making within the group? 
What are the influences from outside the group which have affected how the group is run? 
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Understand how monitoring, enforcement, incentives and punishments are used to keep 
rules and norms:  
How are rules monitored and how are they enforced?  
What forms of management are there? 
What are the techniques or practices for enforcement? 
Is there ever any need for any forms of exclusion? 
What support is there for people in the group? 
What forms of incentives are there to get involved, adopt the rules and share norms? 
What incentives are there to support and change norms? 
 
Understand how knowledge is shared and how trust is developed within the group: 
What are the main trust-forming activities? 
What forms of group sharing, education or training happens? 
What other forms of sharing occur?  
What effect is there from the density and design of the layout of mutual housing? 
What is the role of the communal spaces? 
What relationship is there outside of the mutual housing group i.e. with the neighbourhood or 
community? 
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Appendix B: List of codes per theme developed during analysis 
 
1 {ASSETS} 
1.1 Narratives 
1.2 Land_access 
1.3 Land_use 
1.4 Finance 
1.5 Land_future 
 
2 {PEOPLE} 
2.1 MicroPracticeGovernance 
2.2 Rule_create 
2.3 Rule_change 
2.4 campaigns 
2.4 Community_create 
2.5 Community_change 
2.6 Community_future 
2.10 conflicts 
2.10 risk 
2.11 knowledge and skills 
2.12 trust 
2.13 co-operation 
2.14 sharing 
2.15 commons 
2.16 gender and diversity 
 
3 {PROCESS} 
3.1 government 
3.2 partnerships 
3.3 umbrellas 
3.4 othermutuals 
3.5 otherorgs 
3.6 housing policy 
 
4. {METHODS} 
4.1 interviewing 
4.2 reflecting 
4.3 analysis 
4.4 references 
 
5. {INFO} 
5.1 interview_contacts 
5.2 Interview_date 
5.3 Interview_mutualgroup 
5.4 Interview_name 
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Appendix C: Participants and interview details 
Interviews conducted – code used in text, participant, role in mutual housing organisation and 
date of interview 
 
Code Participant Role Date of interview 
M. from FDT 
Marc O’Hagan, Fulham 
Development Trust Director of Trust 2nd June 2012 
T. from ELCLT ELCLT Director 6th July 2012 
O. from Locality 
Anne Marie Naylor 
Locality Head of Assets 10th July 2012 
D. from Locality Dave Chapman, Locality Head of Policy 11th July 2012 
Nick Bailey Westminster University 
Professor of 
Regeneration 12th July 2012 
T. from RR Radical Routes 
Director and co-op 
facilitator 15th July 2012 
M. from CCH Blase Lambert, CCH Chief Officer 22nd August 2012 
I. from CLTN 
Catherine Harrington, 
CLT Network National Director  7th September 2012 
N. from Sanford Sanford Co-op Member and resident 6th December 2012 
H. from CNUK 
Jo Gooding, Co-housing 
Network UK National Director 18th December 2012 
S. from Brixton 
Green Brixton Green Ex-Board member 23rd January 2015 
C. from LCHC LCHC Board member 15th December 2015 
T. from Backdoor Backdoor Housing Member and resident 3rd February 2016 
T. from Sanford Sanford Co-op Member and resident 4th February 2016 
A from GUHC GUHC Member and resident 11th February 2016 
S. from Brixton 
Green Brixton Green Board member 11th February 2016 
C. from LCHC LCHC Board member 13th February 2016 
S. from Backdoor Backdoor Housing Member and resident 16th February 2016 
M. from Backdoor Backdoor Housing Member and resident 17th February 2016 
B. from GUHC GUHC Member and resident 19th February 2016 
I. from GUHC GUHC Member and resident 19th February 2016 
C. from OWCH OWCH Member and resident 1st March 2016 
P. from GUHC GUHC Member and resident 3rd March 2016 
F. from Woodside Co-housing Woodside Ex-member 10th March 2016 
M. from BHC 
Brixton Housing Co-
operative Member 11th March 2016 
D. from Backdoor Backdoor Housing Member and resident 14th March 2016 
J. from Woodside  Co-housing Woodside Member 12th April 2016 
W. from Woodside Co-housing Woodside Member 12th April 2016 
C. from LCHG 
London Co-operative 
Housing Group  Co-ordinator 9th June 2016 
J. from LCHG 
London Co-operative 
Housing Group Co-ordinator 10th June 2016 
Iain Clark 
Yellow Brick Housing 
Co-operative Founder director 13th June 2016 
David Gilles 
Co-founder of CDS and 
Sanford Housing co-op Co-founder  5th December 2016 
Grand Union 
Housing Co-op:  
Oral history tapes 
(#2, #8, #9, #11) GUHC Past members From around 2004 
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Appendix D: Consent form used 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniel Fitzpatrick 
Bartlett, UCL 
d.fitzpatrick@ucl.ac.uk 
 
Consent Form for research project 
Mutual housing in London 
 
 
Dear ___________ 
 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed. By signing this letter, you are consenting to voluntarily 
participating in my research by being interviewed. The interview will take around 60 minutes. There may be 
the need for a follow-up interview which can be conducted by telephone.  
 
I will ask you a series of questions about your organisation’s history, your role in your organisation, on the 
factors for success and challenges faced by your organisation and your relationship with other organisations.  
 
You are free to decline any questions which you do not wish to answer. Furthermore, if at any time you 
wish to end the interview and leave, you are free to do so. If you agree to the interview, you will be recorded 
for transcription purposes only.  
 
All information that is shared in the course of the interview is kept strictly confidential. Your name 
will not be associated with the information you share in any of the analysis or in the final write-up 
of the report if you so wish. The information you provide will only be used for the purposes of this 
study.  
 
Level of anonymity – do you consent to the following?  
(If you do not tick then I am assuming that you decline, and I will anonymise all the information from this 
interview) 
 
Can I reveal your name? 
  
Can I reveal the name of your organisation? 
 
Can I reveal the location of your organisation?   
 
Would you like to read a copy of the transcript to comment? 
 
Would you like to read a copy of the final report? 
 
 
The information you share will be written up in a PhD thesis and in papers for publication in academic 
journals and in online material (blog or online papers). You will not be identified in any of the publications 
if you so wish.  
 
I agree to take part in the study described above: 
 
Name:       
 
Signature: 
 
Date:  
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Appendix E: Legal forms and asset locks 
 
Summary of the key features of different legal forms of organisations, including asset locks on 
property. 
 
 
Legal Form Do 
members 
have 
limited 
liability? 
Governing 
document 
Can it 
issue 
shares? 
Can it pay a 
return on 
shareholding?
Does it have 
to register 
with a 
shareholding 
body? 
Is it 
suitable 
for 
charitable 
status? 
Does it 
have an 
asset 
lock? 
Partnership No Deed No No No No No 
Associations No Constitution No No No, unless a 
charity 
Yes No, 
unless a 
charity 
Trust No Deed No No No, unless a 
charity 
Yes No, 
unless a 
charity 
Limited 
Liability 
Partnership 
(LLP) 
Yes Agreement 
or Deed 
No No Companies 
House 
No No 
Company 
Limited by 
Guarantee 
Yes Articles No No Companies 
House 
Yes No, 
unless a 
charity 
Company 
Limited by 
Shares 
Yes Articles Yes Yes Companies 
House 
In the past No, 
unless a 
charity 
Community 
Interest 
Company 
(Limited by 
guarantee) 
Yes Articles No No Companies 
House & CIC 
regulator 
No Yes 
Community 
Interest 
Company 
(Limited by 
shares) 
Yes Articles Yes Yes - subject to 
cap 
Companies 
House & CIC 
regulator 
No Yes 
Charitable 
Incorporated 
Organisation 
Yes Constitution No No Charity 
Commission 
Yes Yes  
Industrial & 
Provident 
Society  
(Bona fide 
co-operative) 
Yes Rules Yes Yes Financial 
Services 
Authority 
No No 
Industrial & 
Provident 
Society 
(Society for 
the benefit of 
the 
community) 
Yes Rules Yes Yes Financial 
Services 
Authority 
Yes Yes, 
optional 
 
[Source: Co-operatives UK 2016, p.29) 
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Appendix F: References of Parliamentary Acts 
 
Housing, Town Planning, &c. Act 1919, c.35. Addison Act 
Housing (Financial Provisions) Act 1924, c. 35, Wheatley Act 
Housing Act 1930, c.39, Greenwood Act 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965, c.12 
Housing Finance Act 1972, c.47 
Housing Act 1974, c.30 
Housing Act 1980, c.51 
Housing Act 1988, c.50 
Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993, c.28 
Housing Act 1996, c.52 
Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, c.51 
Companies Act 2006, c.46 
Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, c.17 
Localism Act 2011, c.20 
Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012, c.3 
Self-build and Custom Housebuilding Act 2015, c.17  
Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014, c.14 
Housing and Planning Act 2016, c.22 
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